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Chapter 1
Abstracts
High-Frequency Trading in Limit Order Markets: Equilibrium Impact and Regu-
lation
Jakub Roj£ek and Alexandre Ziegler
Abstract
We investigate the impact of high-frequency trading (HFT) on market quality and investor welfare using
a dynamic general limit order book model. We ﬁnd that while the presence of HFT always improves
market quality under symmetric information, under asymmetric information this is the case only if
competition between high-frequency traders is suﬃciently strong. While HFT does not negatively
impact investor welfare, it reduces the welfare of slow speculators. The ﬂexibility of the model allows
investigating the eﬀect of the main recent regulatory initiatives designed to curb HFT on market
quality and investor welfare. We consider minimum resting time rules, cancellation fees, transaction
taxes, rebate fee structures, and speed bumps. While some of these regulations lead to improvements
in a number of market quality measures, this generally does not translate into higher welfare for
long-term investors. Rather, the main eﬀect of such regulations is to generate wealth transfers from
high-frequency traders to slow speculators. These regulations therefore appear inadequate to enhance
investor welfare in the presence of HFTs. Of the diﬀerent measures, transaction taxes are the least
harmful; while they reduce welfare roughly by the amount of the tax, they do not signiﬁcantly worsen
market quality. The common practice by exchanges of granting rebates to limit orders is detrimental to
market quality and investor welfare, causing both higher eﬀective spreads and longer execution times.
Keywords: High-frequency trading, Regulation, Market quality
JEL classiﬁcation: G14 · G28 · C63 · C73 · D82
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Price Impact of Aggressive Liquidity Provision
Ramazan Gençay, Soheil Mahmoodzadeh, Jakub Roj£ek and Michael C. Tseng
Abstract
This paper analyzes brief episodes of high-intensity quotes turnover and revisionbursts in quotes
in the U.S. equity market. Such events occur very frequently, around 400 times a day for actively traded
stocks. We ﬁnd signiﬁcant price impact associated with this market-maker initiated event, about ﬁve
times higher than during non-burst periods. Bursts in quotes are concurrent with short-lived structural
breaks in the informational relationship between market makers and market takers. During bursts,
market makers no longer passively impound information from order ﬂow into quotesa departure from
the traditional market microstructure paradigm. Rather, market makers signiﬁcantly impact prices
during bursts in quotes. Further analysis shows that there is asymmetry in adverse selection between
the bid and ask sides of the limit order book and only a sub-population of market makers enjoys an
informational advantage during bursts. Our results call attention to the need for a new microstructure
perspective in understanding modern high-frequency limit order book markets.
Keywords: Price Impact, Burst, High-Frequency Trading, Market Quality, Adverse Selection
JEL classiﬁcation: G14 · G28 · C58.
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A Model of Price Impact and Market Maker Latency
Jakub Roj£ek
Abstract
Price impact measures the diﬀerence between the best quoted price and the realized price as a function
of order size. This paper analyzes how price impact depends on the latency that a market maker is
subject to. I propose a tractable model which allows incorporating both order size and latency eﬀects
as determinants of price impact. The model is solved analytically and is novel in the theoretical
microstructure literature. Larger latency increases adverse selection costs to the market maker and
reduces his probability of trading with a slow investor. A larger order size decreases the slow trader's
outside option, making him susceptible to accept a worse price for his trade. It is shown that the
ﬁrst-order eﬀect of increased latency and increased order size is to increase price impact. Their joint
impact is also positive. When the probability of trading is taken into consideration, the utility of the
slow institutional investor decreases with latency.
Keywords: Price Impact, High-Frequency Trading, Trade Size, Latency, Market Quality, Welfare
JEL classiﬁcation: D53 · G14 · C72.
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Hochfrequenzhandel in Limit-Order-Märkten: Auswirkungen auf das Marktgle-
ichgewicht und Regulierung
Jakub Roj£ek and Alexandre Ziegler
Zusammenfassung
Wir untersuchen die Auswirkungen des Hochfrequenzhandels (HFT) auf die Marktqualität und die
Wohlfahrt der Investoren anhand eines allgemeinen dynamischen Limit-Orderbuch-Modells. Wir
ﬁnden, dass die Anwesenheit von HFT unter symmetrischer Information die Marktqualität immer
verbessert. Unter asymmetrischer Information ist dies jedoch nur dann der Fall, wenn der Wettbe-
werb zwischen Hochfrequenzhändlern ausreichend stark ist. Während HFT das Wohlergehen der
Investoren nicht negativ beeinﬂusst, reduziert es das Wohlergehen langsamer Spekulanten. Die Flex-
ibilität des Modells ermöglicht es, die Auswirkungen der wichtigsten jüngsten Regulierungsansätze
zu untersuchen, welche erwogen wurden, um Hochfrequenzhandel zu begrenzen. Wir betrachten
Mindestruhezeitregeln, Stornogebühren, Transaktionssteuern, Rabattstrukturen und sogenannte
Bodenschwellen (Speed Bumps). Während einige dieser Regelungen zu Verbesserungen in einer
Reihe von Marktqualitätsmassen führen, ist dies in der Regel nicht mit höherer Wohlfahrt für
langfristige Investoren verbunden. Vielmehr besteht der Haupteﬀekt dieser Regulierungen in einer
Vermögensübertragung von Hochfrequenzhändlern zu langsamen Spekulanten. Diese Regelungen
sind daher ungeeignet, um die Wohlfahrt der Anleger beim Vorliegen von HFT zu erhöhen. Von
den verschiedenen Massnahmen sind Transaktionssteuern am wenigsten schädlich. Während sie die
Wohlfahrt ungefähr um den Betrag der Steuer reduzieren, verschlechtern sie die Marktqualität nicht
wesentlich. Die gängige Praxis vieler Börsen, Rabatte für Limit-Aufträge zu gewähren, reduziert die
Marktqualität und die Wohlfahrt der Anleger, indem sie höhere eﬀektive Geld-Brief-Spannen und
längere Ausführungszeiten verursacht.
Schlüsselwörter: Hochfrequenzhandel, Regulierung, Marktqualität
JEL Klassiﬁzierung: G14 · G28 · C63 · C73 · D82
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Die Auswirkung agressiver Liquiditätsbereitstellung auf Preise
Ramazan Gençay, Soheil Mahmoodzadeh, Jakub Roj£ek and Michael C. Tseng
Zusammenfassung
Dieser Artikel untersucht kurze Perioden, in welchen Gebote mit einer hohen Intensität auf dem US-
Aktienmarkt abgegeben und revidiert werden  sogenannte Bursts. Solche Ereignisse treten sehr
häuﬁg auf, etwa 400 Mal pro Tag für aktiv gehandelte Aktien. Diese durch Market-Maker initiierte
Ereignisse haben erhebliche Auwirkungen auf Preise, etwa fünfmal stärker als in anderen Perioden.
Zusätzlich sind diese Perioden mit kurzlebigen strukturellen Brüchen in der Informationsbeziehung
zwischen Market-Maker und Market-Taker verbunden. Während Burst-Perioden lassen die Market-
Maker Information aus dem Auftragsablauf nicht mehr passiv in ihre Gebote einﬂiessen, sondern bee-
inﬂussen die Preise aktiv  was eine Abkehr vom traditionellen Paradigma der Markt-Mikrostruktur
bedeutet. Nähere Analysen zeigen, dass eine Asymmetrie in der adversen Selektion zwischen der Kauf-
und der Verkaufs-Seite des Limit-Orderbuches besteht und nur ein Teil der Market-Maker einen In-
formationsvorteil während Bursts geniesst. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen die Notwendigkeit einer neuen
Mikrostruktur-Perspektive auf, um moderne Hochfrequenz-Limit-Orderbuch-Märkte zu verstehen.
Schlüsselwörter: Preisauswirkung, Burst, Hochfrequenzhandel, Marktqualität, Adverse Selektion
JEL Klassiﬁzierung: G14 · G28 · C58.
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Ein Modell von Preisauswirkung und Market Maker-Latenz
Jakub Roj£ek
Zusammenfassung
Preisauswirkung misst die Diﬀerenz zwischen dem besten angebotenen Preis und dem realisierten Preis
als Funktion der Auftragsgrösse. Dieser Artikel untersucht, wie die Preisauswirkung von der Latenz
abhängt, der ein Market Maker unterliegt. Es wird ein analytisches Modell vorgestellt, das sowohl die
Auftragsgrösse als auch die Latenz als Determinanten der Preisauswirkung erfasst. Das Modell wird
analytisch gelöst und ist in der theoretischen Mikrostrukturliteratur neuartig. Eine grössere Latenz
erhöht die Kosten der adversen Selektion für den Market Maker und reduziert die Wahrscheinlichkeit,
dass er mit langsamen Investoren handelt. Eine grössere Auftragsgrösse verschlechtert die Alternativen
des langsamen Händlers und veranlasst ihn, einen schlechteren Transaktionspreis zu akzeptieren. Es
wird gezeigt, dass Latenz und Auftragsgrösse die Preisauswirkung erhöhen. Ihre gemeinsame Wirkung
ist ebenfalls positiv. Wird die Handelswahrscheinlichkeit berücksichtigt, so reduziert Latenz den
Nutzen langsamer institutioneller Anleger.
Schlüsselwörter: Preisauswirkung, Hochfrequenzhandel, Auftragsgrösse, Latenz, Marktqualität,
Wohlfahrt
JEL Klassiﬁzierung: D53 · G14 · C72.
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Part I
Introduction
Chapter 2
Introduction and Summary of Research
Results
High-frequency trading emerged as a set of algorithmic trading strategies that focus on the ability
to react to new information faster than anybody else, or more precisely, faster than any other machine.
The relative speed advantage combined with the ability to process information allowed traders with
otherwise no intrinsic motives to trade to earn signiﬁcant proﬁts. The quest for a speed advantage led
trading companies to explore the absolute speed limits by investing immense sums in technological,
software, and communication development. The rise of trading machines competing on speed raised
questions of great importance to our society, whose economy in its core relies on an eﬀective and
eﬃcient allocation of capital. Is high-frequency trading good or bad for market quality? Does it make
spreads smaller and help narrow the distance between assets' fundamental value and their price faster?
Are execution costs higher because machines learn fundamental traders' trading intentions better?
Does the price impact of a large trade change with higher speed? Do unpredictable jumps in prices
emerge as an outcome of relative speed competition? Does the ability to change quotes at striking
speed lead to price manipulation? Should high-frequency trading be regulated, and if so, how? Would
that lead to welfare transfers among diﬀerent groups of traders? How can we make the markets serve
their purpose better?
This doctoral thesis entitled Market Quality and Price Impact of High-frequency Trading and Its
Regulation, aims at answering some of the above questions. It consists of three diﬀerent papers, which
utilize diﬀerent methodologies in order to answer a subset of the above questions.
The ﬁrst paper presented in Chapter 3, named High-Frequency Trading in Limit Order Markets:
Equilibrium Impact and Regulation, investigates the impact of high-frequency trading on market
quality and investor welfare using a dynamic general limit order book model. This is joint work
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with Alexandre Ziegler. The paper ﬁnds that while the presence of HFT always improves market
quality under symmetric information, under asymmetric information this is the case only if competition
between high-frequency traders is suﬃciently strong. While HFT does not negatively impact investor
welfare, it reduces the welfare of slow speculators. The ﬂexibility of the model allows investigating the
eﬀect of the main recent regulatory initiatives designed to curb HFT on market quality and investor
welfare. The paper considers minimum resting time rules, cancellation fees, transaction taxes, rebate
fee structures, and speed bumps. While some of these regulations lead to improvements in a number of
market quality measures, this generally does not translate into higher welfare for long-term investors.
Rather, the main eﬀect of such regulations is to generate wealth transfers from high-frequency traders
to slow speculators. These regulations therefore appear inadequate to enhance investor welfare in
the presence of HFTs. Of the diﬀerent measures, transaction taxes are the least harmful; while they
reduce welfare roughly by the amount of the tax, they do not signiﬁcantly worsen market quality. The
common practice by exchanges of granting rebates to limit orders is detrimental to market quality and
investor welfare, causing both higher eﬀective spreads and longer execution times.
The second paper presented in Chapter 4 is an empirical study and is entitled Price Impact
of Aggressive Liquidity Provision. It is joint work with Ramo Gençay, Soheil Mahmoodzadeh, and
Michael Tseng. In this paper, we analyze brief episodes of high-intensity quotes turnover and revision
bursts in quotesin the U.S. equity market. Such events occur very frequently, around 400 times
a day for actively traded stocks. We ﬁnd signiﬁcant price impact associated with this market-maker
initiated event, about ﬁve times higher than during non-burst periods. Bursts in quotes are concurrent
with short-lived structural breaks in the informational relationship between market makers and market
takers. During bursts, market makers no longer passively impound information from order ﬂow into
quotesa departure from the traditional market microstructure paradigm. Rather, market makers
signiﬁcantly impact prices during bursts in quotes. Further analysis shows that there is asymmetry
in adverse selection between the bid and ask sides of the limit order book and only a sub-population
of market makers enjoys an informational advantage during bursts. The paper's results call attention
to the need for a new microstructure perspective in understanding modern high-frequency limit order
book markets.
The last paper of this dissertation, A Model of Price Impact and Market Maker Latency, is
presented in Chapter 5. It provides an analytical model of price impact as a function of latency,
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which is the delay traders suﬀer and which can be thought of as the inverse of trading speed. Price
impact measures the diﬀerence between the best quoted price and the realized price as a function
of order size. The paper analyzes how price impact depends on the latency that a market maker
is subject to. It presents a tractable model which allows incorporating both order size and latency
eﬀects as determinants of price impact. The model is solved analytically and is novel in the theoretical
microstructure literature. Larger latency increases adverse selection cost to the market maker and
reduces the probability of trading with a slow investor. A larger order size decreases the slow trader's
outside option, making him susceptible to accept a worse price for his trade. It is shown that the
ﬁrst-order eﬀect of increased latency and increased order size is to increase price impact. Their joint
impact is also positive. When the probability of trading is taken into consideration, the utility of slow
institutional investors decreases with latency.
Each paper of the dissertation is followed by the related tables and ﬁgures. Proofs and supplemen-
tary theoretical results are given in the appendix. The cumulative bibliography of all three research
papers appears at the end of the thesis.
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Part II
Research Papers
Chapter 3
High-Frequency Trading in Limit Order
Markets: Equilibrium Impact and Regula-
tion
Jakub Roj£ek and Alexandre Ziegler1
Abstract
We investigate the impact of high-frequency trading (HFT) on market quality and investor welfare using
a dynamic general limit order book model. We ﬁnd that while the presence of HFT always improves
market quality under symmetric information, under asymmetric information this is the case only if
competition between high-frequency traders is suﬃciently strong. While HFT does not negatively
impact investor welfare, it reduces the welfare of slow speculators. The ﬂexibility of the model allows
investigating the eﬀect of the main recent regulatory initiatives designed to curb HFT on market
quality and investor welfare. We consider minimum resting time rules, cancellation fees, transaction
taxes, rebate fee structures, and speed bumps. While some of these regulations lead to improvements
in a number of market quality measures, this generally does not translate into higher welfare for
long-term investors. Rather, the main eﬀect of such regulations is to generate wealth transfers from
high-frequency traders to slow speculators. These regulations therefore appear inadequate to enhance
investor welfare in the presence of HFTs. Of the diﬀerent measures, transaction taxes are the least
harmful; while they reduce welfare roughly by the amount of the tax, they do not signiﬁcantly worsen
1We are grateful to Ronald Goettler for sharing his code. We have beneﬁted from the comments of Ramo Gençay,
Harald Hau, Christopher Hemmens, Soheil Mahmoodzadeh, Angelo Ranaldo, Michael Tseng, and of participants at the
Multi-Agent Simulation and Global Issues workshop at the University of Tokyo, the Swiss Finance Institute Research
Days in Gerzensee, and the University of Zurich. All errors and omissions remain ours.
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market quality. The common practice by exchanges of granting rebates to limit orders is detrimental to
market quality and investor welfare, causing both higher eﬀective spreads and longer execution times.
Keywords: High-frequency trading, Regulation, Market quality
JEL classiﬁcation: G14 · G28 · C63 · C73 · D82
3.1. Introduction
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) describes high-frequency trading (HFT) as one
of the most signiﬁcant market structure developments in recent years (SEC, 2010, p. 45). High-
frequency traders (HFTs) nowadays account for over half of the volume on many stock, futures and
options exchanges. After the Flash crash that occurred in May 2010, a controversy around the impact
of HFT on market quality arose in the public discussion, the academic literature, and among regulators
and exchanges. Of particular concern are the lack of knowledge about HFTs' strategies, their potentially
destabilizing eﬀect on markets in periods of turmoil, and the large volume of quotes not leading to
trades which HFTs submit to exchanges, so-called high-frequency spam.2
Concerns about the impact of HFT on the functioning of markets are not limited to the U.S. For
example, a new European Directive (so-called MiFID 2, 2011) identiﬁes speciﬁc regulatory and su-
pervisory measures necessary in order to adequately deal with the potential threats for the orderly
functioning of markets arising from algorithmic and high-frequency trading. HFT and make/take fee
structures  the practice common among exchanges of granting fee rebates to qualiﬁed market partici-
pants providing liquidity  are also among concerns listed in a consultation paper by the Committee of
European Securities Regulators (2010). While regulators have been mostly concerned about the impact
of HFT on market quality and the welfare of long-term investors, exchanges have been mostly worried
about high-frequency spam, as the practice has raised their infrastructure costs without leading to a
commensurate increase in trading volume.
The goal of this paper is to assess the impact of HFT on market quality and investor welfare and to
investigate the suitability of a number of regulatory measures that have been suggested to improve
market quality in the presence of HFT. These measures include a minimum resting time for quotes, the
2The term high-frequency spam refers to the practice of rapidly canceling and changing quotes without even changing
price and with no intention of executing, i.e. anticipatory strategies used to reveal liquidity and trade ahead of it
(Hunsader, 2011).
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imposition of cancellation fees when the ratio of quotes to trades exceeds a certain value, transaction
taxes, so-called speed bumps enforcing minimum delays between the time an order is submitted and the
time it hits the order book, and the use of make-take fees (or rebate fee structures) to provide HFTs
incentives to make markets.
In spite of the fact that little is known about the impact of these measures on market quality and
investor welfare, a number of them have been introduced in several countries either alone or in combi-
nation:
1. Minimum resting time or similar rules have been introduced in Europe and the U.S. The Eurex
options exchange imposes a minimum resting time for quotes as part of market maker obligations.
The European Parliament has enacted a requirement for HFTs to maintain their quotes for at
least half a second, and Italy has introduced a tax of 0.02% on orders that are cancelled within
half a second. In the U.S., minimum resting time requirements have been derived from FINRA
rule 5210, which requires quotes to represent bona ﬁde intention to trade. This rule has been
explicitly adopted by the NYSE and NYSE Arca in 2011 (see SEC 2011a, 2011b), and the CME
enacted a similar regulation in its rule 575 in 2014 (see CFTC, 2014).
2. Cancellation fees have been introduced by the Canadian regulatory authority IIROC with the
explicit aim of curbing high-frequency spam. The Milan Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ Stock
Market introduced an excess order fee for high quote-to-trade ratios in April and July 2012 (see
SEC, 2012). Cancellation fees are also imposed by Eurex for order-to-trade ratios exceeding 5,
on NASDAQ OMX for ratios exceeding 100, as well as on the German stock exchange. The new
MiFID2 European Directive also foresees the introduction of cancellation fees to curb excessive
quote-to-trade ratios.
3. Transaction taxes are currently imposed in roughly 40 countries globally and mostly serve to
ﬁnance regulatory activities related to the operation of ﬁnancial markets. The U.S. imposes
a ﬁnancial transaction tax of 0.0034%. The U.K. collects a stamp duty of 0.5%, but many
intermediary transactions are exempted. France introduced a ﬁnancial transaction tax of 0.2%
in August 2012, and Italy a tax of 0.12% in 2013. In January 2013, 11 European countries
approved the principle of a ﬁnancial transaction tax, but postponed its implementation until
mid-2016.
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4. Speed bumps have been introduced by NASDAQ OMX and by a newly founded exchange, IEX,
in October 2013. At IEX, the speed bump takes the form of a minimal physical distance between
clients' servers and the exchange's main server and is imposed on all orders. NASDAQ OMX
applies the speed bump to market orders only, presumably to encourage liquidity provision.
5. Make-take fees giving incentives to liquidity providers are used by numerous exchanges in North
America (NASDAQ, NYSA Arca, BATS Exchange, NSX, BATS Options Exchange, Boston
Options Exchange, International Securities Exchange, TSX) and Europe (Euronext, OMX ex-
changes, Chi-X). Many other exchanges, including the London Stock Exchange, XETRA and
SIX Swiss Exchange grant rebates to designated market makers or other signiﬁcant providers of
liquidity.
We assess the impact of HFT and of proposed regulations on market quality and investor welfare
using a uniﬁed framework based on the theoretical model of Goettler, Parlour and Rajan (2005, 2009).
Goettler et al. develop a theoretical model of a dynamic limit order market with strategic players and
asymmetric information and solve for Markov perfect equilibria numerically using an extension of the
simulation-based algorithm of Pakes and McGuire (2001) for complete information games. We conduct
our investigation by comparing the properties of market equilibria in diﬀerent settings, speciﬁcally
settings with HFTs to settings without HFTs, and settings where speciﬁc regulatory proposals are
implemented to settings where they are not. In addition to measures of market quality and overall
welfare, we investigate the impact of HFT and proposed regulations on speciﬁc groups of market
participants, namely long-term investors and speculators.3
We ﬁnd that the presence of HFTs improves most common measures of market quality. Speciﬁcally,
markets with HFTs exhibit narrower spreads, improved price discovery and higher depth. These results
hold without qualiﬁcation under symmetric information. When HFTs have an informational advantage
over slow traders, however, improvements in market quality arise only if competition between them is
suﬃciently strong. We also ﬁnd that HFT does not negatively impact investor welfare. However, it
leads to a reduction in the welfare of slow speculators, who are crowded out by HFTs.
We also ﬁnd that none of the proposed regulations consistently improves the welfare of long-term
investors. Admittedly, some of the proposed regulations do lead to an improvement in a number
3Consistent with the terminology in Goettler et al. (2005, 2009), we use the term speculator to denote a trader with zero
private valuation for an asset; hence the term includes HFTs.
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of market quality measures. For example, minimum resting time rules reduce trading costs under
asymmetric information, while speed bumps increase book depth and decrease spreads. However, none
of the improvements in market quality translates into higher welfare for long-term investors. Rather,
the main eﬀect of these regulations is to generate wealth transfers from high-frequency traders to slow
speculators. These regulations therefore appear inadequate to enhance investor welfare in the presence
of HFTs. Of the diﬀerent measures, transaction taxes are the least harmful; while they reduce welfare
roughly by the amount of the tax (a reduction that can be oﬀset by distributing tax proceeds back
to traders), they do not signiﬁcantly worsen market quality. Importantly, the common practice by
exchanges of granting rebates to limit orders is detrimental to market quality and investor welfare,
causing both higher eﬀective spreads and longer execution times.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides a short overview of the existing literature.
Section 3.3 describes the model and the solution methodology. Section 3.4 details our ﬁndings on the
impact of HFT on market quality and investor welfare, while Section 3.5 considers the eﬀect of proposed
regulations. Section 3.6 concludes. Technical aspects of the solution methodology are described in the
Appendix.
3.2. Literature Review
High-frequency trading has been a very active area of research in recent years, with the literature
focusing on three main questions: the impact of HFT on market quality and welfare, the nature of
HFTs' strategies, and the impact of potential regulations on markets.
Theoretical papers examining the welfare implications of HFT and its impact on other market partici-
pants have not reached a consensus on whether the eﬀect of HFT is predominantly positive or negative.
Jovanovic and Menkveld (2011) ﬁnd that the presence of HFTs has an ambiguous eﬀect on welfare.
Maollemi and Sa§lam (2013) show that the presence of HFTs imposes signiﬁcant costs on market
participants with higher latency. Along similar lines, Hoﬀmann (2014) ﬁnds that slow traders are left
with a smaller share of overall trading surplus because of their limited ability to avoid their orders
being picked-oﬀ. On the other hand, Aït-Sahalia and Sa§lam (2014) show that competition among
HFTs improves the welfare of slow traders and that volatility leads HFTs to reduce their provision of
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liquidity. Biais, Foucault, and Moinas (2015) establish that investment into fast technology may go
beyond its socially optimal level.
Theoretical results on the impact of higher trading speed on market quality are also inconclusive. Using
a model with endogenous information acquisition, Baldauf and Mollner (2015) show that an increase
in trading speed crowds out information acquisition and causes both a decrease in the bid-ask spread
and a deterioration in price eﬃciency. Menkveld and Zoican (2015) ﬁnd that the eﬀect of a reduction
in a stock exchange's latency on the bid-ask spread is ambiguous; whether market liquidity improves
or deteriorates is driven by the ratio of news traders to liquidity traders.
Several empirical papers document that HFTs improve market quality by providing the best bid-ask
spreads and contribute signiﬁcantly to liquidity and price discovery, and that HFT activity is not pos-
itively correlated with price and quote volatility (Brogaard, 2010, Hasbrouck and Saar, 2013, Riordan
and Storkenmaier, 2012, Conrad, Wahal, and Xiang, 2015, and Hasbrouck, 2015). Hendershott, Jones,
and Menkveld (2011) report that HFTs improve liquidity and enhance the informativeness of quotes,
but their presence also decreases the depth of the order book and increases the costs of executing
large orders. Taking execution costs into consideration, Tong (2015) measures the execution shortfall
of institutional investors and ﬁnds that HFTs increase transaction costs for them. While it has been
found that HFTs did not cause the Flash crash, their presence exacerbated the price movement as they
absorbed immediacy ahead of others by withdrawing their orders in the face of higher market volatility
(Kirilenko, Kyle, Samadi, and Tuzun, 2014).
Another strand of the literature seeks to better understand the nature of HFTs' strategies. Hagströmer
and Nordén (2013) quantify the market-making activity of HFTs on the NASDAQ-OMX Stockholm
exchange. They ﬁnd that HFTs engaged in market making are present about 60% of the time, while
other categories of HFTs are on average present only about 5% of the time. Carrion (2013) ﬁnds that
in the aggregate, HFTs on the NASDAQ make money on average when supplying liquidity and lose
money on average when demanding liquidity.4 Foucault, Hombert, and Ro³u (2016) investigate the
impact of HFTs engaging in news-based trading on market dynamics. They ﬁnd that when a HFT
has faster access to news, she signiﬁcantly changes her strategy and her trades account for a much
larger fraction of trading volume and forecast short-run price changes. Hasbrouck and Saar (2013)
4Interestingly, this appears to be exactly the opposite of the ﬁndings in Brogaard, Hendershott and Riordan (2014) using
the same dataset.
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document that HFT leads to a high number of quote cancellations in the millisecond environment.
Using a trading game with continuous prices, Baruch and Glosten (2013) ﬁnd that such a strategy of
ﬂeeting orders is supported by equilibrium.
Theoretical predictions regarding the impact of current regulatory initiatives on continuous limit-order
markets are scarce.5 Harris (2013) argues that by causing liquidity-supplying HFTs to lose more often
when oﬀering liquidity, minimum resting time rules would ultimately increase investor transaction
costs. Aït-Sahalia and Sa§lam (2014) ﬁnd that both minimum resting time rules and cancellation fees
induce HFTs to quote more on both sides of the market. However, both measures lead HFTs to provide
liquidity countercyclically with volatility, providing high (low) liquidity in low (high) volatility periods.
Transaction taxes cause a reduction in HFT quoting and lead to lower transaction volume.
Empirical evidence on the impact of cancellation fees is provided by Malinova, Park, and Riordan
(2013), who ﬁnd that following their introduction on the Toronto Stock Exchange, quoting activity
decreased by 30% and spreads increased by 9%. Umlauf (1993) investigates the impact of the introduc-
tion of the Swedish transaction tax and documents a large shift in trading volume from Sweden to the
U.K. Colliard and Hoﬀmann (2015) ﬁnd a large decrease in trading volume following the introduction
of the French ﬁnancial transaction tax in August 2012. Interestingly, the decrease is concentrated in
the OTC market. While the main market remained resilient and spreads were not aﬀected, the intro-
duction of the tax led to a decrease in market depth, resiliency, and price eﬃciency.6 Malinova and
Park (2015) use a change in Toronto Stock Exchange fees to investigate the impact of make-take fees
on market quality. They ﬁnd that rebates improve quoted spreads, decrease adverse selection costs,
and increase the aggressiveness of retail traders. They also observe that the eﬀective spread plus total
fee retained by the exchange remained constant, conﬁrming the conjecture of Colliard and Foucault
(2012) that only total fees (spread plus exchange fees) aﬀect liquidity and trading volume. This last
ﬁnding contrasts with the predictions of the model of O'Donough (2015), where the total trading cost
5An alternative to regulating continuous limit-order markets is to make changes to the trading mechanism as such. A
few recent papers consider this approach. Budish, Cramton and Shim (2015) show that changing the design away from
continuous limit order books (CLOB) to frequent batch auctions eliminates mechanical arbitrage rents that are built
into the CLOB market design, enhance liquidity for investors, and stops the HFT arms race for speed. Du and Zhu
(2014) characterize the socially optimal frequency of such batch auctions in a setting with private information. They
show that the optimal frequency is low for scheduled information arrivals and high for stochastic information arrivals.
6Further results on the eﬀect of the French ﬁnancial transaction tax on market quality can be found in a number of
studies. Becchetti, Ferrari, and Trenta (2014) ﬁnd a reduction in turnover and intraday volatility, but mixed eﬀects on
liquidity. Meyer, Wagener, and Weinhardt (2015) document a reduction in the number of quote and price updates by
liquidity suppliers and a decline in top order book depth. Gomber, Haferkorn, and Zimmermann (2015) report a drop
in both liquidity demand and supply, an increase in spreads, and a decline in top order book depth.
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to investors increases when the taker fee and maker rebate increase, even if the net fee is held ﬁxed.
Empirically, O'Donough reports decreasing bid-ask spreads, lower trader participation, higher order
aggressiveness and higher probability of execution of limit orders as the taker fee and maker rebate
increase.
Most closely related to our analysis is the recent paper by Bernales (2014). He extends the model of
Goettler et al. (2009) in a similar way to ours and investigates the impact of HFT and a number of
regulatory proposals on market quality. However, our analysis diﬀers from his in several important
respects. First, we model HFTs as fast speculators, i.e. as traders that have zero private valuations for
the asset. By contrast, Bernales assumes that HFTs have the same distribution of private valuations
as slow traders, which is unlikely to be the case in practice. Second, the set of regulatory proposals
that we consider is much broader. Bernales only considers cancellation fees and an approximation for
latency restrictions. Speciﬁcally, regarding the latter, in order to be able to use the original Goettler
et al. (2009) model with few modiﬁcations, he models latency restrictions using a decrease in the
frequency with which traders return to the market. Doing so, however, makes fast traders slower
without actually enforcing these restrictions. By contrast, we model latency restrictions exactly in the
way that they have been proposed for real-world markets, i.e. by either enforcing minimum resting
time rules  a ﬁxed time during which a limit order cannot be modiﬁed  or by introducing a speed
bump  a delay between the time that a market order is submitted and the time it hits the order book.
Modeling latency restrictions in a realistic fashion is important to be able to accurately assess their
impact. Indeed, as we show below, these two forms of latency restrictions lead to diﬀerent outcomes
in terms of market quality and welfare. Furthermore, our analysis also considers the impact of rebate
fee structures.
3.3. Model and Solution Methodology
3.3.1. Model Assumptions
Overview
We consider a continuous-time dynamic trading game in one ﬁnancial asset similar to that in Goettler
et al. (2009). Trading takes place by continuous double auction implemented using a limit order book.
The asset's fundamental value vt follows a random walk where the timing of price changes is driven by
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a Poisson process with intensity λv; conditional on a price change occurring, up and down moves are
equally likely.
Traders arrive to the market randomly according to a Poisson process with intensity λ. They observe
both the current state of the order book and the market's transaction history. We investigate both
symmetric and asymmetric information settings. Under symmetric information, all traders observe
the fundamental value in real time. Under asymmetric information, informed traders observe the
fundamental value in real time, while uninformed traders observe it with a lag of ∆ units of time and
form an expectation about its current value based on their last observed value and the current state
of the market.
Upon arrival, each trader selects the best action given the current state of the book, the asset's
(observed or estimated) fundamental value, the transaction history and his individual parameters
(described in detail below). This action may be to submit a buy or sell market or limit order or not
to submit any order.
Traders whose orders are executed leave the market and never return. The others return to the market
at random times which are exponentially distributed with intensity λr. Upon returning to the market,
traders again select the best action, but based on the new state.
Structure of the Limit Order Book
We keep the notation consistent with Goettler et al. (2009). Prices are discrete P = {pi}+∞i=−∞ and
the distance between any two adjacent prices is identical and called the tick size. With each price
pi ∈ P is associated a queue of outstanding limit orders denoted by lit. This quantity is displayed
as a positive (negative) integer for buy (sell) limit orders. The limit order book is the collection
of the indexed queues Lt = {lit}+∞i=−∞. The best sell order in the book is called the ask price and
denoted A(L) = pmin{i|lit<0}. Analogously, the best buy order is called the bid price and given by
B(L) = pmax{i|lit>0}. In the implementation, we use a grid with a ﬁnite number of prices np and
center these around the fundamental value vt. We choose the number of ticks np suﬃciently high that
orders never fall oﬀ the grid. That is, orders are revised by returning traders before becoming too
unaggressive for the grid, or get picked oﬀ before becoming too aggressive for the grid.
As is standard in limit order markets, the priority of execution of limit orders is based on price and
time. Price priority means that buy (sell) orders at higher (lower) price have priority over those at lower
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(higher) prices. Time priority gives the limit orders in the particular price queue preference depending
on the time of arrival. When an order executes against an outstanding limit order, the order which
was submitted earlier at that price has priority. A buy (sell) market order is an order which executes
against the resting sell (buy) limit orders starting from the best ask (bid). A marketable limit order is
the same as a market order with a speciﬁed maximum (minimum) price for buying (selling) a speciﬁed
number of units of the asset.
Trader Types and Behavior
New traders arrive to the market according to a Poisson process with intensity λ. Upon arrival, they
may choose to submit a buy or sell market or limit order or not to submit any order. The action they
select is optimal given the current state of the limit order book, the history of transactions, the asset's
(observed or estimated) fundamental value, and their type. Changes in the fundamental value expose
limit orders to two risks: (i) obtaining an undesirable execution when the fundamental value moves
in an unfavourable direction, and (ii) not obtaining a desirable execution when the fundamental value
moves in a favourable direction.
Traders may submit orders only for one share. Traders whose order is executed leave the market.
The others return to the market with intensity λr. The reentry (or monitoring) rate λr depends on
the technology available to the trader  it will be high when monitoring costs are low as in Foucault,
Kadan, and Kandel (2013)  and represents a friction which traders have to take into account when
making their decisions. A higher monitoring rate allows faster reaction to changing market conditions,
giving the trader the ability to execute against a stale limit order or to cancel or resubmit her own
order and thus avoid her order being picked-oﬀ.
Upon reentry, traders choose their action optimally, depending on the current state of the limit order
book, the history of transactions, the asset's (observed or estimated) fundamental value, their type,
and the priority and position of their last limit order if they submitted any. They are allowed to
retain their existing limit order and they do so if this is the highest expected value action for them.
Otherwise, they might cancel the existing order, possibly incurring a cancellation cost and choose a
diﬀerent value-maximizing action.
Traders' type θ is deﬁned by three attributes, θ = {h, α, ρ}: whether they are HFT or not (h ∈ {0, 1}),
their private valuation for the asset, α, and their impatience, ρ. The private valuation α is drawn from
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a discrete probability distribution in which the probability of a zero private value is positive. Traders
with a zero private value are called speculators, those with a nonzero private value are investors.
Traders with nonzero private valuation α seek to materialize this potential beneﬁt through trade.
Traders' type is also deﬁned by their impatience parameter ρ, which enters their utility function in
a similar fashion as a discount factor. The impatience coeﬃcient represents the trader's disutility of
obtaining execution later. Traders are risk neutral and their instantaneous utility at time t is given
by:
ut =

α+ vt − pi if she executes a buy order at price pi and time t,
pi − α− vt if she executes a sell order at price pi and time t,
0 if she does not execute at time t.
(3.1)
HFTs are modeled as fast speculators, i.e. their monitoring rate exceeds that of other traders, λhr >
λr, and their private valuation for the asset is zero.7 In addition, when investigating asymmetric
information settings, we assume that HFTs observe the fundamental value vt in real time, whereas
slow traders observe it with a lag of ∆ time units as in Foucault, Hombert, and Ro³u (2013). Thus,
in the presence of asymmetric information, non-HFTs have to form an expectation about the current
fundamental value vt based on the lagged fundamental value vt−∆ and the current state of the market
in the same way as the uninformed traders in Goettler et al. (2009).
3.3.2. Time Line and Solution of the Game
Since the game evolves in continuous time and the diﬀerent events that can occur arrive stochastically,
there is no pre-set sequence of events. Rather, when solving the game, the ﬁrst step is to draw the
time of the next event from an exponential distribution with intensity given by the overall event arrival
intensity Λt, which is the sum of (i) the intensity of arrivals of new traders λ, (ii) the weighted intensity
of arrivals of returning traders λr and λhr , and (iii) the intensity of changes in the fundamental value
λv. Formally,
Λt = λ+N
h=0
t λr +N
h=1
t λ
h
r + λv, (3.2)
7A categorization of traders based on their intrinsic motivation to trade, presence in the market, information, trading
strategies and other characteristics is provided in Harris (2002). Using this categorization, we distinguish two basic
categories of traders  those with an intrinsic motivation (investors) and those without (speculators). We model HFTs
as fast speculators who may have an information advantage because of faster information processing.
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where Nh=0t denotes the number of slow traders and N
h=1
t the number of HFTs that have not left the
market at time t.
Once the time of the next event is known, its nature  new arrival, return, or change in the fundamental
value  is determined randomly based on the ratio of the intensity of that event to the overall event
intensity Λt. The game is then played following the workﬂow summarized in Figure 3.1. Speciﬁcally,
when a new trader arrives, the trader performs her optimization and submits her order or no order.
When an existing trader returns, the trader performs her optimization and retains or cancels her
existing order and, in the latter case, submits a new order or no order. All active orders are stored
in the limit order book and if a new order was submitted, it enters in the precise position speciﬁed
by the trader. If the trader submits a market order, the order executes against a resting limit order;
that order is then removed from the book and the priorities of the remaining limit orders are updated.
Traders whose orders are executed are removed from the system. Finally, if the event is a change in
the fundamental value vt, the price grid in the limit order book is shifted as described in Section 3.3.1.
Throughout, payoﬀs, transaction costs and other statistics are computed and stored.
Since traders have privately known α's as well as possibly private information about the fundamental
value vt and time is not a state variable, the solution concept for this game is Markov-perfect Bayesian
equilibrium as pointed out in Maskin and Tirole (2001). We focus on symmetric equilibria, where
traders of the same type optimally choose the same action in a given state.
The state space consists of the past history of the game, the current limit order book, the trader's
type and the position of his past order (if any) in the book. Our state space is richer than that in
Goettler et al. (2009) because of the additional parameter h. Let Θ denote the set of feasible agent
types. Ideally, the state space considered during decision making would comprise all the variables of
the limit order book and the entire transaction history. In order to make the problem tractable, we
make certain restrictions. Speciﬁcally, we do not consider the entire transaction history but just the
last transaction, whether it was buyer- or seller-initiated, and the transaction price. Moreover, we do
not consider the full detail of the limit order book, but focus on its most informative variables, namely
bid price, ask price, bid size, ask size, depth oﬀ bid and depth oﬀ ask. We perform tests to determine
whether there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in actions compared to those arising when using a broader
information set, but like Goettler et al. (2009) ﬁnd that broadening the state space does not improve
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predictive power. A mathematical description of the state space and the optimization problem faced
by traders is provided in the Appendix.
3.3.3. Parameterization
In setting parameter values, we relate to Goettler et al. (2009) and the empirical literature cited therein
in order to ensure the comparability of our results. We set the arrival rate for new traders λ to 0.25.
The returning rate of HFTs λhr is set to 4 and that of non-HFTs λr to 1. Thus, we assume that HFTs
react four times faster than non-HFTs.
The discount rate ρ is set to 0.03 for all traders. The support of the private valuation α in ticks
is {−4,−2, 0, 2, 4} with probability distribution Fα = {0.15, 0.35, 0.65, 0.85, 1.0}. This private value
distribution roughly corresponds to the empirical ﬁndings in Holliﬁeld, Miller, Såndas and Slive (2006)
for the Vancouver stock exchange.
The tick size is set to 1/8. The expected time between changes in the fundamental value is set to 10
units of time, i.e. λv = 0.1. When the fundamental value changes, it always does by one tick, with
up and down moves equally likely. When considering asymmetric information settings, we set the lag
∆ with which slow traders observe the fundamental value to 2 units of time; we experimented with
higher values and found that the results do not change signiﬁcantly.
The limit orders being tracked in the book may lie between 7 ticks below and 7 ticks above the
fundamental value. The fundamental value lies on the tick in the middle of this price range. Limit
orders may be submitted at prices between 3 ticks below and 3 ticks above the fundamental value.
There are thus seven possible prices at which a limit order can be submitted.
3.4. The Impact of HFT on Market Quality and Welfare
In this section, we investigate the impact of HFT on market quality and welfare by comparing the
properties of equilibrium between a situation without HFTs and situations with HFTs. We assess
market quality using the following standard measures:
1. The bid-ask spread is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the best ask price and the best bid price.
It measures the price for immediacy.
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2. The eﬀective spread is deﬁned as the absolute value of the diﬀerence between the transaction
price and the mid-quote at the time of the transaction, and measures eﬀective trading costs.
3. Market depth is measured by the number of units of the asset available to buy or sell in the limit
order book. We consider both the depth at bid and ask and the depth oﬀ-bid and oﬀ-ask. Large
depth means that the price impact of an order of a given size and thus related transaction costs
are small.
4. Price discovery measures the percentage distance between the fundamental value and transaction
prices. In eﬃcient and transparent markets, the diﬀerence between the fundamental value and
transaction prices is small.
5. Microstructure noise volatility measures the dispersion of transactions around the asset's funda-
mental value. The higher microstructure noise volatility, the larger execution risk for traders, for
example because their limit orders may be picked oﬀ or become stale.
To assess the impact of HFT on welfare, we compute each trader's utility using equation (Equa-
tion (3.1)), i.e. as the diﬀerence between his valuation for the asset (fundamental value plus private
valuation) and the price at which he is able to purchase or sell the asset on the market. For limit
orders, utility is discounted by the amount of time it took to execute the limit order. We then compute
welfare as the average utility of all traders in the game. Since regulators are likely to be more concerned
about the welfare of investors than that of speculators, in addition to total welfare, we also compute
welfare separately for investors and speculators.
Before we proceed, it is useful to consider the trade-oﬀs faced by traders in the market and how these
might be aﬀected by the presence of HFTs. We say that an order is more aggressive if it is submitted at
a price which is closer to the opposite side of the market. The most aggressive order is a market order.
The more aggressive an order is, the higher the execution probability prior to the trader returning.
This probability, however, also depends on the other orders already in the book and on which new
orders are submitted before the trader returns. As mentioned earlier, changes in the fundamental value
expose limit orders to two risks: (i) obtaining an undesirable execution when the fundamental value
moves in an unfavourable direction, and (ii) not obtaining a desirable execution when the fundamental
value moves in a favourable direction. In the ﬁrst case, the presence of HFTs exacerbates picking-oﬀ
risk for a slow trader because HFTs are likely to react to the new situation before the slow trader's
36
returning to the market and lift the order. In the second case, the presence of HFTs reduces the
probability that a slow trader wishing to update her order given the new situation will be able to pick
oﬀ a too aggressively priced order on the other side of the market. Furthermore, if she decides to
submit a limit rather than a market order when updating her order, that order is likely to lie behind
HFTs' orders in the queue, delaying execution.
When conducting our quantitative analysis, we model the situation without HFTs using the base case
parameter values described in Section 3.3.3. Recall that in this parameterization, the shares of traders
with private valuations of 0, 2, and 4 ticks in absolute value are 30%, 40%, and 30%, respectively. We
assess the impact of HFT in two ways: (1) by gradually replacing slow speculators with HFTs, and
(2) starting from a situation in which half of speculators are slow and the other half are HFTs (i.e. a
situation in which both groups each make up 15% of the overall population), by gradually adding HFTs
until their overall share of the population reaches 25%. Note that while the ﬁrst approach only aﬀects
the distribution of traders, the second increases overall trader arrivals and therefore overall market
activity. Arguments could be made in favor of using one or the other approach; as will be shown
shortly, however, our ﬁndings are robust to the approach chosen.
The impact of HFT on market quality and welfare using the ﬁrst approach can be seen in Table 3.1
and Figure 3.2 for the symmetric information case and Table 3.3 and Figure 3.6 for the asymmetric
information case. The results using the second approach are reported in Table 3.2 and Figure 3.4 for
the symmetric information case and Table 3.4 and Figure 3.7 for the asymmetric information case. We
highlight our main observations regarding market quality and investor welfare and then discuss them
in more detail. Throughout, we begin with the results under symmetric information and then contrast
them with those under asymmetric information.
Observation 1 (Market Quality): The presence of HFTs increases market depth, reduces spreads
and transaction costs, and improves price discovery. Under asymmetric information, these eﬀects arise
only if the share of HFTs in the market is suﬃciently large to generate competition between them.
Consider ﬁrst the case where slow speculators are replaced with HFTs. As can be seen in the top
panel of Figure 3.2, an increase in the share of HFTs among speculators signiﬁcantly improves depth
and yields small improvements in the quoted bid-ask spread, the eﬀective spread, and price discovery.
The volatility of microstructure noise is also slightly lower (see Table 3.1). Two channels drive these
results. First, HFTs' shorter reaction times allow them to update their limit orders faster, resulting in
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quotes that track the evolution of the fundamental value more closely and improving price discovery.
HFTs' faster reaction times also leads to lower picking-oﬀ risk. Accordingly, as is apparent in the
bottom panel of Figure 3.2, the expected payoﬀ of their limit orders is signiﬁcantly higher than for
slow speculators. Second, HFTs are faster at picking-oﬀ mispriced orders using market orders. This
results in their submitting a larger proportion of market orders than slow speculators, as can be seen
in the bottom panel of Figure 3.2. Although proﬁts from lifting mispriced orders remain constant at
one tick (0.125, see the bottom panel of Figure 3.2, right axis), an increase in the proportion of HFTs
increases competition, reducing the probability of lifting mispriced orders. This induces both HFTs
and slow speculators to reduce their use of market orders and leads to higher liquidity provision by both
groups.8 With increasing competition, however, pick-oﬀ risk increases for both groups of speculators,
as is apparent from the decrease in their utility from limit orders in the bottom panel of Figure 3.2.
A closer look at the bottom panel reveals that slow speculators' expected payoﬀ from limit orders in
the case without HFTs (the intercept of the solid blue line) exceeds HFTs' expected payoﬀ from limit
orders in the case where there are no slow speculators (the value of the dashed blue line on the right).
This means that investors demanding liquidity pay a lower price in the case where all speculators are
HFTs than in the case without HFTs.
Inspection of traders' strategies in Table 3.1 reveals that consistent with the ﬁndings in Hoﬀmann
(2014), tighter spreads cause slow traders to submit less aggressive orders as competing for the best
quotes would increase their risk of being picked-oﬀ. Tighter spreads also reduce the volatility of
microstructure noise. As their share in the market increases, HFTs provide more liquidity by increasing
their share of limit orders (see the bottom panel of Figure 3.2), which beneﬁts investors in the form
of shorter execution times (see the Transactions section in Table 3.1). HFTs' ability to submit high
priority orders also results in an increase in depth at the bid and ask and further in the book. These
ﬁndings are in line with the empirical studies by Hasbrouck and Saar (2013) for U.S. data and Riordan
and Storkenmaier (2013) for German data. As can be seen in Figure 3.3, in the presence of HFTs, the
order book is more skewed towards the fundamental value (located in the middle of the price grid).
8Bernales (2014) also ﬁnds that HFTs favor market orders when their share of the market is small and limit orders when
it is large. However, he does not provide a breakdown of the order types for the diﬀerent groups of slow traders and
only considers an asymmetric information setting.
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As can be seen in Table 3.2 and Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5, under symmetric information, the impact
of HFT on market quality is similar if HFTs are added to the market instead of substituting slow
speculators.
The impact of HFT on market quality is less clear-cut under asymmetric information. This is best
seen in the case where the overall trader population is constant (see Table 3.3 and Figure 3.6). Since
slow traders observe the fundamental value with a lag, they must base their trading decisions on an
estimate of the fundamental value rather than on the true value. This gives HFTs better opportunities
to pick-oﬀ mispriced orders. Imperfect information about the fundamental value also causes slow
traders to make mistakes when submitting market orders to lift orders they believe to be mispriced,
resulting in a growing diﬀerence between their and HFTs' payoﬀ from market orders (see the bottom
panel of Figure 3.6). The beneﬁciaries of these mistakes are HFTs, whose average discounted payoﬀ
from limit orders increases compared to the symmetric information case (contrast the bottom panels
of Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.6; the exact values are 0.0348 under symmetric information and 0.0448
under asymmetric information). When the share of HFTs in the market is small, the adverse selection
causes price discovery and spreads to worsen. As the share of HFTs in the market increases, however,
competition among them leads to an improvement in all market quality measures. When the share
of HFTs is suﬃciently large, the competition eﬀect dominates the adverse selection eﬀect and market
quality is better than in the case without HFTs. In the case where HFTs are added to the market
instead of substituting slow speculators (see Table 3.4 and Figure 3.7), the share of HFTs is already
sizable at 15% initially. As a result, the competition eﬀect dominates and market quality improves as
HFTs are added.
It is instructive to contrast our results with those in Bernales (2014). He investigates the asymmetric
information case and ﬁnds that market quality increases monotonically with the share of HFTs in
the market. Our results show that while this statement holds under symmetric information, it does
not hold under asymmetric information. Rather, when HFTs have an informational advantage, HFT
initially reduces market quality, and increases it once HFTs' share in the market becomes relatively
large.9
9The reason that Bernales (2014) identiﬁes a monotonic impact is that he considers step sizes for the market share of
HFTs of 20% and the nonmonotonicity occurs in the range between 0% and 20%.
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Observation 2 (Welfare): HFT does not reduce investor welfare but aﬀects the welfare of slow
speculators negatively. HFTs' welfare is signiﬁcantly higher than that of slow speculators. HFTs supply
more liquidity than investors, but less than slow speculators.
Turning to investor welfare and again starting with the case where information is symmetric and slow
speculators are replaced with HFTs, we ﬁnd that both overall welfare and average welfare for all slow
traders (speculators and investors) are not negatively aﬀected by the presence of HFTs (see Figure 3.2,
middle panel). However, the impact of HFTs on welfare diﬀers across trader categories. Whereas
slow speculators' welfare falls markedly, investors experience a slight increase in welfare reﬂecting the
beneﬁts from increased liquidity in the market. Because of improved liquidity and the increase in
picking-oﬀ risk associated with HFT, investors' use of market orders rises (see the Trader Strategies
section in Table 3.1).
Reﬂecting their speed advantage, HFTs earn higher surpluses than slow speculators. Both aspects
of slow speculators' disadvantage compared to HFTs are visible in Table 3.1: since they are slow at
updating their orders when the fundamental value changes, (i) they earn lower proﬁts on limit orders
than HFTs, and (ii) they seldom manage to pick oﬀ mispriced orders, as can be seen from the lower
share of market orders in their transactions compared to HFTs.
Interestingly, the results in Table 3.1 also reveal that HFTs supply more liquidity than investors, but
less than slow speculators. As the share of HFTs increases, slow speculators initially substitute market
orders with aggressive limit orders. As the share of HFTs increases further, however, competing for the
best quotes with HFTs in an environment with narrower spreads increases slow speculators' pick-oﬀ
risk, inducing them to submit fewer aggressive limit orders. Slow speculators provide liquidity even
more often than HFTs, but their technological disadvantage prevents them from earning substantial
payoﬀs as their orders are frequently picked-oﬀ. As one would expect, as the share of HFTs among
speculators rises, increased competition between them erodes their trading proﬁts. The decline in
proﬁts, however, is even more pronounced for slow speculators.
As can be seen in Table 3.2 and Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5, the impact of HFT on welfare is similar if
HFTs are added to the market instead of substituting slow speculators. Thus, the impact of HFT on
both market quality and welfare is robust to the way that it is modeled.
Under asymmetric information (see Table 3.3 and Figure 3.6), the impact of HFT on welfare is similar
to that under symmetric information: the welfare of investors increases slightly, and that of slow
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speculators falls. It is worth noting that slow speculators' welfare falls more strongly under asymmetric
information than under symmetric information because they face both a speed and an informational
disadvantage. Similar patterns can be observed if HFTs are added to the market instead of substituting
slow speculators (see Table 3.4 and Figure 3.7).
Thus, our results highlight that the welfare impact of HFT on slow traders is heterogeneous. While
slow speculators generally experience a welfare reduction from increased competition by HFTs, the
welfare of investors increases. Put diﬀerently, the negative impact of HFT on slow trader welfare
identiﬁed by Bernales (2014) does not hold for all subgroups, but only for slow speculators.
3.5. Impact of Proposed Regulations
In this section, we investigate the eﬀectiveness of a number of regulatory measures that have been
suggested to improve market quality in the presence of HFT. We focus on the main regulatory ini-
tiatives, namely minimum resting time rules, cancellation fees, transaction taxes, make/take (rebate)
fee structures and speed bumps. We compute the equilibria arising when introducing each of these
regulations, thus fully accounting for the resulting changes in traders' optimal strategies, and collect
the market quality and welfare statistics. We then assess the impact of each regulation by comparing
the properties of the resulting equilibrium with those of the unregulated case. Section 3.5.1 describes
the diﬀerent regulations and how they are implemented in our analysis, and Section 3.5.2 presents our
ﬁndings.
3.5.1. Description of the Regulations and Implementation in the Model
Minimum resting time
Minimum resting time (also known as minimum holding or waiting time and henceforth abbreviated
as MRT) is an artiﬁcial delay imposed between the time an order is submitted and the time at which it
may be changed or cancelled. According to D'Antona (2010), the topic of a minimum resting time for
quotes came up during joint meetings on the Flash crash between the SEC and the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission that took place in summer 2010. The range of values that were considered in
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these discussions was from 50 milliseconds to one second. Such a measure would in eﬀect impose on all
market participants some of the obligations that are imposed on market makers by some exchanges.10
The inability to immediately change orders increases picking-oﬀ risk for traders, thus making it more
costly to submit limit orders. The implementation of MRT rules in the model is straightforward.
A trader that had submitted an order at time s and returns at time t < s + MRT , i.e. before the
minimum resting time requirement is met, is put into a waiting queue. Further events in the game are
then drawn and processed as long as their time is less than s+MRT . As soon as an event time after
s + MRT is drawn, the trader recorded in the queue is allowed to modify or cancel her order based
on the state at time s + MRT . We report results for a MRT of one time unit. We have investigated
MRT values between 0.25 and ﬁve time units and came to similar conclusions.
Cancellation fee
A cancellation fee is a fee that traders must pay whenever they cancel or modify their orders. Cancel-
lation fees make updating orders costly and must be taken into consideration by traders when choosing
the aggressiveness of their limit orders. In the implementation, the fee is subtracted from the trader's
current utility whenever an order is cancelled or updated. Note that any fees incurred following poten-
tial later order cancellations are automatically included in the continuation utility associated with the
current state by the solution algorithm and therefore do not need to be tracked explicitly. To make
the welfare comparison with the unregulated situation fair, fee proceeds are then distributed equally
across all traders. For completeness, we report total welfare both without and with fee proceeds. We
report results for a cancellation fee value of 0.015, corresponding to roughly 0.38% of the average asset
price.11 We also experimented with values between 0.001 and 0.5 and found the results to be similar.
Transaction tax
Under a transaction tax, traders have to pay a tax amount equal to a certain proportion of the value
of their transactions. In the implementation, the tax is collected at the time of order execution and,
consistent with taxes typically imposed in the real world, shared equally between the seller and the
buyer. To make the welfare comparison with the unregulated situation fair, tax proceeds are then
10For example, in addition to submitting quotes on both sides of the market, market makers on the Eurex options
exchange have to quote with a minimum holding time of ten seconds. Similar rules are in force on the Hong Kong
Exchange and on the ASX options market, where the holding period is 30 seconds.
11According to Holliﬁeld et al. (2006) and Goettler et al. (2009), based on the distribution of private values that we use,
the expected stock price is roughly 3.89. Because private valuations are additive in the utility function and orders
do not fall oﬀ the price grid, traders only consider changes in the fundamental value, not its level, which follows a
random walk and has an inﬁnite support.
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distributed equally across all traders. For completeness, we report total welfare both without and with
tax proceeds. We set the tax rate at 0.1%, a value in the ballpark of rates imposed in several countries.
Because the fundamental value follows a random walk and transactions happen at prices around the
fundamental value, the transaction tax lowers agents' ﬁnal payoﬀ by 0.001945. We also investigate
varying the tax rate from 0.05% to 0.5% and come to similar conclusions.
Make/take fees
Under a make/take (or rebate) fee structure, whenever a transaction is executed, the consumer of the
liquidity has to pay a taker fee and the trader who provided the limit order receives a maker fee (a
rebate on transaction fees). As mentioned in the Introduction, such fee structures are used by many
exchanges in order to encourage liquidity provision. However, their desirability is controversial.12 Since
such fee structures discourage trading by market orders and encourage submitting limit orders, one
would expect them to result in tighter quoted spreads. To implement rebates in the model, we simply
subtract the taker fee from the utility of the trader that consumed liquidity and add the maker fee to
the utility of the trader whose limit order got picked oﬀ. We set the taker fee at $0.01 and the maker
fee at (minus) $0.01, which is in line with the actual pricing structures at various exchanges. We set
both fees symmetrically in order to make the fee structure budget neutral overall, thus facilitating
the comparison with the unregulated case. We investigated the properties of market equilibrium for a
range of make/take fee structures, both symmetric and asymmetric, and obtained similar results.
Speed bump
A speed bump is an artiﬁcial delay imposed on incoming orders; when submitted, orders are stored for
a ﬁxed amount of time before they are routed to the order book. Traders submitting orders have to
take into account that by the time their order reaches the book, the book could be diﬀerent than what
they observed when they submitted the order. As mentioned in the Introduction, speed bumps have
been imposed on all orders on some exchanges and only on market orders on others. In our analysis,
we choose to apply the speed bump to market orders only. Such orders are converted to marketable
limit orders upon submission in order to protect traders against adverse quote movements between the
time that an order is submitted and the time it hits the order book. However, execution is no longer
12For example, in its Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, the SEC (2010) raises the following concerns: Are
liquidity rebates unfair to long-term investors because they necessarily will be paid primarily to proprietary ﬁrms
engaging in passive market making strategies? Or do they generally beneﬁt long-term investors by promoting narrower
spreads and more immediately accessible liquidity? Do liquidity rebates reward proprietary ﬁrms for any particular
types of trading that do not beneﬁt long-term investors or market quality?
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guaranteed. If the best quote the market order intends to trade on moves in an unfavourable direction,
the order is recorded in the intended position in the book and the trader can decide on her optimal
action again upon her next reentry. This is consistent with the way that speed bumps have been
implemented on Nasdaq. We report results for a speed bump of one time unit. We have experimented
with values between 0.25 and ﬁve time units and found similar results.
3.5.2. Results
We conduct our analysis using the parameterization described in Section 3.3.3. Recall that in this
parameterization, the shares of traders with private valuations of 0, 2, and 4 ticks in absolute value
are 30%, 40%, and 30%, respectively. We assume that half of speculators are HFTs. As mentioned
at the beginning of this section, we assess the impact of each regulation by comparing the properties
of the resulting equilibrium with those of the unregulated case. We consider both the symmetric
information case, where all traders observe the fundamental value in real time, and a situation with
asymmetric information where HFTs observe the fundamental value in real time and all other traders
observe it with a lag of two time units. The market quality and welfare indicators under symmetric
and asymmetric information are reported in Table 3.5 and Table 3.6, respectively. We highlight our
main observations regarding market quality and investor welfare and then discuss them in more detail.
Observation 3 (Minimum Resting Time): MRT does not improve market quality, reduces aggre-
gate welfare, transfers welfare from HFTs to slow speculators, increases the aggressiveness of orders
submitted by investors and increases order execution time for all trader groups.
Overall, MRT has a mixed impact on market quality. It reduces the depth of the book, but leads
to a decrease in both quoted and eﬀective spreads in the presence of asymmetric information.13 At
the same time, MRT worsens price discovery and increases the volatility of microstructure noise under
both symmetric and asymmetric information. This ﬁnding is in line with the results in Kirilenko and
Lamacie (2015), who report that an increase in latency leads to higher short-term volatility.
MRT has a negative impact on aggregate welfare. Importantly, the decrease in aggregate welfare
is entirely borne by investors and not by speculators. The welfare of HFTs does decrease, but this
13While our results on market depth are in line with those reported by Bernales (2014) who analyzes the asymmetric
information case, our results on spreads diﬀer from his. As mentioned in the introduction, while we implement
MRT rules exactly in the way that they have been proposed for real-world markets, Bernales (2014) models them by
reducing the returning frequency of fast traders. Doing so makes fast traders slower without actually enforcing the
MRT restriction.
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decrease is exactly oﬀset by an increase in the welfare of slow speculators, which are the only group
that is better of under MRT rules. The reason for the welfare transfer from HFTs to slow speculators is
that HFTs' inability to modify or cancel their outstanding limit orders suﬃciently fast exposes them to
increased picking-oﬀ risk. HFTs' reduced reaction ability is clearly visible in Table 3.5 and Table 3.6:
the share of limit orders that they cancel falls by an order of magnitude, and the fraction of their
transactions from limit orders rises (equivalently, the fraction of transactions that they initiate via
market orders falls).
Due to increased picking-oﬀ risk, HFTs substitute risky aggressive limit orders with less risky orders at
the best quote. By contrast, slow speculators and 4 ticks private value investors, who are now better
able to pick-oﬀ stale orders, are more likely to submit market orders. Overall, HFTs end up providing
more liquidity. However, the fact that liquidity provision becomes more risky for all trader groups
results in wider spreads. This lower quality of liquidity reduces liquidity consumption. Accordingly,
as can be seen at the bottom of Table 3.5 and Table 3.6, execution times increase for all groups of
traders, negatively aﬀecting welfare.
Observation 4 (Cancellation Fees): Cancellation fees decrease market quality and welfare, increase
the usage of market orders and limit orders posted at the best quote, and lead to a rise in order execution
time for all trader groups.
Consistent with the empirical ﬁndings in Friederich and Payne (2015), cancellation fees decrease depth
and worsen price discovery. Under symmetric information, the quoted spread remains the same and
the eﬀective spread worsens. Under asymmetric information, the quoted spread falls, but the eﬀective
spread remains the same. Thus, even ignoring the fee itself, the introduction of cancellation fees does
not reduce transaction costs.
Turning to welfare, cancellation costs lower overall welfare; importantly, distributing fee proceeds to
traders does not oﬀset the welfare loss. Welfare losses are registered in all trader groups, but slow
speculators facing asymmetric information are least aﬀected. As one would expect, order cancellation
ratios fall. More strikingly, cancellation fees lead to a sharp decrease in spread-improving (i.e. ag-
gressive) limit orders: realizing that the fees make it more costly to remove orders that have become
mispriced to prevent them from being lifted, traders become more prudent in their order submission.
Instead of aggressive limit orders, they use market orders or limit orders submitted at the best current
quote. Another consequence of cancellation fees is that they induce traders to decide not to submit
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any order initially and wait until they return to do so, leading to lower overall depth in the book.
This causes liquidity to become hidden and execution times to rise signiﬁcantly for all trader groups.
The reason is similar to that in the case of MRT rules: cancellation fees make liquidity provision more
costly for all trader groups, leading to lower quality liquidity and reduced liquidity consumption.
Observation 5 (Transaction Taxes): Transaction taxes reduce the trading gains of all trader groups
roughly by the amount of the tax and do not signiﬁcantly impact market quality, aggregate welfare, and
trading strategies.
Transaction taxes only have a small impact on market quality. Welfare decreases for all groups of
traders roughly by the amount of the tax; accordingly, distributing tax proceeds to traders completely
oﬀsets the welfare loss. The decrease in welfare is somewhat stronger for slow speculators because
the tax represents a larger portion of their welfare without the tax. Under asymmetric information,
transaction taxes lead uninformed traders to submit fewer aggressive limit orders because the riskiness
of such orders remains the same but their payoﬀ is lower.
It is worth noting that with a ﬁner distribution of private values (or with a higher tax rate), some
traders would decide not to trade at all, which would lead to wider spreads and a decrease in market
liquidity as was observed by Colliard and Hoﬀmann (2015) in their event study on the introduction of
the French ﬁnancial transaction tax.
Observation 6 (Rebates): Rebates reduce market quality and investor welfare, increase the aggres-
siveness of speculators, and lead to a rise in order execution time for all trader groups.
Contrary to what one might expect, rebates lead to worse price discovery and reduce depth. Although
they improve the quoted spread in the symmetric information case, this does not translate into lower
transaction costs as measured by the eﬀective spread. Rather, the eﬀective spread increases under
both symmetric and asymmetric information.
Rebates also lead to a reduction in overall welfare. They increase the welfare of slow speculators at
the expense of investors, while HFT welfare is almost unaﬀected. The higher costs of market orders
lead traders to avoid such orders and induces longer execution times of limit orders for all groups
of traders. Slow speculators and especially HFTs do not compete for the best quotes (the share of
aggressive limit orders that they submit is lower than in the base case). Rather, they wait for investor
quotes to become mispriced and lift them, as can be seen from the higher proportion of market orders
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in speculators' strategies and transactions. As HFTs can react to mispriced limit orders faster, the
proportion of market orders in their transactions rises more strongly than for slow speculators. Like
speculators, investors also submit fewer aggressive limit orders and more limit orders at the best quote
than in the base case. However, the proportion of limit orders at the best quote increases more strongly
for investors than for speculators, and a sizable part of that increase comes from a reduction in orders
submitted below the best quote. The reason that investors increase their use of orders at the best
quote is that submitting market orders is costly because of the take fees and submitting aggressive
limit orders is risky due to speculators' more frequent lifting of mispriced orders. Accordingly, rebates
cause market depth to fall more strongly oﬀ the best quote than at the best quote.
Observation 7 (Speed Bumps): Speed bumps for market orders increase microstructure noise and
worsen price discovery. They reduce the welfare of slow speculators, but do not aﬀect investor welfare.
Speed bumps also make order submissions by investors and HFTs more aggressive and increase order
execution time for all trader groups.
Speed bumps generally worsen price discovery, but improve spreads and depth in the book. The
welfare of investors is unaﬀected and that of slow speculators decreases. Speed bumps render the
execution of market orders uncertain. Perhaps surprisingly, speed bumps actually lead to an increase
in market order submissions in all groups. The reason is that since speed bumps for market orders are
implemented as marketable limit order with the limit set at the current best limit order on the other
side of the market (consistent with the way that speed bumps have been implemented on Nasdaq),
traders might obtain slightly better execution. This induces them to submit blind orders and leads to
higher pick-oﬀ risk for standing limit orders. This is reﬂected in lower cancellation ratios for HFTs and
a higher proportion of limit orders in their transactions.
The results in Table 3.5 and Table 3.6 relate to a speed bump with a deterministic delay. Harris (2013)
proposed introducing speed bumps with random delays, primarily to deter the technology arms race
between HFTs. In order to assess whether such random speed bumps lead to improvements in market
quality and welfare, we implemented two versions of his proposal. In the ﬁrst, the speed bump was
drawn from a uniform distribution between zero and one second, while in the second, it was drawn
from a uniform distribution with strictly positive support (the cases considered were between 0.1 and
1.1 second and between 0.5 and 1.5 seconds). All these cases led to results that were similar to those
for deterministic speed bumps presented in Table 3.5 and Table 3.6 and are not reported for brevity.
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We ran numerous additional cases, varying both the parameter values of the underlying base case
(in particular the volatility of the asset's fundamental value and the proportions of investors, slow
speculators and HFTs) and the values of the parameters capturing the diﬀerent regulations. The
general conclusion that none of these regulations consistently improves investors' welfare is robust.
3.6. Conclusion
We investigate the impact of HFT and a number of regulatory initiatives on market quality and investor
welfare using a general dynamic limit order book model as in Goettler, Parlour, and Rajan (2009).
We solve for the Markov perfect equilibrium numerically using the Q-learning algorithm. We ﬁnd that
the presence of HFTs improves most common measures of market quality, reducing spreads, increasing
market depth, and enhancing price discovery. These results hold without qualiﬁcation under symmetric
information. When HFTs have an informational advantage over slow traders, however, improvements
in market quality arise only if competition between them is suﬃciently strong. We also ﬁnd that HFT
does not negatively impact investor welfare. However, it leads to a reduction in the welfare of slow
speculators, who are crowded out by HFTs.
The ﬂexibility of the model allows us to investigate the impact of the main recent regulatory initiatives
designed to curb HFT on market quality and investor welfare. We consider minimum resting time
rules, cancellation fees, transaction taxes, rebate fee structures and speed bumps. We ﬁnd that most
of these regulatory proposals have a negative impact on market quality and that none consistently
improves investor welfare. Admittedly, some of these regulatory proposals lead to improvements in
a number of market quality measures; for example, minimum resting time rules reduce trading costs
under asymmetric information, while speed bumps increase book depth and decrease spreads. However,
these improvements generally do not translate into higher welfare for long-term investors. Rather, the
main eﬀect of these regulations is to generate wealth transfers from HFTs to slow speculators. These
regulations therefore appear inadequate to enhance investor welfare in the presence of HFTs. Of the
diﬀerent measures, transaction taxes are the least harmful; while they reduce welfare roughly by the
amount of the tax (a reduction that can be oﬀset by distributing tax proceeds back to traders), they do
not signiﬁcantly worsen market quality. Importantly, the common practice by exchanges of granting
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rebates to limit orders is detrimental to market quality and investor welfare, causing both higher
eﬀective spreads and longer execution times.
It should be noted that while we have considered asymmetric information between HFTs and other
traders in our analysis, we have assumed that markets are not fragmented and ruled out front-running
of already submitted orders by HFTs. In order to make the analysis tractable, we have restricted
individual traders to trade a single share. A promising avenue for future research is to investigate to
what extent our ﬁndings generalize to settings where traders may submit large orders, thus requiring
them to incorporate the issues of price impact and detection by other traders in their decision-making
process.
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Table 3.1
Impact of HFT on market quality, welfare, and strategies when the overall trader population is constant under
symmetric information.
Share of HFTs among Speculators 0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Market Quality
Best Bid/Oﬀer size 1.419 1.708 1.976 2.282 2.569
Depth oﬀ BBO 4.611 5.024 5.822 6.447 7.558
Quoted spread 1.610 1.611 1.615 1.575 1.575
Eﬀective spread 1.266 1.298 1.176 1.100 1.079
Price discovery |pt − vt|/vt % 1.322 1.315 1.289 1.260 1.166
Microstructure noise volatility 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.079 0.077
Welfare
Average welfare 0.235 0.237 0.239 0.240 0.242
Slow speculator 0.069 0.060 0.050 0.035 -
Investor 2 ticks PV 0.216 0.217 0.219 0.222 0.228
Investor 4 ticks PV 0.434 0.434 0.435 0.436 0.440
HFT - 0.105 0.096 0.084 0.066
Trader Strategies
Slow speculator
Buy market order % 0.153 0.103 0.064 0.046 -
Aggressive buy limit order % 1.282 1.337 1.454 1.200 -
At quote buy limit order % 9.946 11.476 10.779 10.147 -
Below best buy limit order % 38.990 40.100 36.537 37.694 -
Investor 2 ticks private valuation
Buy market order % 5.570 5.416 5.420 5.736 5.903
Aggressive buy limit order % 10.027 10.450 13.777 16.736 17.940
At quote buy limit order % 45.644 46.547 39.156 31.097 22.696
Below best buy limit order % 34.607 34.243 36.161 42.232 50.017
Investor 4 ticks private valuation
Buy market order % 18.159 17.558 16.951 16.754 14.030
Aggressive buy limit order % 16.893 16.515 17.898 18.841 18.492
At quote buy limit order % 55.195 56.216 53.357 47.620 45.845
Below best buy limit order % 9.029 8.986 10.880 15.968 21.633
High-frequency trader
Buy market order % - 0.073 0.047 0.033 0.022
Aggressive buy limit order % - 1.026 1.106 0.845 0.779
At quote buy limit order % - 8.872 11.309 11.421 10.981
Below best buy limit order % - 40.116 37.588 36.410 39.218
Order cancellation ratio % - 75.759 72.403 68.491 65.988
Transactions
Share of Limit Orders
Slow speculator % 66.157 74.731 81.265 84.376 -
Investor 2 ticks PV % 52.286 52.301 51.537 50.735 46.804
Investor 4 ticks PV % 30.875 32.548 33.865 35.169 39.147
HFT % - 33.756 47.012 56.990 65.109
Execution Times
Slow speculator 7.774 6.394 4.939 3.918 -
Investor 2 ticks PV 5.029 4.324 3.649 2.752 1.914
Investor 4 ticks PV 3.789 3.526 3.278 3.174 2.604
HFT - 3.188 3.746 4.142 3.556
This table presents the market quality indicators, welfare, trader strategies and transactions from model simulations
performed for ﬁve diﬀerent parameterizations in which the share of HFTs among speculators is progressively
increased from 0% to 100%. Overall market activity and the total share of speculators in the trader population are
held constant at 30%. To better compare strategies across trader groups, we report strategies for positive private
valuation investors. Strategies for negative private value traders are symmetric.
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Table 3.2
Impact of HFT on market quality, welfare, and strategies when adding HFTs to the trader population under
symmetric information.
Share of HFTs in the Market 15% 17.5% 20% 22.5% 25%
Market Quality
Best Bid/Oﬀer size 1.976 2.162 2.637 3.261 4.281
Depth oﬀ BBO 5.822 7.119 8.338 9.909 11.576
Quoted spread 1.615 1.561 1.503 1.469 1.467
Eﬀective spread 1.176 1.078 1.057 1.024 1.029
Price discovery |pt − vt|/vt % 1.289 1.185 1.138 1.101 1.118
Microstructure noise volatility 0.080 0.077 0.076 0.075 0.076
Welfare
Average welfare 0.239 0.235 0.228 0.220 0.213
Slow speculator 0.050 0.034 0.023 0.011 0.011
Investor 2 ticks PV 0.219 0.228 0.229 0.230 0.228
Investor 4 ticks PV 0.435 0.437 0.440 0.442 0.444
HFT 0.096 0.085 0.074 0.069 0.062
Trader Strategies
Slow speculator
Buy market order % 0.064 0.043 0.034 0.025 0.025
Aggressive buy limit order % 1.454 1.291 1.099 0.705 0.707
At quote buy limit order % 10.779 10.174 9.684 9.966 10.013
Below best buy limit order % 36.537 37.885 37.962 40.220 40.380
Investor 2 ticks private valuation
Buy market order % 5.420 6.203 6.463 6.846 6.859
Aggressive buy limit order % 13.777 18.525 17.020 14.812 11.870
At quote buy limit order % 39.156 23.535 23.974 23.650 30.606
Below best buy limit order % 36.161 44.639 45.313 47.052 44.746
Investor 4 ticks private valuation
Buy market order % 16.951 16.522 14.384 15.300 15.359
Aggressive buy limit order % 17.898 18.662 17.164 16.664 19.036
At quote buy limit order % 53.357 50.203 46.913 46.831 39.505
Below best buy limit order % 10.880 14.361 17.811 20.744 19.995
High-frequency trader
Buy market order % 0.047 0.035 0.029 0.023 0.021
Aggressive buy limit order % 1.106 1.144 0.855 0.449 0.425
At quote buy limit order % 11.309 9.568 10.471 11.742 12.881
Below best buy limit order % 37.588 38.910 38.285 37.883 35.807
Order cancellation ratio % 72.403 69.300 60.705 52.054 36.435
Transactions
Share of Limit Orders
Slow speculator % 81.265 85.839 87.097 90.778 90.212
Investor 2 ticks PV % 51.537 45.541 42.803 40.411 38.702
Investor 4 ticks PV % 33.865 37.331 38.214 37.085 35.739
HFT % 47.012 50.984 53.750 56.382 59.944
Execution Times
Slow speculator 4.939 3.902 3.632 3.904 4.701
Investor 2 ticks PV 3.649 2.041 2.018 2.046 2.674
Investor 4 ticks PV 3.278 3.142 3.037 2.830 2.473
HFT 3.746 2.624 3.009 4.077 4.216
This table presents the market quality indicators, welfare, trader strategies and transactions from model simulations
performed for ﬁve diﬀerent parameterizations in which the share of HFTs in the overall trader population is
progressively increased from 15% to 25% by gradually adding HFTs. Overall market activity increases in this
scenario. To better compare strategies across trader groups, we report strategies for positive private valuation
investors. Strategies for negative private value traders are symmetric.
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Table 3.3
Impact of HFT on market quality, welfare, and strategies when the overall trader population is constant under
asymmetric information.
Share of HFTs among Speculators 0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Market Quality
Best Bid/Oﬀer size 1.334 1.454 1.582 1.837 2.441
Depth oﬀ BBO 3.523 3.530 3.822 4.522 6.765
Quoted spread 1.697 1.878 1.780 1.683 1.619
Eﬀective spread 1.413 1.492 1.452 1.415 1.163
Price discovery |pt − vt|/vt % 1.356 1.363 1.376 1.382 1.287
Microstructure noise volatility 0.082 0.082 0.083 0.084 0.080
Welfare
Average welfare 0.235 0.237 0.239 0.240 0.241
Slow speculator 0.069 0.062 0.053 0.034 -
Investor 2 ticks PV 0.215 0.215 0.217 0.218 0.225
Investor 4 ticks PV 0.432 0.433 0.433 0.434 0.437
HFT - 0.108 0.098 0.092 0.073
Trader Strategies
Slow speculator
Buy market order % 0.199 0.163 0.132 0.121 -
Aggressive buy limit order % 2.045 3.312 2.237 2.488 -
At quote buy limit order % 11.066 11.377 11.032 8.121 -
Below best buy limit order % 38.403 36.298 37.108 37.172 -
Investor 2 ticks private valuation
Buy market order % 5.499 5.188 5.031 5.381 5.721
Aggressive buy limit order % 10.030 10.369 12.311 13.558 18.796
At quote buy limit order % 45.305 45.089 43.027 39.022 23.746
Below best buy limit order % 32.551 33.789 32.868 33.342 43.805
Investor 4 ticks private valuation
Buy market order % 19.777 16.810 17.571 17.435 15.686
Aggressive buy limit order % 19.543 17.508 21.585 21.419 20.295
At quote buy limit order % 47.963 55.758 44.745 42.703 42.498
Below best buy limit order % 6.766 8.381 13.174 16.518 20.794
High-frequency trader
Buy market order % - 0.100 0.069 0.050 0.024
Aggressive buy limit order % - 2.110 1.782 1.604 0.724
At quote buy limit order % - 9.801 14.471 12.895 11.884
Below best buy limit order % - 37.688 34.955 33.916 37.387
Order cancellation ratio % - 81.879 74.740 72.260 69.670
Transactions
Share of Limit Orders
Slow speculator % 66.003 71.591 74.231 70.361 -
Investor 2 ticks PV % 52.942 53.329 53.753 53.525 47.813
Investor 4 ticks PV % 32.748 34.740 32.635 34.021 37.755
HFT % - 28.979 50.596 58.298 65.110
Execution Times
Slow speculator 6.546 5.053 3.968 2.461 -
Investor 2 ticks PV 5.100 4.917 4.141 3.400 1.732
Investor 4 ticks PV 3.747 3.448 2.935 2.544 2.409
HFT - 2.631 3.448 4.227 4.400
This table presents the market quality indicators, welfare, trader strategies and transactions from model simulations
performed for ﬁve diﬀerent parameterizations in which the share of HFTs among speculators is progressively
increased from 0% to 100%. Overall market activity and the total share of speculators in the trader population are
held constant at 30%. To better compare strategies across trader groups, we report strategies for positive private
valuation investors. Strategies for negative private value traders are symmetric.
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Table 3.4
Impact of HFT on market quality, welfare, and strategies when adding HFTs to the trader population under
asymmetric information.
Share of HFTs in the Market 15% 17.5% 20% 22.5% 25%
Market Quality
Best Bid/Oﬀer size 1.594 1.835 1.946 2.281 2.495
Depth oﬀ BBO 3.732 5.003 5.684 6.665 7.150
Quoted spread 1.844 1.779 1.756 1.699 1.625
Eﬀective spread 1.530 1.439 1.356 1.332 1.261
Price discovery |pt − vt|/vt % 1.376 1.310 1.266 1.239 1.194
Microstructure noise volatility 0.084 0.081 0.082 0.081 0.080
Welfare
Average welfare 0.250 0.242 0.235 0.228 0.221
Slow speculator 0.051 0.033 0.013 -0.001 -0.013
Investor 2 ticks PV 0.217 0.223 0.228 0.229 0.229
Investor 4 ticks PV 0.434 0.436 0.437 0.442 0.447
HFT 0.101 0.094 0.088 0.080 0.073
Trader Strategies
Slow speculator
Buy market order % 0.154 0.120 0.125 0.115 0.134
Aggressive buy limit order % 3.525 2.551 2.409 1.724 1.529
At quote buy limit order % 10.045 9.060 8.889 9.578 10.478
Below best buy limit order % 34.896 38.626 38.139 38.588 39.642
Investor 2 ticks private valuation
Buy market order % 5.420 5.763 6.044 6.217 6.653
Aggressive buy limit order % 12.440 16.459 18.500 17.078 16.379
At quote buy limit order % 41.317 30.980 22.593 23.842 23.337
Below best buy limit order % 33.382 37.852 41.395 44.093 46.961
Investor 4 ticks private valuation
Buy market order % 18.543 16.263 14.509 13.232 11.566
Aggressive buy limit order % 22.554 21.351 20.549 20.428 18.278
At quote buy limit order % 40.609 46.282 48.886 39.764 33.156
Below best buy limit order % 15.667 15.667 14.399 18.110 24.482
High-frequency trader
Buy market order % 0.078 0.056 0.044 0.039 0.031
Aggressive buy limit order % 2.484 1.987 1.824 1.200 1.044
At quote buy limit order % 11.290 11.721 10.156 11.070 11.718
Below best buy limit order % 34.209 36.410 37.674 38.794 37.973
Order cancellation ratio % 77.457 75.674 71.732 66.213 62.043
Transactions
Share of Limit Orders
Slow speculator % 73.135 73.036 71.930 71.937 70.757
Investor 2 ticks PV % 54.129 49.471 45.203 43.629 41.855
Investor 4 ticks PV % 34.551 38.871 42.138 41.716 40.451
HFT % 46.788 50.580 54.623 57.075 60.599
Execution Times
Slow speculator 3.818 2.598 2.057 2.040 2.007
Investor 2 ticks PV 3.980 2.567 1.758 1.601 1.650
Investor 4 ticks PV 2.978 2.467 2.575 2.204 1.996
HFT 3.170 2.946 2.608 2.923 2.969
This table presents the market quality indicators, welfare, trader strategies and transactions from model simulations
performed for ﬁve diﬀerent parameterizations in which the share of HFTs in the overall trader population is
progressively increased from 15% to 25% by gradually adding HFTs. Overall market activity increases in this
scenario. To better compare strategies across trader groups, we report strategies for positive private valuation
investors. Strategies for negative private value traders are symmetric.
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Table 3.5
Impact of regulations on market quality, welfare, and strategies under symmetric information.
Setting Base Minimum Cancellation Transaction Rebates Speed
case resting time fee tax bump
1.0s $0.015 0.1% $0.01/-$0.01 1.0s
Market Quality
Best Bid/Oﬀer size 1.976 1.964 1.460 2.042 1.868 4.592
Depth oﬀ BBO 5.822 5.292 2.466 5.998 4.684 12.862
Quoted spread 1.615 1.609 1.616 1.592 1.557 1.265
Eﬀective spread 1.176 1.303 1.428 1.172 1.275 1.065
Price discovery |pt − vt|/vt % 1.289 1.358 1.360 1.282 1.341 1.337
Microstructure noise volatility 0.080 0.082 0.082 0.080 0.081 0.083
Welfare
Average welfare 0.239 0.234 0.219 0.237 0.234 0.233
Average welfare + proceeds 0.239 0.234 0.222 0.239 0.234 0.233
Slow speculator 0.050 0.057 0.042 0.047 0.056 0.034
Investor 2 ticks PV 0.219 0.214 0.206 0.218 0.213 0.222
Investor 4 ticks PV 0.435 0.431 0.426 0.433 0.427 0.434
HFT 0.096 0.089 0.083 0.094 0.095 0.089
Trader Strategies
Slow speculator
Buy market order % 0.064 0.102 0.128 0.063 0.101 0.241
Aggressive buy limit order % 1.454 0.705 0.648 1.450 1.172 0.179
At quote buy limit order % 10.779 11.699 8.197 11.137 12.739 10.388
Investor 2 ticks private valuation
Buy market order % 5.420 5.803 5.136 5.471 5.642 7.194
Aggressive buy limit order % 13.777 10.080 6.201 14.618 9.511 7.068
At quote buy limit order % 39.156 49.321 52.062 35.261 48.603 55.778
Investor 4 ticks private valuation
Buy market order % 16.951 20.645 17.439 17.320 17.786 30.567
Aggressive buy limit order % 17.898 17.415 12.743 19.707 15.932 14.481
At quote buy limit order % 53.357 50.763 65.568 48.191 56.785 41.407
High-frequency trader
Buy market order % 0.047 0.073 0.087 0.047 0.066 0.082
Aggressive buy limit order % 1.106 0.294 0.236 1.181 0.975 0.127
At quote buy limit order % 11.309 16.212 16.050 10.920 12.197 13.444
Order cancellation ratio % 72.403 7.892 1.127 73.185 74.833 29.026
Transactions
Share of Limit Orders
Slow speculator % 81.265 75.936 73.510 81.856 78.869 87.530
Investor 2 ticks PV % 51.537 54.144 53.195 51.461 53.860 51.243
Investor 4 ticks PV % 33.865 29.475 35.975 34.024 33.671 17.593
HFT % 47.012 54.069 45.960 46.120 43.242 74.078
Execution Times
Slow speculator 4.939 7.672 21.359 4.936 6.648 9.533
Investor 2 ticks PV 3.649 4.962 6.869 3.387 5.286 4.769
Investor 4 ticks PV 3.278 3.854 4.841 3.302 4.448 3.397
HFT 3.746 9.211 14.867 3.452 4.650 10.614
This table presents the market quality indicators, welfare, trader strategies and transactions from model simulations
performed for six diﬀerent parameterizations. The base case is a situation where 30% of traders are speculators,
half of which are HFTs, and HFTs do not have an information advantage over other traders. The ﬁve other cases
introduce a minimum resting time, cancellation fees, transaction taxes, rebate fees and speed bumps of a size
reported in the respective column headers. To better compare strategies across trader groups, we report strategies
for positive private valuation investors. Strategies for negative private value traders are symmetric.
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Table 3.6
Impact of regulations on market quality, welfare, and strategies under asymmetric information.
Setting Base Minimum Cancellation Transaction Rebates Speed
case resting time fee tax bump
1.0s $0.015 0.1% $0.01/-$0.01 1.0s
Market Quality
Best Bid/Oﬀer size 1.596 1.570 1.545 1.633 1.547 2.205
Depth oﬀ BBO 3.865 3.687 2.601 3.953 3.435 4.895
Quoted spread 1.844 1.670 1.692 1.807 2.005 1.339
Eﬀective spread 1.530 1.463 1.542 1.453 1.939 1.332
Price discovery |pt − vt|/vt % 1.376 1.440 1.419 1.381 1.522 1.395
Microstructure noise volatility 0.084 0.085 0.084 0.083 0.087 0.086
Welfare
Average welfare 0.239 0.233 0.221 0.237 0.236 0.237
Average welfare + proceeds 0.239 0.233 0.224 0.239 0.236 0.237
Slow speculator 0.051 0.058 0.049 0.048 0.064 0.039
Investor 2 ticks PV 0.217 0.213 0.205 0.215 0.212 0.218
Investor 4 ticks PV 0.434 0.430 0.424 0.431 0.425 0.431
HFT 0.101 0.092 0.083 0.099 0.103 0.102
Trader Strategies
Slow speculator
Buy market order % 0.154 0.170 0.135 0.143 0.223 0.397
Aggressive buy limit order % 3.525 1.272 0.608 3.358 3.548 0.913
At quote buy limit order % 10.045 11.798 11.315 10.412 10.537 12.191
Investor 2 ticks private valuation
Buy market order % 5.420 5.325 4.870 5.272 4.924 6.180
Aggressive buy limit order % 12.440 10.077 6.651 11.862 9.917 7.265
At quote buy limit order % 41.317 50.117 56.761 42.962 48.141 53.765
Investor 4 ticks private valuation
Buy market order % 18.543 19.115 17.107 17.638 15.757 37.369
Aggressive buy limit order % 22.554 18.086 13.076 21.552 17.933 10.934
At quote buy limit order % 40.609 52.817 64.357 45.604 55.863 32.865
High-frequency trader
Buy market order % 0.078 0.097 0.083 0.071 0.111 0.160
Aggressive buy limit order % 2.484 0.434 0.208 2.553 2.360 0.460
At quote buy limit order % 11.290 18.273 16.747 11.253 12.974 14.485
Order cancellation ratio % 77.457 7.975 1.195 79.108 77.173 64.577
Transactions
Share of Limit Orders
Slow speculator % 73.135 70.136 69.571 73.218 62.305 79.815
Investor 2 ticks PV % 54.129 55.252 54.852 53.519 56.627 56.939
Investor 4 ticks PV % 34.551 31.122 35.422 35.261 42.767 13.417
HFT % 46.788 53.369 46.644 46.803 34.623 74.599
Execution Times
Slow speculator 3.968 12.585 21.244 4.936 4.055 10.144
Investor 2 ticks PV 4.141 6.716 9.108 3.387 8.908 3.919
Investor 4 ticks PV 2.978 3.376 4.393 3.211 3.015 3.488
HFT 3.170 8.806 14.522 3.075 3.786 6.228
This table presents the market quality indicators, welfare, trader strategies and transactions from model simulations
performed for six diﬀerent parameterizations. The base case is a situation where 30% of traders are speculators,
half of which are HFTs. The ﬁve other cases introduce a minimum resting time, cancellation fees, transaction
taxes, rebate fees and speed bumps of a size reported in the respective column headers. Throughout, HFTs have an
information advantage over other traders, which only observe the fundamental value with a lag of two time units.
To better compare strategies across trader groups, we report strategies for positive private valuation investors.
Strategies for negative private value traders are symmetric.
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Figure 3.1: Workﬂow of the game.
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Figure 3.2: Impact of HFT on market quality, welfare, and strategies under symmetric information when the
overall trader population is constant.
This ﬁgure presents the market quality indicators, welfare, and trader strategies from model simulations per-
formed for ﬁve diﬀerent parameterizations in which the share of HFTs among speculators is progressively
increased from 0% to 100%. Overall market activity and the total share of speculators in the trader population
are held constant at 30%.
The top panel reports the diﬀerent market quality measures as a function of the share of speculators in the
market that are HFTs. The middle panel reports welfare for the diﬀerent groups and the average welfare of all
traders in the market. The bottom panel reports the share of market orders in slow speculators' and HFTs'
transactions (left axis) and their welfare from market orders and limit orders (right axis).
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Figure 3.3: Average composition of the limit order book when replacing slow speculators by HFTs.
Average composition of the limit order book from model simulations performed for two diﬀerent
parameterizations in which the share of HFTs among speculators is increased from 25% (left) to
75% (right). Overall market activity and the total share of speculators in the trader population
are held constant at 30%.
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Figure 3.4: Impact of HFT on market quality, welfare, and strategies under symmetric information when adding
HFTs to the trader population.
This ﬁgure presents the market quality indicators, welfare, and trader strategies from model simulations per-
formed for ﬁve diﬀerent parameterizations in which the share of HFTs in the overall trader population is
progressively increased from 15% to 25% by gradually adding HFTs. Overall market activity increases in this
scenario.
The top panel reports the diﬀerent market quality measures as a function of the share of traders in the market
that are HFTs. The middle panel reports welfare for the diﬀerent groups and the average welfare of all traders
in the market. The bottom panel reports the share of market orders in slow speculators' and HFTs' transactions
(left axis) and their welfare from market orders and limit orders (right axis).
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Figure 3.5: Average composition of the limit order book when adding HFTs.
Average composition of the limit order book from model simulations performed for two diﬀerent
parameterizations in which the share of HFTs in the overall trader population is increased from
15% (left) to 25% (right) by adding HFTs. Overall market activity increases in this scenario.
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Figure 3.6: Impact of HFT on market quality, welfare, and strategies under asymmetric information when the
overall trader population is constant.
This ﬁgure presents the market quality indicators, welfare, and trader strategies from model simulations per-
formed for ﬁve diﬀerent parameterizations in which the share of HFTs among speculators is progressively
increased from 0% to 100%. Overall market activity and the total share of speculators in the trader population
are held constant at 30%.
The top panel reports the diﬀerent market quality measures as a function of the share of speculators in the
market that are HFTs. The middle panel reports welfare for the diﬀerent groups and the average welfare of all
traders in the market. The bottom panel reports the share of market orders in slow speculators' and HFTs'
transactions (left axis) and their welfare from market orders and limit orders (right axis).
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Figure 3.7: Impact of HFT on market quality, welfare, and strategies under asymmetric information when
adding HFTs to the trader population.
This ﬁgure presents the market quality indicators, welfare, and trader strategies from model simulations per-
formed for ﬁve diﬀerent parameterizations in which the share of HFTs in the overall trader population is
progressively increased from 15% to 25% by gradually adding HFTs. Overall market activity increases in this
scenario.
The top panel reports the diﬀerent market quality measures as a function of the share of traders in the market
that are HFTs. The middle panel reports welfare for the diﬀerent groups and the average welfare of all traders
in the market. The bottom panel reports the share of market orders in slow speculators' and HFTs' transactions
(left axis) and their welfare from market orders and limit orders (right axis).
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Figure 3.8: Updates of beliefs
At each time t in each state s, each action a˜ has an associated payoﬀ Qt(a˜|s). The beliefs at each time t imply
an optimal strategy yt, which assigns the payoﬀ maximizing action at each state, a
∗(s) ∈ arg maxa˜∈A(s)Qt(a˜|s).
The value of state s then is J(s, yt) = Qt(a
∗(s)|s). If the previous state was s and the state s′ is hit, the
continuation value J(s′|yt′) is based on the action a′ taken in the new state s′:
1. Market order : payoﬀ from the market order.
2. Limit order : expected value of the limit order represented by the action a′, Q(a′|s′).
3. No order : expected value of taking no action a′, Q(a′|s′).
Put together, the Q-factors are updated in the following fashion, where J(s′|yt′) represents the payoﬀ to the
action taken at state s′ and time t′.
Qt′(a
∗|s) = n
n+ 1
Qt(a
∗|s) + 1
n+ 1
e−ρ(t
′−t)J(s′|yt′)
Similarly, if the previously submitted limit order is executed, the expected payoﬀ at the previous state is updated
by x˜(α+ vt′ − a˜∗), where t′ is the current time.
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Chapter 4
Price Impact of Aggressive Liquidity Pro-
vision
Ramazan Gençay, Soheil Mahmoodzadeh, Jakub Roj£ek and Michael C. Tseng1
Abstract
This paper analyzes brief episodes of high-intensity quotes turnover and revisionbursts in quotes
in the U.S. equity market. Such events occur very frequently, around 400 times a day for actively traded
stocks. We ﬁnd signiﬁcant price impact associated with this market-maker initiated event, about ﬁve
times higher than during non-burst periods. Bursts in quotes are concurrent with short-lived structural
breaks in the informational relationship between market makers and market takers. During bursts,
market makers no longer passively impound information from order ﬂow into quotesa departure from
the traditional market microstructure paradigm. Rather, market makers signiﬁcantly impact prices
during bursts in quotes. Further analysis shows that there is asymmetry in adverse selection between
the bid and ask sides of the limit order book and only a sub-population of market makers enjoys an
informational advantage during bursts. Our results call attention to the need for a new microstructure
perspective in understanding modern high-frequency limit order book markets.
Keywords: Price Impact, Burst, High-Frequency Trading, Market Quality, Adverse Selection
JEL classiﬁcation: G14 · G28 · C58.
4.1. Introduction
The increasing prevalence of algorithmic trading has spurred a considerable amount of work seeking
to understand the impact of high-frequency trading on market quality and its inﬂuence on execution
1Ramazan Gençay gratefully acknowledges ﬁnancial support from the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council
of Canada and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. Jakub Roj£ek gratefully acknowledges
the support of the Swiss Finance Institute's Advanced Doctoral Student Grant during his visit to Simon Fraser Univer-
sity. We are grateful for fruitful discussions, comments and suggestions made by Michel Habib, Joel Hasbrouck, Hubert
Kempf, Marc Paolella, Angelo Ranaldo, Thomas Richter, Jean-Charles Rochet, Alexander Wagner, Alexandre Ziegler,
and seminar participants at the University of Zurich. All errors and omissions remain ours.
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quality for traditional institutional investors.2 As pointed out by O'Hara (2015), the rapid proliferation
and evolution of high-frequency technology presents challenges to the existing market microstructure
paradigm. While theoretical models have shown that algorithmic traders in continuous limit order
markets derive competitive advantage from faster analysis of order book evolution and other informa-
tion,3 the empirical literature has focused on the impact of algorithmic trading on traditional measures
of market quality.4 Armed with the ability to update and revise quotes at an extremely fast rate, the
behavior of high-frequency market makers may depart fundamentally from that assumed in the market
microstructure literature. This issue remains largely understudied. In this paper, we aim to ﬁll this
gap by analyzing market makers' activity that manifests itself directly in the quotation process and is
not immediately attributable to the traditional role of passive liquidity provider.
Understanding the various dimensions of the quotation process in ﬁnancial markets is crucial, as it
spans and interweaves diﬀerent market participants, such as market makers, speculators, institutional
investors and regulators, and diﬀerent objectives, such as inventory management, optimal execution,
arbitrage, price discovery, and fairness of the trading process. One aspect of the quotation process that
is of particular concern to regulators is irregularity in arrival intensity. Regulatory questions regarding
the impact of high-frequency traders' ability to manipulate the quotation process on the market remain
unanswered.5
While unrelated with the fundamental value of assets, we show in this paper that market-maker
initiated irregularity in the quotation process, nevertheless, has price impact. Many exchanges have
rushed to introduce rules designed to minimize such, apparently predatory, market making activity. For
example, traders may be penalized for updating their quotes more than 100 times per transaction, by
so-called cancellation fees.6 The empirical analysis of new regulations thus comes ex post.7 Adopting
ad hoc regulations in response to a poorly understood phenomenon may lead to suboptimal market
2For an overview of the literature on high-frequency trading, see the surveys by Jones (2013) and O'Hara (2015).
3Foucault et al. (2015), Aït-Sahalia and Saglam (2014), Biais et al. (2015) and Hoﬀmann (2014).
4See Jovanovic and Menkveld (2011), Brogaard (2010), Hasbrouck and Saar (2013), Riordan and Storkeimeier (2012),
Tong (2013) and Hendershott et al. (2011).
5These concerns are stated in SEC (2010) and CESR (2010), for example.
6Examples of regulatory initiatives can be found in Aït-Sahalia and Saglam (2014), Colliard and Hoﬀmann (2013),
Friedrich and Payne (2015), and Rojcek and Ziegler (2015).
7The experimental approach in regulation seems to have become a new feasible way to test new regulatory proposals,
supported and initiated also by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the recent controlled tick size change
event, see SEC (2014).
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outcomes.8 In this paper, we provide a detailed analysis of market quality during periods where the
quotation process exhibits extreme behavior. We show that during very brief periods of aggressive
liquidity provision, bursts in quotes, market makers are able to anticipatepossibly precipitateprice
impact and trade in the direction of the subsequent price change.9 Aggressive liquidity provision, in
contrast to passively absorbing incoming market orders, is a form of information inﬂow into the market.
Further analysis on this departure from the traditional microstructure paradigm shows that asymmetry
in adverse selection exists during, and only during, bursts in quotes between market makers on opposite
sides of the limit order book. Market makers on the side opposite of the burst suﬀer elevated adverse
selection costs, while market makers on the side of the burst enjoy negative price impact.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 surveys the related literature. Section 4.3
describes the data selection, and Section 4.4 explains the deﬁnition and detection of bursts. Section 4.5
gives a detailed analysis of market quality during bursts. Section 4.6 states our main results on the price
impact of bursts in quotes. Section 4.7 reﬁnes the analysis by examining the asymmetry in adverse
selection faced by market makers on opposite sides of order book during bursts in quotes. Section 4.8
concludes.
4.2. Literature Review
Our paper contributes to the growing literature analyzing the role of quotations in current ﬁnancial
markets that are dominated by algorithmic and high-frequency traders using limit order book as
the underlying matching mechanism. The rise in quote cancellations in the millisecond environment is
documented, e.g. by Hasbrouck and Saar (2013) and many others. A few streams of thought are present
within this domain. Hasbrouck (2015) observes that at sub-second horizons bids and asks in US equity
markets are more volatile than implied by long-term fundamentals. In considering underlying causes,
Hasbrouck (2015) suggests that this volatility is not likely to arise from quote-stuﬃng, spooﬁng, or
mixed-strategy behavior, but more likely reﬂects Edgeworth cycles, or recurrent phases of undercutting.
This comports with Baruch and Glosten (2013), who show that repeatedly playing a certain static
liquidity provision game has a subgame perfect equilibrium in mixed strategies, which correspond
8For example, if exchanges or regulators considered imposing a cap on the order to trade ratio or rate of quote arrivals,
we suggest ﬁrst analyzing liquidity, price impact, and other market quality measures precisely during periods where the
quotation process exhibits extreme behavior.
9In our sample, the duration of such periods of extremely high order arrival intensity is approximately 1.09 seconds,
implying that high-frequency traders are the primary liquidity suppliers during such events.
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to ﬂeeting orders and ﬂickering quotes.10 The natural question is then under what conditions is the
market in an equilibrium with ﬂickering quotes and what the corresponding conditions for the quotation
process are. As we show in this paper, extreme quotation activity only occurs in brief and irregular
episodes.
Other studies, somewhat similar to ours, have focused their attention on analyzing the number of
quotes involved in the trading process. Egginton et al. (2014) ﬁnd that stocks experience decreased
liquidity, higher trading costs, and increased short term volatility during periods of intense quoting
activity. We conﬁrm these ﬁndings in Section 4.5 and further examine the issue of permanent price
impact and adverse selection during bursts in quotes. On the order ﬂow side, Conrad et al. (2015)
explores market resiliency during periods of exceptionally high-intensity and low-latency trading
large liquidity drawdowns in which, during a millisecond, trading algorithms systematically sweep
large volume across multiple trading venues using predominantly intermarket sweep orders (ISO's).11
Although such large drawdowns incur trading costs, they do not appear to degrade the subsequent
price formation process or increase the subsequent cost of trading. Chakravarty et al. (2012) analyze
the role of ISO's. They ﬁnd that ISO trades have a signiﬁcantly larger information share despite their
small trade size relative to non-ISO trades. We also ﬁnd that during bursts in quotes, compared to
periods with no bursts in quotes, the share of ISO trades rises from roughly 39% to 49% in our sample.
On the price process, Brogaard et al. (2015) ﬁnd that, during extreme price movements, high-frequency
traders act as net liquidity suppliers, while non-high-frequency traders act as net liquidity demanders.
Moreover, high-frequency traders are active liquidity providers during price jumps that result in perma-
nent price changes, absorbing the most informed order ﬂow. Our results verify a conditional converse:
during periods of burst in quotation activity, when liquidity suppliers are necessarily high-frequency
traders, volatility is signiﬁcantly higher, and high-frequency market makers on the opposite side of the
burst absorb incoming order ﬂow that is more informed than during non-burst periods. This ﬁnding
indicates that part of the order ﬂow consumed during extreme price movements necessarily includes
slower market makers being picking oﬀ. We also ﬁnd that the burst itself has price impact and it
magniﬁes the price impact of those trades which are on the opposite side of the burst. Utilizing the
NASDAQ dataset which identiﬁes high-frequency traders, Brogaard et al. (2014) shows that high-
10The notion of ﬂickering quotes corresponds to bursts in quotation activity in this paper.
11ISO's are marketable limit orders designed to be sent to multiple venues simultaneously. They are meant to facilitate
Reg NMS' basic principle of routing orders to the exchange claiming the NBBO.
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frequency trading is correlated with public information and that high-frequency traders trade in the
direction of permanent price impact and opposite of transitory pricing errors. Our results are diﬀerent
in that, in addition to competition for the order ﬂow, bursts in quotes may be the outcome of a zero-
sum game between market makers. Brogaard et al. (2015) considers the price impact of limit orders
using Canadian regulatory data on a trade by trade basis. They ﬁnd that high-frequency traders are
responsible for the biggest portion of price discovery through their limit orders. Our ﬁnding can be
interpreted in the opposite direction. Rather than correcting price mis-alignment, it is possible that
bursts in quotes are used to introduce price mis-alignment.
Our paper also relates to the literature on the price impact of trades, with the additional feature of
incorporating bursts in quotes, which have not been analyzed previously. Building on the permanent
price impact model of Hasbrouck (1991), several models incorporating trading activity and its non-
linear impacts have been put forward (see e.g. Dufour and Engle (2000), Zhang et al. (2001), Engle
and Lunde (2003), and Hautsch and Huang (2012)).12 Related to our paper is the paper by Cont et
al. (2014), who enhance the traditional deﬁnition of the order ﬂow by the no-trade limit order book
events and show that such an approach dramatically increases the explanatory power of the basic price
impact regression. While supporting this ﬁnding by showing that bursts in quotes have signiﬁcant
price impact, we also explore information asymmetry in the market.13 In addition, we consider the
economic implications of bursts taking place on the same and opposite side of the book as order ﬂow.
Various regulators and self-regulatory organizations have introduced or are contemplating introducing
caps on quote-to-trade ratios. The obvious implementation is introducing cancellation fees. Cancella-
tion fees have been introduced by the Canadian regulatory authority IIROC with the explicit aim of
curbing high-frequency spam. The Milan Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ Stock Market introduced
an excess order fee for high quote-to-trade ratios in April and July 2012 (see SEC (2012)). Cancel-
lation fees are also imposed by Eurex for order-to-trade ratios exceeding 5, on NASDAQ OMX for
ratios exceeding 100, as well as on the German stock exchange. The new MiFID2 European Directive
also foresees the introduction of cancellation fees to curb excessive quote-to-trade ratios. Empirical
evidence on the impact of cancellation fees is provided by Malinova et al. (2013), who ﬁnd that follow-
ing their introduction on the Toronto Stock Exchange, quoting activity decreased by 30% and spreads
12Further useful surveys on the empirical estimation of price impact are provided in Bouchaud (2010) and Pham et al.
(2015).
13Cont et al. (2014) explicitly eschews the adverse selection perspective.
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increased by 9%. Friederich and Payne (2015) study the cancellation fees introduced above a certain
quotes-to-trades ratio threshold on the Italian Stock exchange and observe a decrease in market depth
and worsened price discovery. Our results indicate two possible channels why curbing the amount of
quotes might be detrimental to market quality. First, such penalties remove an information channel
to the market, since quotes have information content. Second, bursts in quotes on the same side
accommodate market taker's order ﬂow with a much smaller increase in eﬀective spreads.
4.3. Data Description
Data for the analysis are taken from the Trades and Quotes (TAQ) database, which is a collection of
intraday trades and quotes for all securities listed on the New York Stock Exchange, American Stock
Exchange, Nasdaq National Market System and SmallCap issues, which are traded on 15 major U.S.
exchanges within the U.S. National Market System (NMS). Quotes data consists of limit orders eligible
for the National Best Bid or Oﬀer (NBBO) and collected through the Securities Information Processor
(SIP). TAQ does not contain quotes at deeper levels of the book. Transactions data consists of all
transactions carried out within the NMS. Two sets of data are used. For sampling frequencies of one
second and ﬁve seconds, we use data of 15 very active and liquid companies during the approximately
four months period from October 10, 2011 to February 7, 2012.14 The summary statistics in terms
of average number of trades, quotes, price, lot size, and quoted spread are shown in Table 4.1. For
a sampling frequency of 100 milliseconds, more recent, millisecond time-stamped TAQ data is used.
Based on the activity criterion, we choose a sample of 20 active stocks for the period from March 9, 2015
through April 8, 2015.15 We divide trading days into equidistant time intervals of 100 milliseconds,
one second, and ﬁve seconds. One trading day is six hours from 9:45 until 15:45, disregarding the ﬁrst
and last 15 minutes of the oﬃcial trading hours for possible excessive volatility. We collect a number
of variables for each intervalthe number of changes in the NBBO across exchanges, the number of
changes of the National Best Oﬀer across exchanges, the number of changes of the National Best Bid
across exchanges, NBBO quoted prices, quoted mid-point, and average quoted spread. We point out
that the changes to the NBBO may be due to a number of possible scenarios. An existing quote may
14Out of the 30 highest capitalization stocks traded on US exchanges, we selected those 15 which had the highest daily
average volume.
15The 20 stocks consist of 10 stocks with the highest average daily traded volume during March 2015 on NASDAQ and
10 stocks based on the same criterion on NYSE.
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be revised on price or size. A new better quote may be transmitted to the NMS. The existing best
quote may be cancelled causing the second best quote to become the new best quote. An incoming
transaction may be executed against the best quote or quotes, in which case the new best quote is
determined from the remaining active quotes in the NMS. Regulations require that transactions are
reported with a maximum delay of 90 seconds.16
Transactions which happen in the upstairs market or dark pools might take place at prices that diﬀer
signiﬁcantly from those observed on lit exchanges or they can be reported with a delay. Transactions
which happen outside of the prevailing bid and ask quotes are known as out-trades." Out-trades
would generate bouncebacks in the transaction price process17, which might compromise our volatility
or eﬀective spread calculations. To ﬁlter out transactions which would introduce bouncebacks due to
out-trades reported with a delay possibly longer than 90 seconds, or negotiated at prices outside of
the prevailing quotes, we use the cleaning procedure described in Aït-Sahalia and Jacod (2014). We
discard transactions at prices which are outside the tunnel constructed by using the worst past 90-
seconds trailing NBBOs and deem the remaining transactions as eligible. Speciﬁcally, ﬁrst we compute
the average NBBO for each interval. Next, for each interval, we construct a range, which is formed by
the minimum average bid and maximum average ask during the past 90 seconds. To determine whether
a transaction which happened during the particular interval is eligible, we test if the transaction falls
within this range. Afterwards, we collect the number of transactions and volume weighted average
price (VWAP).18 Using the methodology of Lee and Ready (1991), we further assign a buy or sell sign
to obtain the order ﬂow variable.19
4.4. Bursts in Financial Data
One man's noise is another man's signal."
As described in Section 4.3, limit order book statistics of interest are computed for subintervals at a
given frequencye.g. the number of quote revisions for every second. We then deﬁne bursts to be
16Exchanges report transactions continuously. The maximum delay restriction applies to transactions from dark pools
and the upstairs market.
17For example an out-trade transaction happening at a price above the prevailing ask will result in a positive return,
followed by a negative return.
18VWAP is computed by summing up the dollar volume of all transactions in an interval and dividing by the total
number of shares traded in the interval.
19The same eligibility criterion and trade-direction assignment procedure is applied to data with a 100-milliseconds
sampling frequency.
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those subintervals during which the given statistic has extremely large realizationse.g. when quote
revisions occur at an extremely high rate per second. We deﬁne extremely large by choosing a
tail probability thresholde.g. Prob = 99.9%. It turns out that the unconditional distributions of
ﬁnancial time series we consider in this paper ﬁt well the exponential distribution (see also Vlachos
et al. (2008)). We therefore choose the threshold for bursts corresponding to tail probability Prob
as x = −µˆ log(1 − Prob), where µˆ is the sample mean of the quotes revision time series during a
corresponding interval.20
The limit order book statistics considered are the number of transaction arrivals, total quote revisions
on both sides of the book, and quote revisions on the bid and ask sides separately. Bursts in our sample
are therefore determined in two steps. First, the threshold for a chosen probability is computed for
every 15-minute interval for each statistic using the formula x = −µˆ log(1 − Prob). Each 15-minute
interval thus has its own speciﬁc threshold. To mitigate the in-sample impact on the threshold of
possible extreme behavior of the considered times series, we include the 5 minutes before and after
the corresponding interval in estimating the mean of the distribution, µ. An example of thresholds
computed for two stocks for quote revisions and transaction arrivals within the same 15-minute interval
is shown in Figure 4.1. These thresholds are then applied to equidistant sub-partitions of the 15-minute
intervals for quotes and trades. The summary statistics for one trading day using Prob = 99.9% and
subintervals of 100 milliseconds, one second, and ﬁve seconds for measuring bursts in quotes are shown
in Table 4.2. As expected, we observe that each summary statistic varies monotonically with the
sampling frequency. Higher sampling frequencycorresponding to shorter subintervalscorrespond
to a higher number of bursts, shorter average duration of bursts, shorter inter-arrival time between
bursts, higher volume traded during bursts, and total longer duration of bursts. We adopt the sampling
frequency of one second for the subsequent analysis. The threshold for the number of quotes and trades
for one trading day at one-second frequency in Alcoa (AA) stock is shown in Figure 4.2.
20Given the exponential assumption, our deﬁnition of burst coincides with that of uniﬁed outlier in Knorr and Ng (1997).
Alternatively, one may simply choose the threshold to be the corresponding quantile of the empirical distribution. Both
deﬁnitions yield similar empirical results.
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4.5. Impact of Bursts on Market Quality
As the initial step in our analysis, we evaluate the impact of bursts in quotes on basic market quality
measures, whose deﬁnitions are recalled below. In Section 4.7, we further consider measures of realized
spread and adverse selection.
 The quoted spread QSt during the t-th interval is measured as the average diﬀerence between
the ask price At and bid price Bt for the given interval, QSt = At −Bt.
 The eﬀective spread during the t-th interval is deﬁned as ESt = 2qt(Pt −Mt), where Pt is the
volume weighted average price (VWAP) in the t-th interval, Mt is the average mid-quote from
the t-th interval, and qt is the trade direction indicator.21 The eﬀective spread measures market
maker's revenue for supplying immediacy.22
 The return volatility is deﬁned as σt =
|Pt−Pt−1|
Mt−1 .
23
As stated in Section 4.4, inspecting the summary statistics reported in Table 4.2 leads us to use a
sampling frequency of one second. To reinforce this point, in this section we also report the market
quality measures computed based on higher (100-milliseconds) and lower (5-seconds) frequencies.24
Figure 4.3, Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5 examine patterns in the quoted spread, the eﬀective spread, and
return volatility in 2.5-second, 25-second and 2-minute windows centered around bursts in quotes. The
panels, from left to right, show market quality measures computed at 100-millisecond, one-second, and
ﬁve-second sampling frequencies, respectively. For example, for the 100-millisecond sampling frequency
(left panel), 100-millisecond sub-interval averages are computed across 2.5-second windows centered
around the burst, across all stocks in our sample. The initial values for each burst event are normalized
to 100. The sample of each market quality measure is displayed as the black solid line. The shaded
area represents one standard deviation from the mean. Corresponding time series for the one-second
21qt = 1 if net aggregate order ﬂow during the t-interval amounts to a buy order and qt = −1 if net aggregate order ﬂow
during the t-interval amounts to a sell order. To compute qt, we ﬁrst determine the trade direction indicator for each
transaction that occurs during the interval using the Lee and Ready (1991) criterion, namely +1 if buyer initiated and
−1 if seller-initiated. The trade direction is then assigned to the volume (number of share traded) in that transaction.
The total signed volume deﬁnes the order ﬂow variable Ot. This variable may be positive or negative depending on
whether more shares were bought or sold, and qt = sgn(Ot).
22Equivalently, the eﬀective spread measures market takers' execution cost.
23Our deﬁnition is close to that for the realized volatility of the process logPt where Pt is modelled as a semimartingale.
24The main part of our analysis in Section 4.6 and Section 4.7 will be based on one-second frequency.
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and ﬁve-second intervals are displayed in the middle and right panels. We also show the average order
size during bursts in quotes in Figure 4.6.
Figure 4.3 shows that a ﬁve-second sampling frequency is unable to detect the spike in the quoted
spread seen at higher frequencies. The noise content is also higher at the ﬁve-second frequency. Not
surprisingly, the spike in quoted spread is accompanied by a concurrent spike in return volatility
with similar signal-noise characteristics with respect to sampling frequency shown in Figure 4.5. Also
telling is the sharp dip in average order size during bursts shown in Figure 4.6, showing a corresponding
change in market taking behavior as well as market making. Average order size decreases by 80% at
100-milliseconds frequency. Lower order size and higher correlation with special order types25 indicates
increased presence of sophisticated market participants. A lower sampling frequency of ﬁve seconds
again shows less pronounced patterns. The concurrent spike in eﬀective spread shows that the market
makers are able to extract higher execution cost during bursts in quotes relative to non-burst periods.
In contrast to other measures, the eﬀective spread is more noisy around bursts at higher frequencies and
consolidates when measured across ﬁve-second intervals. Taken together, the market quality measures
indicate that trading is more volatile during bursts in quotes. Our analysis thus farin particular,
the duration and sensitivity with respect to sampling frequencypoints towards the characterization
of bursts as unanticipated short-lived events whose market signature dissipates quickly. The frequency
at which limit order book statistics associated to bursts are visible also suggests that these are events
for which the primarypossibly the onlyinstigators are high-frequency traders.
4.6. Empirical Analysis of Price Impact
Price impact usually refers to measures of the information content of a trade. A trade can have a
permanent and temporary price impact. The permanent price impact is impounded to asset prices,
whereas the temporary price impact dissipates as time passes. In this section, we study the permanent
price impact and the role that bursts in quotes play in determining permanent changes in prices.
4.6.1. Price Impact during Bursts
To examine the process with which information is incorporated into prices, we extend the VAR model
of Hasbrouck (1991) to reﬂect burst activity. Let rt denote the change in the market maker's estimate
25Correlation with the number of ISOs increases from 39% to 45% during periods of bursts in quotes.
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of fundamental value and qt be the (aggregated) order ﬂow direction, positive for buyer-initiated trades
and negative for seller-initiated trades, as deﬁned in Section 4.5.26 We start with the basic assumption
that trades have linear price impact27, i.e.
rt = βtqt + εt (4.1)
where εt is information available to the market maker in addition to information from order ﬂow {qt}.
Ensuring exogeneity of εt and its interpretation as the market maker's information uncorrelated with
order ﬂow requires controlling for microstructure frictions. For example, inventory-control eﬀects may
cause past quote updates to inﬂuence the market maker's current quote update. Delayed adjustment
to information and expectation of order-splitting on the part of the market takers means order ﬂow
may have lagged eﬀects on quote updates. This suggests an inﬁnite-order autoregressive speciﬁcation28
rt = α1rt−1 + α2rt−2 + · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
inventory-control eﬀects
+ β0qt + β1qt−1 + β2qt−2 + · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
delayed adjustment, response to order-splitting, etc
+ εt︸︷︷︸
market maker's information
.
(4.2)
On the market taker side, similar microstructure considerations apply to order ﬂow {qt}, which is
therefore assumed to follow a similar speciﬁcation:29
qt = γ1rt−1 + γ2rt−2 + · · ·+ δ1qt−1 + δ2qt−2 + · · ·+ νt︸︷︷︸
market takers' private information
(4.3)
where the trade innovation νt is market takers' private information. Assuming all regressors are exoge-
nous, embedded in the above VAR model of {rt, qt} is the fundamental assumption that εt and νt are
orthogonal.30 This underpins the traditional microstructure perspectivethere is no contemporaneous
causality running from the market makers' quote adjustment to order ﬂow. On the other hand, market
takers' private information is reﬂected by the market maker's update to his estimate of the fundamen-
26We use the midpoint of the quoted spread as a proxy for the market maker's estimate as in Hasbrouck (1991). rt is
the percentage mid-quote return based on the average mid-quote immediately before t and immediately after t.
27Many theoretical microstructure models, spanning from the seminal Kyle (1985) model to, for example, Duﬃe and
Zhu (2015), derive an equilibrium where the functional form of price impact of trades is linear.
28In estimating the model, we found that rt has signiﬁcant autocorrelation whose directions alternate with respect to
lag increments, consistent with a market maker who is inventory-neutral. See Table 4.6 in the Appendix. Also as
expected, past order ﬂow, up to 10 lags, has price impact. See Table 4.7 in the Appendix.
29Order ﬂow {qt} may exhibit auto-correlation due to order splitting. Autocorrelation in {qt} may also arise as an
equilibrium outcome when the market taker anticipates the market maker's inventory-neutral tendency and may adjust
his order ﬂow according to past quote updates. In estimating the order ﬂow equation, we do ﬁnd the coeﬃcients γt
mirror the behavior of αt in alternating signs, but with opposite signs. See Table 4.7 in the Appendix.
30Assume that the market makers' public information εt is exogenous to past returns {rt−1, rt−2, · · · } and past order
ﬂow {qt−1, qt−2, · · · }. Then εt is exogenous to qt if and only if it is exogenous to νt.
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tal value of the asset. The burst activity we consider, which is a fundamentally new phenomenon of
the modern high-frequency market, suggests the possibility of departure from this informational di-
chotomy. We also point out that Equation (4.2) and Equation (4.3) impose no structural restriction on
the exact nature of information being incorporated into quote updates, except that trade information
νt and non-trade information εt are orthogonal. This ﬂexibility allows us to transport and extend the
model into the high-frequency setting.31
To analyze the permanent price impact of bursts in quotes, deﬁne the time series indicators BQt and
BTt by
32
BQt =

1 if there is a burst in quotes in period t
0 otherwise,
(4.4)
BTt =

1 if there is a burst in trades in period t
0 otherwise.
(4.5)
Allowing for additional price impact during bursts in quotes and trades leads to the speciﬁcation
rt =
∞∑
i=1
αirt−i +
∞∑
i=0
[φQi B
Q
t−i + φ
T
i B
T
t−i + φ
Q&T
i B
Q
t−iB
T
t−i + βi]qt−i + ε
′
t (4.6)
where the innovation εt, market maker's information, in Equation (4.2) is now separated into
εt =
∞∑
i=0
[φQi B
Q
t−i + φ
T
i B
T
t−i + φ
Q&T
i B
Q
t−iB
T
t−i]qt−i︸ ︷︷ ︸
Information impounded into prices during bursts in quotes or trades
+ ε′t︸︷︷︸
Market maker's information after controlling for bursts
(4.7)
31In the high-frequency setting, we may interpret information as any knowledge regarding the likelihood of price move-
ment in a time horizon relevant to a high-frequency trader, e.g. a few seconds. This certainly diﬀers from information
with price impact measured in days, e.g. information possessed by some institutional traders (Schedule 13D ﬁlers)
discussed in Collin-Dufresne and Fos (2015).
32Throughout the paper we impose minimal econometric assumptions on the models considered. The data generating
process {rt, qt, BQt ,BTt , εt, νt} necessarily features heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. For consistent estimation
and robust inference, we assume appropriate mixing conditions hold. Informally, mixing conditions describe asymptotic
independence where events suﬃciently far apart in time are close to being independent. See White (2014), pp. 43-45.
This is certainly reasonable in the high-frequency microstructure setting. This is in contrast with Hasbrouck (1991)
and later empirical investigations (e.g. Hendershott et al. (2011)) that impose covariance-stationarity.
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Consistency with Equation (4.2) therefore requires that bursts in quotes and bursts in trades are
uncorrelated with {rt−1, rt−2, · · · } and {qt, qt−1, qt−2, · · · }. This assumption rests on the transient
nature, both in duration and eﬀect on the market, of bursts in quotes and trades. The results in
Section 4.5 show that these conditions are met33: the average duration of burst in quotes is 1.09 seconds
and for trades 1.11 seconds. Quoted spread, eﬀective spread, return volatility, and average order size
all show concurrent spikes of the same duration. Bursts are therefore surprise events unanticipated by
the rest of the market and exogenous to normal price updates and order ﬂow.34
The order ﬂow time series remains the same as Equation (4.3). Our model subsumes the Hasbrouck
model as a special case when there is no burst activity. In particular, ε′t, the market maker's information
after controlling for bursts, and νt are contemporaneously uncorrelated and exogenous. As expected,
our model selection procedure for choosing the number of lags conﬁrms that burst indicators are not
signiﬁcant for lags greater than zero. We compare the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian
Information Criterion (BIC) for models in Equation (4.2) and Equation (4.3) with up to 30 lags of
past returns and order ﬂow. Figure 4.7 reports AIC and BIC for one trading day of AA stock. Similar
results are obtained for the rest of the stocks and days. Based on the values of AIC and BIC, for all
stocks we choose the ten lags for rt and qt and zero lag for bursts in quotes and trades. We therefore
arrive at the model
rt =
10∑
i=1
αirt−i +
10∑
i=1
βiqt−i + β0qt + φQB
Q
t qt + φ
TBTt qt + φ
Q&TBQt B
T
t qt + ε
′
t, (4.8)
qt =
10∑
i=1
γirt−i +
10∑
i=1
δiqt−i + νt (4.9)
Estimation results for this model are reported in Table 4.3.35 The coeﬃcient of bursts in quotes, φQ,
has an average value of 0.009, and is positive and signiﬁcant at the 5% level during 81.67% of ﬁrm-days.
The average impact of bursts in quotes is 50% larger than the corresponding impact of bursts in trades,
which averages 0.006 and is signiﬁcant during 91.67% of ﬁrm-days. Aggressive liquidity provision has
an impact on prices, which is in its magnitude even larger than the impact of bursts in trades. The
33Section 4.7 provides further conﬁrmation on the trasient nature of bursts.
34The behavior of the empirical adverse selection proxy in Section 4.7 also conﬁrms that the shifts in the informational
structure of the market associated to bursts in quotes are short-lived with no lag eﬀects.
35Estimation results for the return Equation (4.2) and order ﬂow Equation (4.3) are reported in Table 4.6 and Table 4.7,
respectively, in the Appendix.
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coeﬃcient of concurrent bursts in quotes and trades, φQ&T , is most of the time not signiﬁcant and
its value is much smaller, -0.002. This suggests that the impact of bursts can be decomposed into
the impact of quotes and trades without introducing the interaction term. The immediate impact of
trades during one-second intervals, β0, is 0.002 on average. Taken together with the impact of bursts
in quotes, the immediate impact of trades increases to 0.011 during bursts in quotes, which is about
ﬁve times higher than during no-burst periods.
4.6.2. Breakdown of Information Dichotomy During Bursts
The additional price impact during bursts in quotes observed in the previous subsection suggests a
temporary structural break in the informational dichotomy between market makers and market takers.
At the high-frequency resolution we consider, some information can be accessed by both market makers
and market takers. There may be temporary contemporaneous correlation between market makers'
and market takers' information, which in turn leads to a temporary change in the severity of adverse
selection faced by the market maker, resulting in magniﬁed price impact of trades we observe during
bursts in quotes. We now test this hypothesis.
Econometrically, our hypothesis is that {εt, νt} are contemporaneously correlated during, and only
during, bursts in quotes. To test for correlation during bursts in quotes, we take the residuals {εˆt, νˆt}
from estimating Equation (4.2) and Equation (4.3). We retain those residuals
{εˆt1{BTt =0 &BQt =1}, νˆt1{BTt =0 &BQt =1}} (4.10)
from burst-in-quote periods and discard those from periods of bursts in trades.36
To test correlations during non-burst-in-quote periods, the non-burst-in-quote residuals
εˆt1{BTt =0 &BQt =0} from Equation (4.2) are not viable as input. If we expect positive correlation of {εˆt, νˆt}
during bursts in trades or quotes, by estimating Equation (4.2) we force negative correlation on {εˆt, νˆt}
during non-burst periods, because the regression residuals have zero correlation on average. Hence we
take the residuals εˆ′t from Equation (4.8) during non-burst-in-quote periods (again discarding burst-in-
trades periods) and test the correlation between {εˆ′t1{BTt =0 &BQt =0}, νˆt1{BTt =0 &BQt =0}}. Equivalently,
36During bursts in trades, εt necessarily contains market takers' private information. Therefore not discarding residuals
εˆt1{BTt =1 &B
Q
t =1}
from bursts-in-trade periods will contaminate our correlation test.
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we can write the market maker's information εt in Equation (4.2) as
εt = φ
T
i B
T
t qt + φ
Q&T
i B
Q
t B
T
t qt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Information impounded into prices during bursts in trades
(4.11)
+ ε#t︸︷︷︸
Market maker's information during bursts in quotes only
+ ε′t︸︷︷︸
Market maker's information during non-burst periods
.
Discarding the ﬁrst part of the residuals representing the information impounded into prices during
bursts in trades leaves us with
εˆt1{BTt =0} = εˆ
#
t + εˆ
′
t. (4.12)
where we use εˆt1{BTt =0 &BQt =1} and εˆ
′
t1{BTt =0 &BQt =0} as empirical proxy for ε
#
t and ε
′
t respectively.
Nonparametric correlation tests performed on the two sets of residuals are reported in Table 4.4. The
correlation of {εˆt, νˆt} is signiﬁcant during bursts in quotes whereas the correlation outside of bursts in
quotes are nonsigniﬁcant with large margins.37 We also test our hypothesis assuming a linear model.
Restricting to non-burst-in-trade periods and assuming a linear relationship between εt and νt,we
estimate the regression
νˆt = η
QBQt εˆt + η
¬Q(1− BQt )εˆ′t + ν ′t. (4.13)
Our null hypotheses are that ηQ 6= 0 and η¬Q = 0.
The results from estimating this speciﬁcation, with residuals as proxies, are reported in Table 4.4.
We clearly fail to reject the null hypotheses. There is a strong relationship between residuals and
thus market maker's and market taker's information that exists only during bursts in quotes. The
coeﬃcient is not distinguishable from zero otherwise. Our results conﬁrm that, during very brief
episodes of aggressive liquidity provision, the limit-order-market-order interaction forms a two-way
information channel. Outside of burst periods limit orders passively absorb information from market
orders. We next examine how this informational structural break diﬀerently impacts the two sides of
the order book.
37Pearson r, Spearman ρ, and Kendall τ statistics are all signiﬁcant with p-values below 10−3 and an average of approx-
imately 0.4.
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4.7. Asymmetric Adverse Selection
We have shown that during bursts in quotes, market maker's and market takers' otherwise orthogonal
information sets become correlated and that the price impact of trades rises signiﬁcantly. We now
analyze the adverse selection faced by market makers from the bid and ask sides of the limit order
book before, during, and after bursts in quotes. We compute the standard empirical measures used in
examining adverse selection. The realized spread at time t, denoted by RSt, is deﬁned by
RSt = 2qt(Pt −Mt+s) (4.14)
where Pt is the transaction price at time t, and Mt+s is the midpoint at time t + s for some chosen
time lag s. RSt is the diﬀerence between the current deal price and the quoted midpoint at a future
time. After a transaction at time t, price movements favorable to the market maker from t to t + s
results in positive RSt. For example, after a buyer-initiated trade (qt = 1), if Pt > Mt+s, the market
maker can unwind his short position to make a proﬁt of Pt −Mt+s per share at t + s. Conversely,
Pt < Mt+s means that, marking to market, the market maker has suﬀered an adverse price move
and must revise his estimate of the fundamental value accordingly. The eﬀective spread at time t, as
deﬁned in Section 4.5, is
ESt = 2qt(Pt −Mt). (4.15)
ESt is a proxy for the market maker's revenue from supplying immediacy. The following limit order
book statistic deﬁned using realized spread and eﬀective spread serves as a reasonable proxy for adverse
selection of market makers (see Bessembinder (2003)):
ADt = ESt −RSt = 2qt(Mt+s −Mt) (4.16)
i.e. ADt is the revenue from supplying immediacy plus the loss due to adverse price moves, or put
diﬀerently, the permanent adverse price move suﬀered by market makers supplying liquidity. The
higher the loss from the realized spread is, the higher the ADt is.
ADt is measured at a chosen time interval s; we choose s = 30 seconds. We report our results at two
diﬀerent sampling frequencies, one second and ﬁve seconds. At one-second intervals, for each instance
of burst in our data, we ﬁrst ﬁnd the realized spread time series {RSt} for 12 intervals before and after,
then average across all bursts. A similar procedure applied to the ﬁve-second sampling frequency gives
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a window of 120 seconds for each statistic (12 intervals of ﬁve seconds before and after burst). To
summarize our ﬁndings, for each company we convert the raw realized spreads into percentages of
the mid-quote and then average across all companies.38 The results for one- and ﬁve-second sampling
frequencies are displayed in Figure 4.8 and Figure 4.9, respectively.39 In both Figure 4.8 and Figure 4.9,
the left and right columns show the results for bursts on the ask and bid side. Inspecting the middle
panel of both ﬁgures shows that market makers on bid and ask sides experience the same realized spread,
except during a few-second window around bursts. The realized spread spikes up for those market
makers when the trade takes place on the same side as burstindicating that they are anticipating
order ﬂow, consistent with our analysis in Section 4.6. On the other hand, market makers on the
opposite side of a burst experience temporarily worse realized spread. The change in price impact
occurs concurrently with an approximately 80% reduction in incoming market order size shown in
Figure 4.6.
The same normalization as for the realized spread is applied to eﬀective spread calculations. The
result is shown in the bottom panels of Figure 4.8 and Figure 4.9. We observe that the eﬀective spread
increases during bursts at either side of the order ﬂow. The amount of increase diﬀers depending on
whether the market maker is on the same side as the burst. The market makers on the opposite side of
the burst charge higher cost for immediacy. This is consistent with our analysis above. Market makers
charge higher transaction cost for order ﬂow trading in the direction of the permanent price impact.
For example, in the left columns of Figure 4.8 and Figure 4.9, during a burst in quotes on the ask side,
the premium for immediacy charged against sell orders spikes up. We ﬁnd it interesting that bursts in
quotes, whose average duration is approximately one second, aﬀect price movements ﬁve seconds after
their occurrence.
Despite extracting a higher immediacy premium, market makers on the opposite side of a burst in
quotes nevertheless suﬀer worse adverse selection relative to non-burst periods. The results of adverse
selection proxy are given in the top panels of Figure 4.8 and Figure 4.9. During bursts there are
clearly opposite shifts in adverse selection for bid- and ask-side market makers. The adverse selection
proxy for the market makers on the opposite side as the burst shows an upward jump during burst,
while a downward dip occurs for those on the same side. There is therefore asymmetry in adverse
38For example, the realized spread is converted to RSt
Mt
× 100%.
39In computing empirical proxies, we only consider bursts in quotes where bursts only occur on one side of the book.
Table 4.5 provides details on the amount of data used in this procedure.
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selection between the two sides of the limit order book during bursts.40 While the market makers on
the opposite side of the burst charge higher cost of immediacy for order ﬂow trading in the direction
of the permanent price impact, it only partially compensates for the negative realized spread resulting
from these events.
The model Equation (4.8) can also be extended to this higher resolution setting, by distinguishing
bursts in quotes on the bid and ask sides. The directional speciﬁcation is41
rt =
10∑
i=1
αirt−i +
10∑
i=1
βiqt−i + β0qt + φQ,sameB
Q,same
t qt + φ
Q,oppBQ,oppt qt + φ
TBTt qt + ε
′
t, (4.17)
where rt is again the percentage mid-quote return during period t. The indicator B
Q,same
t is 1 if qt
hits the side of the book where there is a burste.g. a buyer-initiated order during a burst on the ask
sideand zero otherwise. Similarly, the indicator BQ,oppt is 1 if qt hits the side of the book opposite a
burst. Results are reported in Table 4.5. The coeﬃcient φQ,same is negative and signiﬁcant at the 5%
conﬁdence level for 67.33% of ﬁrm-days. The coeﬃcient φQ,opp is positive and signiﬁcant at the 5%
conﬁdence level for 82.67% of ﬁrm-days. The results conﬁrm the asymmetry in adverse selection during
bursts. Our previous ﬁndings from Section 4.6 that market makers' and market takers' information
become correlated during bursts in quotes can be made more precise. The brief information advantage
is only enjoyed by those market makers who precipitate the burst. The orders on the opposite side of
the burst in quotes have elevated permanent price impact. On the other hand, for order ﬂow hitting
the same side of the book as a burst, the price impact is negative and possibly proﬁtable for the market
maker.
4.8. Conclusions
In this paper, we analyze periods of extreme behavior of the quotation process in the U.S. equity
market. We show that these very brief periods are associated with sharp spikes in return volatility,
eﬀective spread, and quoted spread, and with a signiﬁcant decrease in order size. Despite only occurring
in sporadic seconds-long episodes exogenous to normal order ﬂow, bursts in quotes impart permanent
price impact. Moreover, the price impact of bursts in quotes is economically more signiﬁcant than an
40As a byproduct, these results also serve as further conﬁrmation that bursts are exogenous shocks largely unanticipated
by the market in general, which was assumed in Equation (4.8).
41All pairwise interaction terms between dummies are included in the regression but suppressed in the equation for
notional compactness.
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analogous impact of bursts in trades. Further analysis shows that bursts in quotes are indications of
short-lived structural breaks in information asymmetry between market maker and market taker, a
departure from the standard microstructure paradigm.
Our analysis calls attention to a phenomenon thus far unexamined by the microstructure literature
price impact due to market maker action. A sub-population of market makersthose that initiate
burstsenjoy a temporary abatement of adverse selection during bursts. The rest of market makers
suﬀers more severe adverse selection relative to non-burst periods. One may put forth a number
of conjectures regarding the reason behind this ﬂeeting merge of information from two sides of the
market. High-frequency market makers may use their speed and information processing advantage
to minimize adverse selection by predicting the direction of price moves. For example, during public
news announcements, high-frequency traders may be using text-mining technology to anticipate market
moves (see e.g. Foucault et al. (2015) and Ro³u (2014)). Or market takers may be using limit orders
as part of their optimal execution strategy. Another possibility is that bursts-in-quote may be a tactic
designed to induce response from other market makers, in which case the resulting asymmetric adverse
selection would indicate this is a zero-sum game among market makers.
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Table 4.1
Data Summary Statistics
This table reports daily medians of 15 highly liquid stocks from October 10, 2011 to February 7,
2012 for 82 trading days. The data is obtained from the Trades and Quotes (TAQ) database. The
number of trades is obtained as the number of transactions from the TAQ. The number of quotes
represents changes in the National Best Bid and Oﬀer (NBBO) either in price or size. Price is the
volume weighted average price of eligible transactions. Spread is given by the diﬀerence between ask
and bid price. Size is measured in number of lots (100 shares). Ticker symbols and company names
are provided in the ﬁrst two columns.
Stock Company Name # of trades # of quotes Price Size in lots Spread in ¢
AA Alcoa 53,207 1,436,262 9.87 6,003 1.00
BAC Bank of America 136,476 1,767,462 6.25 44,121 1.00
GE General Electric 81,607 2,008,788 17.21 9,128 1.00
IBM International Business Machines 17,838 754,269 186.05 840 3.04
JNJ Johnson & Johnson 29,928 1,487,517 64.48 1,582 1.63
JPM JPMorgan Chase 90,824 3,501,468 33.79 5,364 1.35
MRK Merck & Co 39,242 1,707,993 35.99 2,520 1.13
PFE Pﬁzer 68,399 1,802,107 20.44 6,646 1.00
PG Procter & Gamble 27,544 1,404,016 64.62 1,486 1.71
PM Philip Morris International 19,413 952,338 73.60 1,092 2.22
T AT&T 51,391 1,699,231 29.32 3,926 1.01
VZ Verizon Communications 34,330 1,444,768 37.82 2,279 1.11
WFC Wells Fargo 82,357 3,000,480 27.04 5,046 1.20
WMT Wal-Mart Stores 30,718 1,409,885 58.49 1,683 1.33
XOM Exxon Mobil 57,168 4,734,158 81.38 2,512 1.90
Table 4.2
Summary Statistics for Bursts
Median daily statistics of bursts in quotes for the 20 most active stocks on NASDAQ and
NYSE from March 9, 2015 to April 8, 2015 using 100-millisecond (ms) intervals and the 15
most active NYSE stocks from October 10, 2011 to February 7, 2012 using one-second and
ﬁve-second intervals. We compute the average length and duration between bursts for every
day and report the medians across days. The threshold for bursts is 99.9%.
Interval length Median # of Average Average duration % Volume % of time
bursts length between bursts during bursts in a day
100 milliseconds 5,692.1 0.12s 3.25s 54.7% 2.9%
One second 419.3 1.09s 42.6s 6.4% 2.3%
Five seconds 24.0 5.27s 1536.7s 1.2% 0.6%
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Table 4.3
Estimated Coeﬃcients for the Price Impact Equation with Bursts
This table shows estimated coeﬃcients for the basic VAR speciﬁcation with bursts in quotes, bursts in trades, and
bursts in both quotes and trades. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation adjusted p-values are displayed below
each coeﬃcient. rt is the percentage mid-quote return based on the average mid-quote immediately before t and
immediately after t. qt is the signed trade direction and B
Q
t is a dummy variable indicating the presence of bursts in
quotes in the interval t. Coeﬃcient φQ represents the price impact attributed to the burst in quotes, BQt . Coeﬃcient
φT represents the price impact attributed to the burst in trades, BTt . Coeﬃcient φ
Q&T represents the price impact
attributed to the burst in quotes with concurrent burst in trades, BQt B
T
t . We display only the leading terms of
the lagged returns. The estimation is performed for each company for every day. We report the median value of
coeﬃcients across stocks with the associated p-value and the percentage of companies for which a speciﬁc coeﬃcient
is signiﬁcant across days. We also display the median number of each type of burst event per day. The analysis in
this table is based on one-second intervals and a 99.9% threshold for bursts. The sample period is October 10, 2011
to February 7, 2012.
rt =
10∑
i=1
αirt−i +
10∑
i=1
βiqt−i + β0qt + φ
QBQt qt + φ
TBTt qt + φ
Q&TBQt B
T
t qt + ε
′
t.
α1 β0 φ
Q φT φQ&T R2-Adj R2-Adj
with w/o
bursts bursts
AA 0.925 0.002 0.046 0.007 -0.012 0.585 0.489
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.030
BAC 0.988 0.001 0.058 0.007 -0.009 0.593 0.510
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.139
GE 0.917 0.001 0.028 0.007 -0.007 0.567 0.484
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.021
IBM 0.247 0.003 0.006 0.005 -0.001 0.416 0.416
0.000 0.000 0.022 0.013 0.281
JNJ 0.445 0.002 0.004 0.004 -0.001 0.411 0.397
0.000 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.213
JPM 0.875 0.006 0.009 0.011 -0.002 0.502 0.482
0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.254
MRK 0.851 0.002 0.012 0.007 -0.004 0.518 0.465
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.045
PFE 0.827 0.000 0.023 0.005 -0.001 0.541 0.461
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.125
PG 0.619 0.002 0.005 0.005 -0.001 0.403 0.381
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.210
PM 0.336 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.000 0.407 0.407
0.000 0.043 0.113 0.009 0.192
T 0.742 0.001 0.015 0.006 -0.006 0.484 0.430
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.027
VZ 0.846 0.001 0.009 0.007 -0.003 0.505 0.437
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.076
WFC 0.922 0.005 0.013 0.013 -0.008 0.551 0.509
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.060
WMT 0.705 0.002 0.007 0.005 -0.002 0.462 0.430
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.082
XOM 0.463 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.002 0.459 0.441
0.000 0.000 0.138 0.000 0.256
Median coeﬃcient 0.827 0.002 0.009 0.006 -0.002 0.502 0.441
Median p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.125
Median daily # of events 419.3 706.1 318.0
% of signiﬁcant ﬁrm-days at 5% 99.67% 93.00% 81.67% 91.67% 30.00%
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Table 4.4
Estimates of Information Relationship During Bursts in Quotes
This table shows Pearson's correlations ρ and regression estimates of the relation between market takers'
and market makers' information, εt and νt. ρ
Q refers to correlation between εˆt and νˆt only during bursts
in quotes, and ρ¬Q to correlation outside of bursts in quotes or trades periods based on residuals from
Equation (4.8) controlling for the eﬀect of bursts. Using residuals from Equation (4.2) and controlling for
bursts in trades, the correlation between εˆt and νˆt outside of bursts in trades is ρ
All. ηQ and η¬Q denote
corresponding OLS estimates from the equation
νˆt = η
QBQt εˆt + η
¬Q(1− BQt )εˆ′t + ν′t.
The estimation is performed for each company for every day. We report the median value of coeﬃcients
across stocks with the associated p-value and the percentage of companies for which a speciﬁc coeﬃcient
is signiﬁcant across days. We also display the median daily number of observations we use for computing
a correlation coeﬃcient and this corresponds to non-zero entries in an array used in the regression. The
analysis in this table is based on one-second intervals and a 99.9% threshold for bursts. The sample period
is October 10, 2011 to February 7, 2012.
ρQ ρ¬Q ηQ η¬Q ρAll
AA 0.487 -0.002 7.779 -0.130 -0.002
0.000 0.724 0.000 0.702 0.726
BAC 0.431 0.007 4.230 0.508 0.005
0.000 0.292 0.000 0.411 0.427
GE 0.514 -0.002 12.735 -0.237 -0.002
0.000 0.729 0.000 0.696 0.720
IBM 0.193 0.000 7.789 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.980 0.001 0.984 0.982
JNJ 0.323 0.000 20.476 -0.021 0.000
0.000 0.947 0.000 0.936 0.946
JPM 0.413 0.000 13.601 -0.037 0.000
0.000 0.905 0.000 0.923 0.913
MRK 0.516 -0.002 22.172 -0.247 -0.002
0.000 0.744 0.000 0.716 0.765
PFE 0.478 0.000 13.568 -0.087 -0.001
0.000 0.779 0.000 0.784 0.828
PG 0.339 0.000 22.921 -0.049 0.000
0.000 0.922 0.000 0.900 0.935
PM 0.022 0.000 0.526 -0.001 0.000
0.000 0.970 0.110 0.971 0.970
T 0.478 -0.001 21.501 -0.202 -0.001
0.000 0.782 0.000 0.788 0.809
VZ 0.417 -0.003 21.597 -0.332 -0.002
0.000 0.691 0.000 0.652 0.716
WFC 0.493 -0.001 15.465 -0.060 0.000
0.000 0.862 0.000 0.871 0.884
WMT 0.410 0.000 26.169 -0.017 0.000
0.000 0.922 0.000 0.937 0.921
XOM 0.206 0.000 15.633 -0.046 0.000
0.000 0.934 0.128 0.935 0.934
Median coeﬃcient 0.417 0.000 15.465 -0.049 0.000
Median p-value 0.000 0.862 0.000 0.871 0.884
Median daily # of events 101.3 20,789 101.3 20,789 20,890
% of signiﬁcant ﬁrm-days at 5% 100% 0% 100% 0% 0%
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Table 4.5
Estimated Coeﬃcients for the Directed Price Impact Equation in the VAR
This table reports estimated coeﬃcients for the basic VAR speciﬁcation with bursts in quotes in the direction of the
trade, in the opposite direction of the trade, and bursts in trades. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation adjusted
p-values are displayed below each coeﬃcient. rt is the percentage mid-quote return based on the average mid-quote
immediately before t and immediately after t. qt is the signed trade direction and Bt is a dummy variable indicating
the presence of bursts in the interval t. Coeﬃcient φQ,same represents the price impact attributed to the burst on
the same side of the book as the sign of the order ﬂow and no burst on the opposite side of the book, BQ,samet .
Hence, BQ,samet is 1 if qt hits the side of the book where there is a burst, e.g. a buyer-initiated order during a burst
on the ask side and zero otherwise. Coeﬃcient φQ,opp represents the price impact attributed to the burst in quotes
on the opposite side of the book. Hence, BQ,oppt is 1 if qt hits the side of the book opposite a burst. Coeﬃcient
φT represents the price impact attributed to the burst in trades, BTt . We display only the leading terms for rt and
qt. The estimation is performed for each company for every day. We report the median value of coeﬃcients across
stocks with the associated p-value and the percentage of companies for which a speciﬁc coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant across
days. We also display the median number of each type of burst event per day. The analysis in this table is based on
one-second intervals and a 99.9% threshold for bursts. The sample period is October 10, 2011 to February 7, 2012.
rt =
10∑
i=1
αirt−i +
10∑
i=1
βiqt−i + β0qt + φ
Q,sameBQ,samet qt + φ
Q,oppBQ,oppt qt + φ
TBTt qt + ε
′
t.
α1 β0 φQ,same φQ,opp φT R2-Adj R2-Adj
with bursts w/o bursts
AA 0.929 0.002 -0.030 0.041 0.031 0.545 0.489
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
BAC 0.988 0.001 -0.024 0.040 0.043 0.558 0.510
0.000 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.000
GE 0.913 0.001 -0.025 0.030 0.018 0.534 0.484
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
IBM 0.247 0.003 0.003 0.007 0.007 0.416 0.416
0.000 0.000 0.178 0.046 0.000
JNJ 0.445 0.002 -0.006 0.008 0.005 0.413 0.397
0.000 0.000 0.007 0.001 0.000
JPM 0.875 0.006 -0.008 0.010 0.013 0.504 0.482
0.000 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.000
MRK 0.848 0.002 -0.014 0.011 0.009 0.507 0.465
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
PFE 0.826 0.001 -0.019 0.024 0.017 0.519 0.461
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
PG 0.619 0.002 -0.003 0.005 0.006 0.397 0.381
0.000 0.000 0.125 0.000 0.000
PM 0.336 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.006 0.408 0.407
0.000 0.035 0.205 0.100 0.000
T 0.742 0.001 -0.013 0.016 0.011 0.472 0.430
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
VZ 0.845 0.001 -0.010 0.010 0.009 0.486 0.437
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
WFC 0.920 0.005 -0.013 0.016 0.014 0.547 0.509
0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
WMT 0.704 0.002 -0.008 0.009 0.006 0.455 0.430
0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000
XOM 0.446 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.455 0.441
0.000 0.000 0.111 0.138 0.000
Median coeﬃcient 0.826 0.002 -0.010 0.010 0.009 0.486 0.441
Median p-value 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000
Median daily number of events 24.8 60.7 318
% of signiﬁcant ﬁrm-days at 5% 99.0% 93.33% 67.33% 82.67% 96.0%
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Table 4.6
Estimated Coeﬃcients for the Return Equation in the VAR
This table reports estimated coeﬃcients for the basic VAR speciﬁcation without bursts in quotes. Heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation adjusted p-values are displayed below each coeﬃcient. rt is the percentage mid-quote return
based on the average mid-quote immediately before t and immediately after t. qt is the signed trade direction. The
estimation is performed for each company for every day. We report the median value of coeﬃcients across stocks with
the associated p-value and the percentage of companies for which a speciﬁc coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant across days. The
analysis in this table is based on one-second intervals. The sample period is October 10, 2011 to February 7, 2012.
rt =
10∑
i=1
αirt−i +
10∑
i=1
βiqt−i + β0qt + εt.
α1 α2 α3 α4 α5 α6 α7 α8 α9 α10 β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 β6 β7 β8 β9 β10 R
2-Adj
AA 0.925 -0.853 0.744 -0.661 0.563 -0.474 0.374 -0.279 0.179 -0.091 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.489
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.238 0.000 0.062 0.000 0.033 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.006
BAC 0.989 -0.906 0.794 -0.695 0.589 -0.488 0.389 -0.300 0.190 -0.095 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.510
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.178 0.000 0.194 0.007 0.042 0.006 0.065
GE 0.915 -0.844 0.738 -0.659 0.551 -0.460 0.368 -0.275 0.183 -0.092 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.484
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.168 0.000 0.085 0.000 0.051 0.001 0.011 0.001 0.012
IBM 0.247 -0.829 0.208 -0.660 0.169 -0.493 0.110 -0.326 0.058 -0.159 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.416
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.007 0.001 0.010 0.055 0.066 0.007 0.297 0.188 0.242
JNJ 0.445 -0.771 0.368 -0.608 0.261 -0.445 0.216 -0.277 0.116 -0.119 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.397
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.031 0.001 0.017 0.001 0.079 0.016 0.181 0.051 0.142
JPM 0.874 -0.790 0.707 -0.617 0.534 -0.438 0.352 -0.260 0.171 -0.084 0.005 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.482
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.250 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000
MRK 0.848 -0.785 0.692 -0.602 0.515 -0.427 0.346 -0.259 0.170 -0.084 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.465
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.243 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.001
PFE 0.828 -0.781 0.686 -0.606 0.515 -0.439 0.348 -0.258 0.171 -0.086 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.461
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.093 0.000 0.170 0.000 0.074 0.001 0.016 0.002 0.007
PG 0.618 -0.718 0.533 -0.539 0.426 -0.375 0.298 -0.229 0.150 -0.087 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.381
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.059 0.000 0.102 0.011 0.070 0.008 0.035
PM 0.336 -0.818 0.278 -0.656 0.212 -0.474 0.142 -0.310 0.077 -0.147 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.407
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.099 0.004 0.043 0.005 0.018 0.020 0.055 0.029 0.134 0.109 0.139
T 0.742 -0.722 0.623 -0.552 0.471 -0.396 0.316 -0.237 0.159 -0.088 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.430
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.050 0.000 0.166 0.001 0.108 0.002 0.080 0.002 0.084
VZ 0.847 -0.783 0.678 -0.597 0.506 -0.426 0.339 -0.256 0.170 -0.087 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.437
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.161 0.000 0.073 0.000 0.012 0.002 0.010 0.009 0.004
WFC 0.920 -0.820 0.739 -0.634 0.552 -0.456 0.363 -0.270 0.180 -0.087 0.005 0.002 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.509
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.098 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
WMT 0.704 -0.735 0.610 -0.548 0.454 -0.385 0.311 -0.231 0.157 -0.080 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.430
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.026 0.000 0.092 0.001 0.042 0.054 0.030 0.031 0.022
XOM 0.541 -0.789 0.430 -0.621 0.321 -0.435 0.251 -0.262 0.145 -0.096 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.441
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.031 0.010 0.085 0.005 0.090
Median
coeﬀ 0.828 -0.789 0.678 -0.617 0.506 -0.439 0.339 -0.262 0.170 -0.088 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.441
Median
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.050 0.000 0.059 0.000 0.051 0.002 0.030 0.005 0.022
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Table 4.7
Estimated Coeﬃcients for the Order Flow Equation in the VAR
This tables shows estimated coeﬃcients for the basic VAR speciﬁcation without bursts in quotes. Heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation adjusted p-values are displayed below each coeﬃcient. rt is the percentage mid-quote return
based on the average mid-quote immediately before t and immediately after t. qt is the signed trade direction. The
estimation is performed for each company for every day. We report the median value of coeﬃcients across stocks with
the associated p-value and the percentage of companies for which a speciﬁc coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant across days. The
analysis in this table is based on one-second intervals. The sample period is October 10, 2011 to February 7, 2012.
qt =
10∑
i=1
γirt−i +
10∑
i=1
δiqt−i + νt.
γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 γ5 γ6 γ7 γ8 γ9 γ10 δ1 δ2 δ3 δ4 δ5 δ6 δ7 δ8 δ9 δ10 R
2-Adj
AA -3.320 0.577 -1.896 1.006 -1.293 0.773 -0.803 0.491 -0.404 0.327 0.096 0.065 0.041 0.038 0.032 0.033 0.023 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.036
0.000 0.162 0.000 0.030 0.019 0.200 0.147 0.226 0.299 0.244 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
BAC -3.999 0.862 -2.392 1.287 -1.756 1.030 -1.270 0.619 -0.687 0.295 0.119 0.084 0.064 0.053 0.046 0.043 0.038 0.037 0.034 0.034 0.071
0.000 0.049 0.000 0.034 0.004 0.078 0.024 0.242 0.132 0.295 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
GE -6.843 1.575 -3.995 2.498 -2.642 2.127 -1.788 1.244 -1.269 0.926 0.101 0.065 0.045 0.037 0.033 0.030 0.022 0.023 0.023 0.025 0.041
0.000 0.024 0.000 0.005 0.005 0.024 0.024 0.097 0.095 0.069 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000
IBM -0.071 -0.006 -0.067 -0.004 -0.052 -0.012 -0.038 -0.009 -0.025 -0.015 0.054 0.023 0.014 0.011 0.012 0.008 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.011 0.006
0.048 0.414 0.145 0.395 0.258 0.471 0.343 0.479 0.374 0.459 0.000 0.001 0.049 0.101 0.089 0.219 0.268 0.211 0.233 0.119
JNJ -2.733 0.047 -1.762 0.227 -1.153 0.206 -0.441 0.110 -0.232 -0.015 0.069 0.033 0.019 0.018 0.017 0.014 0.011 0.010 0.011 0.014 0.011
0.000 0.176 0.001 0.163 0.036 0.211 0.176 0.381 0.280 0.322 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.009 0.014 0.039 0.103 0.121 0.108 0.047
JPM -4.274 1.308 -2.319 1.512 -1.676 1.114 -1.077 0.831 -0.491 0.267 0.105 0.050 0.028 0.024 0.019 0.017 0.012 0.015 0.011 0.016 0.024
0.000 0.007 0.000 0.011 0.007 0.067 0.049 0.124 0.251 0.277 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.008 0.014 0.081 0.037 0.115 0.020
MRK -6.778 2.090 -3.996 2.476 -2.735 2.129 -1.849 1.320 -0.929 0.669 0.092 0.052 0.033 0.028 0.026 0.024 0.014 0.017 0.016 0.019 0.026
0.000 0.007 0.000 0.004 0.003 0.027 0.042 0.104 0.190 0.197 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.044 0.012 0.019 0.006
PFE -6.710 1.279 -3.666 2.017 -2.318 1.775 -1.592 1.294 -0.912 0.945 0.102 0.072 0.048 0.045 0.039 0.036 0.029 0.031 0.028 0.033 0.049
0.000 0.063 0.000 0.020 0.015 0.042 0.050 0.116 0.152 0.049 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
PG -4.726 1.038 -2.952 1.420 -1.988 1.190 -1.023 0.514 -0.570 0.264 0.070 0.036 0.021 0.023 0.017 0.016 0.010 0.012 0.011 0.013 0.013
0.000 0.094 0.000 0.075 0.015 0.117 0.102 0.315 0.202 0.357 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.013 0.018 0.165 0.098 0.097 0.067
PM -0.160 -0.046 -0.160 -0.045 -0.139 -0.029 -0.095 -0.017 -0.044 -0.018 0.054 0.017 0.010 0.010 0.013 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.006 0.011 0.006
0.000 0.126 0.003 0.249 0.044 0.271 0.154 0.378 0.310 0.440 0.000 0.012 0.126 0.143 0.052 0.269 0.277 0.216 0.179 0.115
T -6.954 1.504 -4.118 2.332 -2.917 1.888 -1.747 1.311 -1.020 0.849 0.081 0.055 0.039 0.032 0.032 0.027 0.022 0.023 0.023 0.027 0.028
0.000 0.070 0.000 0.033 0.007 0.067 0.070 0.166 0.266 0.175 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000
VZ -7.679 2.228 -4.398 2.649 -3.118 2.328 -2.298 1.415 -1.147 0.833 0.075 0.045 0.029 0.026 0.025 0.020 0.016 0.019 0.017 0.022 0.021
0.000 0.007 0.000 0.006 0.002 0.035 0.029 0.090 0.134 0.185 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.022 0.008 0.014 0.002
WFC -4.495 1.116 -2.228 1.642 -1.706 1.289 -1.166 0.806 -0.560 0.317 0.107 0.059 0.036 0.032 0.029 0.024 0.018 0.019 0.017 0.021 0.03
0.000 0.055 0.000 0.017 0.017 0.069 0.103 0.192 0.276 0.317 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.012 0.007 0.018 0.002
WMT -4.372 0.856 -2.439 1.157 -1.235 1.137 -0.972 0.626 -0.387 0.463 0.077 0.038 0.026 0.022 0.023 0.016 0.013 0.014 0.013 0.016 0.015
0.000 0.136 0.002 0.186 0.069 0.198 0.272 0.283 0.336 0.281 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.022 0.054 0.042 0.065 0.021
XOM -4.964 1.137 -2.460 1.018 -1.707 0.771 -0.708 0.092 -0.322 -0.043 0.092 0.034 0.019 0.017 0.016 0.014 0.010 0.012 0.010 0.013 0.017
0.000 0.034 0.000 0.102 0.010 0.178 0.063 0.300 0.273 0.329 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.016 0.024 0.048 0.169 0.088 0.149 0.054
Median
coeﬀ -4.495 1.116 -2.439 1.420 -1.707 1.137 -1.077 0.626 -0.560 0.317 0.092 0.050 0.029 0.026 0.025 0.020 0.014 0.017 0.016 0.019 0.024
Median
p-value 0.000 0.063 0.000 0.033 0.015 0.078 0.070 0.226 0.266 0.281 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.044 0.012 0.019 0.006
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Figure 4.1: Burst threshold for the number of quotes and trades during 900 one-second intervals.
Thresholds for determining bursts during 900 intervals of length one-second are given by the dashed lines.
The threshold for the 15-minute window is computed based on an exponential ﬁt to the 25-minute interval
including 5 minutes before and 5 minutes after the 15-minute interval. For every one-second interval once
the corresponding series reaches the threshold, a burst for that interval is recorded. The top panels show
the number of quotes and the bottom panels the number of trades. These graphs represent the data for
Bank of America and Wal-Mart Stores (tickers BAC on the left and WMT on the right) between 10:00am
and 10:15am on October 13, 2011. The ﬁtted exponential distributions are shown in dotted lines. The
estimated means of the exponential distributions based on the 15-minute intervals are 250.2 and 179.5
for the number of quotes for the respective stocks, and 6.3 and 3.0 for the number of trades.
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Figure 4.2: Burst threshold for the number of quotes and trades during one day.
Thresholds for determining bursts. For every one-second interval once the corresponding series reaches
the threshold, a burst for that interval is recorded. The left panel shows the number of quotes and the
right panel the number of trades. These graphs represent the data for Alcoa (ticker AA) between 9:45am
and 15:45pm on October 10, 2011.
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Figure 4.3: Quoted spread around bursts in quotes.
This ﬁgure shows the quoted spread in a 2.5-second (25-second, 2-minute) window around bursts in quotes
on the left (middle, right). The black line represents the average across all 100-millisecond (1-second,
5-second) intervals before, during, and after bursts, as well as across all stocks in our sample, where the
initial value was normalized to 100. The shaded area represents one standard deviation from the mean.
91
Figure 4.4: Eﬀective spread around bursts in quotes.
This ﬁgure examines the eﬀective spread in a 2.5-second (25-second, 2-minute) window around bursts
in quotes on the left (middle, right). The black line represents the average across all 100-millisecond
(1-second, 5-second) intervals before, during, and after bursts, as well as across all stocks in our sample,
where the initial value was normalized to 100. The shaded area represents one standard deviation from
the mean.
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Figure 4.5: Return volatility around bursts in quotes.
This ﬁgure illustrates return volatility in a 2.5-second (25-second, 2-minute) window around bursts in
quotes on the left (middle, right). The black line represents the average across all 100-millisecond (1-
second, 5-second) intervals before, during, and after bursts, as well as across all stocks in our sample,
where the initial value was normalized to 100. The shaded area represents one standard deviation from
the mean.
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Figure 4.6: Average order size around bursts in quotes.
This ﬁgure studies average order size in a 2.5-second (25-second, 2-minute) window around bursts in
quotes on the left (middle, right). The black line represents the average across all 100-millisecond (1-
second, 5-second) intervals before, during, and after bursts, as well as across all stocks in our sample,
where the initial value was normalized to 100. The shaded area represents one standard deviation from
the mean.
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Figure 4.7: Lag Selection Using Bayesian Information Criterion.
This ﬁgure represents the values of the Bayesian information criterion for the returns and order ﬂow
equations for one trading day of AA stock. We obtained similar results for other stocks and days and
when using the Akaike information criterion.
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Figure 4.8: Adverse Selection, Realized and Eﬀective Spread Around Bursts, One-Second Intervals.
This ﬁgure studies the adverse selection proxy in the top panel, the realized spread in the middle panel,
and the eﬀective spread in the bottom panel, before, during, and after bursts. The left panels show the
reaction of the variables to a burst at ask with no concurrent burst at bid. The right panels show the
same reaction to a burst at bid with no concurrent burst at ask. The reported values are percentage
values of the mid-quote and averaged across 15 companies. They show the reaction of the variables to buy
(sell) order ﬂow in full (dashed) line. This ﬁgure is based on one-second intervals and a 99.9% threshold
for bursts.
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Figure 4.9: Adverse Selection, Realized and Eﬀective Spread Around Bursts, Five-Second Intervals.
This ﬁgure studies the adverse selection proxy in the top panel, the realized spread in the middle panel,
and the eﬀective spread in the bottom panel, before, during, and after bursts. The left panels show the
reaction of the variables to a burst at ask with no concurrent burst at bid. The right panels show the
same reaction to a burst at bid with no concurrent burst at ask. The reported values are percentage
values of the mid-quote and averaged across 15 companies. They show the reaction of the variables to buy
(sell) order ﬂow in full (dashed) line. This ﬁgure is based on ﬁve-second intervals and a 99.9% threshold
for bursts.
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Chapter 5
A Model of Price Impact and Market
Maker Latency
Jakub Roj£ek1
Abstract
Price impact measures the diﬀerence between the best quoted price and the realized price as a function
of order size. This paper analyzes how price impact depends on the latency that a market maker is
subject to. I propose a tractable model which allows incorporating both order size and latency eﬀects
as determinants of price impact. The model is solved analytically and is novel in the theoretical
microstructure literature. Larger latency increases adverse selection costs to the market maker and
reduces his probability of trading with a slow investor. A larger order size decreases the slow trader's
outside option, making him susceptible to accept a worse price for his trade. It is shown that the
ﬁrst-order eﬀect of increased latency and increased order size is to increase price impact. Their joint
impact is also positive. When the probability of trading is taken into consideration, the utility of the
slow institutional investor decreases with latency.
Keywords: Price Impact, High-Frequency Trading, Trade Size, Latency, Market Quality, Welfare
JEL classiﬁcation: D53 · G14 · C72.
5.1. Introduction
The joint inﬂuence of trading speed and order size has been largely neglected in recent high-frequency
trading research. Most analyses have focused on understanding the impact of high-frequency trading
on market quality and its inﬂuence on execution quality for traditional institutional investors in terms
of the bid-ask spreads valid for unit size orders.2 While theoretical models have shown in this setting
1I am grateful to Ramazan Gençay, Boyan Jovanovic, Albert Menkveld, and Alexandre Ziegler for providing me with
comments, discussion and suggestions on this paper. All errors and omissions remain mine.
2For an overview of the literature on high-frequency trading, see the surveys by Jones (2013) and O'Hara (2015).
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that algorithmic traders in continuous limit order markets derive a competitive advantage from faster
analysis of order book evolution and other information,3 the empirical literature has focused on the
impact of algorithmic trading on traditional measures of market quality.4 The majority of the empirical
literature conﬁrms the positive ﬁrst-order eﬀects of HFT, especially lower bid-ask spreads and faster
price discovery. However, Hendershott et al. (2011) report that the presence of HFTs also decreases
the depth of the order book and increases the costs of executing large orders. Taking execution costs
into consideration, Tong (2013) measures the execution shortfall of institutional investors and ﬁnds
that HFTs increase transaction costs for them. It is this overall eﬀect of increased price impact which
large institutional traders suﬀer that this paper focuses on. I present a model which incorporates the
joint eﬀect of latency and order size in a setting with a high-frequency market maker, high-frequency
snipers, and slow investors. The model predicts that higher market maker latency and larger order size
lead to higher price impact. Taking the probability of trading into consideration, slow institutional
investors' utility is strictly deteriorating in larger order size and latency. The following sections present
a review of the related literature, the model, comparative statics of the quoted price, and a welfare
analysis.
5.2. Related Literature
The existing theoretical literature on HFT does not provide a model of price impact as a function
of latency. There are two related streams of theoretical models. Repeated double auction models,
which represent synchronous trading; and asynchronous trading models, which represent trading in
continuous time. This section reviews the theoretical predictions of models in these two categories.
The double auction models of Ro³u (2014), Rostek and Weretka (2015), Du and Zhu (2015), and
Foucault et al. (2015) build on the models of Kyle (1985), Vayanos (1999), and Vives (2011).
Ro³u (2014) models fast traders as those receiving information about the fundamental value instantly
and slow traders as those receiving the information with a lag. Both categories are speculators. The
comparative statics of price impact are derived as a function of the number of fast and slow traders,
but it is not obvious how they would generalize to changing trading frequency. Moreover, it is not clear
3Foucault et al. (2015), Aït-Sahalia and Saglam (2014), Biais et al. (2015) and Hoﬀmann (2014).
4See Jovanovic and Menkveld (2011), Brogaard (2010), Hasbrouck and Saar (2013), Riordan and Storkenmaier (2012),
Tong (2013), and Hendershott et al. (2011).
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how the market maker's latency would be modelled. Rostek and Weretka (2015) show that for traders,
maximizing welfare and stabilizing liquidity through disclosure of information about fundamentals at
the same time represents a trade-oﬀ. The traders in their model balance the present execution value
against future price impact. In a rational expectations equilibrium, traders split their orders optimally.
The point from which I try to depart in my model is the synchronicity of traders arrivals. Du and Zhu
(2014) depart from the synchronicity of arrivals in the double auction framework. They introduce one
fast trader who is in the market every time step, while the rest of the traders arrives only every certain
number of time steps. This leads to interesting results where the fast trader prefers higher frequency
of trading, whereas the slow traders prefer slower trading. However, because this model falls into the
category of double auction markets, traders do not suﬀer the latency eﬀect per se. Their supplies
change based on their frequency of trading, but not based on the risk they bear due to latency, during
which they cannot change their orders. The present paper models this latency eﬀect directly as a
parameter of the price impact function. The closest to the modelling goal of the current paper is the
paper by Foucault et al. (2015), where the speculator can receive the news about the fundamental
value with a time advantage. This can be considered latency. In the repeated double auction setting
they consider, the authors cannot solve for the equilibrium analytically and resolve to numerical
solutions. This might lead one to conclude that double auction models with latency might be diﬃcult
to solve analytically. The current paper solves for price impact as a function of latency and size analyti-
cally. In order to achieve this, it uses the asynchronous arrivals modelling framework as a starting point.
Departing from the double auctions modelling framework are the asynchronous trading models of
Menkveld and Zoican (2016), Budish et al. (2015), and Chacko et al. (2008).
Using Poisson arrivals, Menkveld and Zoican (2016) model liquidity traders (submitting market
orders), HF Bandits (also submitting market orders), HF market makers (submitting limit orders),
and good or bad news about the fundamental value. The net eﬀect of latency on the spread depends
on the news to liquidity traders ratio. What this model is lacking is the eﬀect of trade size on prices.
Budish et al. (2015) predict that in a limit order market with competing fast traders, the quoted size
will always be one unit. An increasing presence of these fast snipers means that the liquidity provider
can update his order only with diminishing probability in case it becomes mispriced. This results in
a partial equilibrium, where the book contains a single unit limit order on each side of the market.
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However, apart from this prediction, their model does not provide the price impact function as a
function of size, because their equlibrium size is always one, nor as a function of latency. Chacko et al.
(2008) model sell limit orders as writing a perpetual American call option, requiring delivery of the
underlying block of shares upon execution. Similarly, a limit order to buy is like a short position in an
American put option. What is speciﬁc about this model is that the limit orders have to be executed
immediately in order to be able to use option pricing techniques. To ensure immediate execution, the
initiator of a transaction oﬀer (the option writer) must oﬀer a price at which it is currently optimal
for the receiver of the transaction oﬀer (the option owner) to exercise the option early. In eﬀect the
market order is modelled as a limit order, which is submitted at the best opposite quote in order to
ensure immediate execution. This structure does not permit an analysis of the eﬀect of latency on
price impact. What it allows, however, is to consider the impact of size, which is derived from the
market maker having to resell the inventory back to the market. As a result, because the traders arrive
at a frequency which decreases with order size, this directly translates into positive price impact, with
its shape coming from the optimal execution rules for perpetual American options.
The goal of this paper is to obtain a tractable model of price impact as a function of order size and
the market maker's latency. To achieve this goal, I propose a continuous time, asynchronous arrival
model that consists of a risk-neutral monopolist market maker, a risk-averse buyer and seller, and
high-frequency bandits. The buyer and the seller arrive in a stylized fashion according to a Poisson
process and look for immediate trading opportunities. They submit a market order if the utility of
doing so is at least their reservation utility. The reservation utility is the utility of submitting a limit
order and waiting for a counterparty with opposite trading needs. In the general case, the fundamental
value is modelled as a Brownian motion and it is possible to solve for the ask price numerically. I also
provide a closed-form solution for price impact as a function of latency for the special case in which
changes in the fundamental value over very short discrete intervals follow a uniform distribution. The
paper provides novel insights on the role of high-frequency market makers and their contribution to
liquidity and welfare in modern ﬁnancial markets. It introduces a novel modelling framework in the
theoretical microstructure literature providing scope for many surmisable extensions.
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5.3. General Modelling Framework of Price Impact with Latency
This section presents a general framework that allows solving for the equilibrium ask price numerically.
Further assumptions are used in the next section to derive an analytical expression for the ask price
in order to facilitate the comparative statics and welfare analysis.
There is one ﬁnancial asset, whose fundamental value at time t is denoted vt. The fundamental
value's dynamics is represented by a continuous-time stochastic process with zero drift and variance
proportional to the time passed, σ2t, where the parameter σ is the volatility of the fundamental value.
Let's denote the distribution of the increment x := vT − vt as F (x;µ = 0, σ2(T − t)).
There is one buyer, one seller, and N risk-neutral high-frequency traders (HFT) in the market. One of
the HFTs is currently the market maker (HFM), while the remaining N − 1 HFTs are high-frequency
bandits (HFB), who wait for mispriced limit orders and in that case, they snipe them and realize a
proﬁt.5 The buyer and the seller are risk-averse.
The ﬂow of events in the model is the following.6 At time t the market maker submits a quote to sell,
a, which is called the ask price. The ask price is expressed as a deviation from the current fundamental
value vt, so that the overall price the market maker sets for the asset is vt + a. The market maker
suﬀers a latency ∆ and can return and update his ask price only after time ∆ passes.7 Two events
can happen. Either the buyer enters according to a point process with intensity λB at a random time
TB before time ∆ passes, evaluates whether he will demand immediacy and trade on the current ask,
or one of the HFTs arrives after time ∆ passes, in which case the market maker adjusts the ask if he
arrives before one of the HFBs. If an HFB arrives before the market maker, the HFB snipes the ask
if it is mispriced.8
The buyer has a private valuation of piB in addition to the asset's current fundamental value. He
will demand immediacy if his utility of holding the asset minus the ask price he pays is at least his
reservation utility from submitting a limit order and waiting for the seller. If the buyer submits a
5This setting generalizes to a dynamic arrivals setting where buyers and sellers arrive according to the stylized fashion
described in detail below.
6The corresponding ﬂow of events for the closed-form example is summarized in Figure 5.1.
7Latency in a strict sense would mean that an ask set at time t∆ would be valid in the time interval [(t+ 1)∆, (t+ 2)∆)
based on information at time (t − 1)∆. This is because processing information and quote submission are also subject
to latency. For this model, I assume that the impact of latency can be simpliﬁed to the starting speciﬁcation with the
market maker's ask set at time t∆ being valid in interval [(t)∆, (t+ 1)∆) based on the information at time t∆.
8The slow traders arrive in continuous time and the HFTs arrive at discrete points in time, ∆ time units apart from each
other.
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market order, he will disappear from the market and the market maker will post a bid price at which
he is willing to buy back the asset from the arriving seller and eliminate his inventory.
Then the seller arrives9 according to a point process with intensity λS . The same reasoning as for
the buyer applies. The seller decides whether to directly trade with the market maker or to submit a
limit order and wait for the arrival of a new buyer, who will arrive at a random time TB2. The seller
submitting a limit order faces the risk that the fundamental value moves in an adverse direction. In
that case, he might suﬀer a loss. On the other hand, if the fundamental value moves too much in
a favourable direction, the buyer will not trade with the seller's limit order. The seller takes these
possibilities into consideration when setting his ask price.
I assume that the traders trade Q shares at once and there is no uncertainty about this quantity.10
As in Chacko et al. (2008), the arrival rate of traders on the opposite side of the market, in this case
the seller, is assumed to be a decreasing function of the trade's size.
By submitting a limit order to sell at price a, the market maker issues an option to the fundamental
buyer. The fundamental buyer executes on this limit order if vTB − vt − a + a′ ≥ 0, where a′ is the
reservation ask. The reservation ask is the maximum price the buyer is willing to pay to trade the
asset immediately and depends on the reservation value derived from submitting a buy limit order and
waiting for a seller. The reservation ask price depends on future trading opportunities; it is computed
in closed-form for the case of a uniform distribution in the next section. If the slow buyer does not
arrive before time ∆ passes and the market maker's limit order becomes mispriced, meaning that
vt+∆ > vt + a, the remaining N − 1 HFBs will try to snipe it. Each one will be successful with equal
probability 1N . With probability
1
N , the market maker will be successful at cancelling this mispriced
order.11
Were the market maker only facing the slow buyer and no HFBs, his payoﬀ could be decomposed into
a short position in an American call option plus owning a cash-or-nothing digital call option, both
with strike price of a− a′ and the payoﬀ of the cash-or-nothing call option equal to a′. The buyer on
9I assume that buyer and seller arrivals alternate in a deterministic fashion.
10This is a classical assumption in the microstructure literature (Ho and Stoll (1981)), which is relaxed in Budish et al.
(2015) and particularly in the optimal execution literature.
11The corresponding payoﬀ of the market maker in the closed-form example is depicted in Figure 5.2.
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the other hand owns an American call option with the same strike price, a− a′. Formally, the market
maker's payoﬀ is
E[LP (a)] = E[(a− (vTB − vt))1vTB−vt≥a−a′1TB≤∆]. (5.1)
Assuming that the buyer arrives according to a Poisson process with intensity λB, this expectation
can be written as
E[LP (a)] =
∫ ∆
0
λBe
−λBy
∫ ∞
a−a′
(a− x)F (dx; 0, σ2y)dy. (5.2)
In the case with HFBs present in the market, the payoﬀ of the market maker has three parts, one
arising from trading with the slow buyer, the other two from trading with the HFBs. The market
maker trades with the HFBs if the ask price at time t+ ∆ is mispriced (vt+∆ > vt + a), provided that
the slow trader does not arrive before t+∆ or if he does, he decides not to trade with the market maker.
The market maker's payoﬀ from trading with HFBs is thus equivalent to selling N−1N call options with
strike price a. Equation (5.1) generalizes to
E[LP (a)] = E[(a− (vTB − vt))1vTB−vt≥a−a′1TB≤∆]
− N − 1
N
E[(vt+∆ − vt − a)1vt+∆−vt≥a1TB>∆]
− N − 1
N
E[(vt+∆ − vt − a)1vt+∆−vt≥a1TB≤∆1vTB−vt<a−a′ ], (5.3)
and the expectations can be computed as
E[LP (a)] =
∫ ∆
0
λBe
−λBy
∫ ∞
a−a′
(a− x)F (dx; 0, σ2y)dy
− N − 1
N
(∫ ∞
∆
λBe
−λBydy
)∫ ∞
a
(x− a)F (dx; 0, σ2∆)
− N − 1
N
∫ ∆
0
λBe
−λBy
∫ a−a′
−∞
∫ ∞
a−x
(z + x− a)F (dz; 0, σ2(∆− y))F (dx; 0, σ2y)dy, (5.4)
where the ﬁrst line represents the possible proﬁt by trading with the slow trader, the second line the
loss due to the mispriced limit order being sniped by one of the HFBs at the end of the latency period
if the slow buyer only arrives after ∆ time passes, and the third line the case where the slow trader
arrives before ∆ time passes, decides not to trade because vTB − vt < a − a′ and subsequently the
fundamental value rises to vt+∆ − vt > a.12
12The last term might be neglected if the probability
∫∆
0
λBe
−λBy ∫ a−a′
−∞
∫∞
a−x F (dz; 0, σ
2(∆−y))F (dx; 0, σ2y)dy is small
enough.
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The reservation ask a′ is the highest price the buyer is willing to pay to obtain the asset from the
market maker. It is the price that equates the immediately available utility with the expected utility
the buyer could obtain by submitting a buy limit order at price b and waiting for a seller.13 The seller's
private valuation for the asset is −piS , where piS > 0. The payoﬀ structure is depicted in Figure 5.3,
where the buyer's payoﬀ is increasing in the fundamental value increment, but shrinks to zero once
the fundamental value increment exceeds the seller's reservation value.14 The expected payoﬀ from
submitting the limit order is the following
VB,LO(b) = E[u(piB − vTB − b+ vTS )|vTB + b ≥ vTS − piS ]. (5.5)
The reservation ask price is then the price which solves the following equation at time TB
u(piB + vTB − a′) = VB,LO(b). (5.6)
Given the reservation ask price, the market maker then uses Equation (5.1) to set a such that he
fulﬁlls an equilibrium condition. He might either set a in order to maximize his payoﬀ or such that his
expected payoﬀ equals the expected HFB's payoﬀ in case the competition from HFBs prevents proﬁt
maximizing behavior. One can solve for the equilibrium ask price a numerically in the general case.
In the next section, I will solve an example which allows for a closed-form solution.
5.4. Closed-form Example
Generally, it is not possible to solve for the ask price in the above problem in closed-form. This section
provides an example of a closed-form solution that allows investigating the role of latency in the price
impact function.
The fundamental value's dynamics is now represented by a discrete-time stochastic process. As before,
we let ∆ denote the market maker's latency. We assume that the change in the fundamental value
over the short interval ∆ is distributed according to a uniform distribution U(−√3σ√∆,√3σ√∆).15
13The bid price, b, is again expressed as a deviation from the fundamental value at time TB and the overall bid price is
vTB + b. The buyer sets b in order to maximize VB,LO(b).
14We assume that the seller accepts the limit order if his payoﬀ is non-negative. However, he could also optimize and
submit a sell limit order, in which case we assume that the previous buyer exits the game. The number of optimizing
agents is driven by computational considerations and trades oﬀ the precision with computation time.
15Empirically, high-frequency returns are not normally distributed and have heavy tails with large spikes around zero.
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The expected change in the fundamental value is thus zero and the variance of the fundamental value
change is proportional to the latency, σ2∆.
The ﬂow of events is summarized in Figure 5.1. A fundamental buyer arrives according to a
Poisson point process with intensity λ. The probability of n buyers arriving by time ∆ is
P[B(0,∆] = n] = (λ∆)
n
n! e
−λ∆. We assume that the latency is suﬃciently small that two and
more arrivals of fundamental traders are very unlikely during the ∆ interval. The probability that
exactly one fundamental buyer arrives by time ∆ is λ∆ +O(∆2), which comes from applying a Taylor
approximation to the probability of Poisson arrivals. The probability of no buyer arriving by time ∆
is then 1− λ∆ +O(∆2).
In order to be able to obtain a closed-form solution to the market maker's problem, we also suppose
that the fundamental buyer faces the fundamental value at the end of the interval ∆. This means that
if the buyer arrives during (t, t+ ∆], the fundamental value he takes into account is vt+∆.16 When the
buyer arrives, he can execute on the current ask price set by the market maker, a, or submit his own
limit order and wait for the potential fundamental seller. In addition to the fundamental value vt+∆,
the buyer derives a private value piB from holding the asset. Let a′ denote the buyer's reservation ask.
The reservation ask is the maximum price the buyer is willing to pay to trade the asset immediately
and depends on the reservation value derived from submitting a buy limit order and waiting for a
seller. The buyer's decision whether to execute or not based on the current ask price, a, is depicted in
Figure 5.2 and can be summarized as follows
vt+∆ − vt

≥ a− a′ buyer executes,
< a− a′ buyer does not execute.
(5.7)
Market Maker's Problem
Because the stylized limit order book can only hold one ask, only one HFT can become a market maker
(HFM). By contrast with Section 5.3, I assume that the slow buyer is never successful at picking oﬀ
a mispriced ask, so his payoﬀ lies between 0 and a′. If the ask becomes mispriced, it is cancelled by
16Weighting the market maker's payoﬀ by the arrival time leads to ﬁxed point problems from which it is not possible to
back out the ask price as a function of parameters and basic functions in closed form.
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the HFM with probability 1N and picked oﬀ by one of the HFBs with probability
N−1
N . The expected
payoﬀ to the market maker is given by
E[LP (a)] = λ∆
∫ a
a−a′
(a− x) 1
2σ
√
∆
√
3
dx− N − 1
N
∫ σ√∆√3
a
(x− a) 1
2σ
√
∆
√
3
dx (5.8)
= λ∆
a′2
4
√
3
√
∆σ
− N − 1
N
(
a2
4
√
3
√
∆σ
− a
2
+
1
4
√
3
√
∆σ
)
. (5.9)
A HFB has a chance of 1N that he would successfully snipe a mispriced ask. His expected payoﬀ is
given by
E[SP (a)] =
1
N
∫ σ√∆√3
a
(x− a) 1
2σ
√
∆
√
3
dx (5.10)
=
1
N
(
a2
4
√
3
√
∆σ
− a
2
+
1
4
√
3
√
∆σ
)
. (5.11)
As in Menkveld and Zoican (2016), our equilibrium condition states that the expected payoﬀ of the
HFM and HFBs must be equal
E[LP (a)] = E[SP (a)]. (5.12)
By applying this condition and rearranging terms, we obtain the following quadratic equation in a,
which must hold
− a
2
4
√
3
√
∆σ
+
a
2
− 1
4
√
3
√
∆σ + λ∆
a′2
4
√
3
√
∆σ
= 0. (5.13)
This equation has two solutions
a∗1,2 =
√
3
√
∆σ ±
√
λ∆a′. (5.14)
Economically meaningful is the solution which increases in the reservation ask price, a∗ =
√
3
√
∆σ +
a′
√
λ∆. The ﬁrst term in the equilibrium ask price comes from the snipe oﬀ part. It represents the
ask price which equates the expected loss of the market maker with the HFB's expected proﬁt in the
case that the probability of the slow buyer's arrival is zero. The second term represents an adjustment
for the expected proﬁt from trading with the slow buyer.
Proposition 1. Market maker's ask price. Let there be N high-frequency traders in the market.
Given the latency ∆, the buyer's arrival rate λ, and assuming v∆ − v0 ∼ U(−
√
3
√
∆σ,
√
3
√
∆σ), the
equilibrium ask price is
a∗ =
√
3
√
∆σ +
√
λ∆a′. (5.15)
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Proof. Follows from the steps above.
We next solve for the highest reservation price a′ that a buyer is willing to pay.
Buyer's Reservation Value
I assume that both the buyer and the seller are risk averse and have exponential constant absolute
risk-aversion utility functions u(x) = 1− e−αx, where α is the risk-aversion coeﬃcient.
The buyer arrives at time t+ ∆ and observes the fundamental value at that time, vt+∆. He executes if
the value of submitting a market order 1− e−α(piB+vt+∆−vt−a) exceeds than the value of submitting a
limit order, which we compute below. Otherwise, the buyer submits a limit order and waits for a seller,
who arrives according to a Poisson process with intensity λS(Q). The arrival intensity is a decreasing
function of the order size Q, meaning that the buyer would in expectation have to wait longer for
an opposite side trader if his order is larger. Although this paper's ﬁndings do not depend on the
precise functional form, for illustration purposes we use the functional form proposed by Chacko et al.
(2008), where the intensity is inversely related to the quantity traded, λS(Q) = ΛSQ . The parameter ΛS
represents the arrival intensity of unit size order seller. This is equivalent to assuming that the demand
for trading is stationary per unit of time as in Garman (1976). I will use λS and λS(Q) interchangeably.
It is assumed that the mean arrival time of the seller, 1λS , is much larger than the market maker's
latency, ∆. Because the innovations to the fundamental value are uniformly distributed with mean
zero and variance σ2∆, it follows from the central limit theorem for sums that the sum of such
innovations,
∑J
j=1(vt+j∆ − vt+(j−1)∆) is normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ2J∆, for
large values of J . The change in the fundamental value between the buyer's arrival (reset to 0 for
convenience) and the seller's arrival time TS is approximately normally distributed with mean 0 and
variance σ2TS , vTS ∼ N(0, σ2TS). This simpliﬁes the calculations for the buyer's reservation value
and enables closed-form solution for the buyer's reservation ask price.
108
Suppose that the buyer submits a limit order priced at the fundamental value vt.17 It is assumed that
the seller will execute on the buyer's order in case his payoﬀ is not negative. His utility from the trade is
1− e−α(piS−vTs ), where −piS is his private valuation for the asset in addition to its current fundamental
value. It thus follows that the seller executes on the buyer's order in case the fundamental value is
below piS , as this still leaves the seller with a positive trading surplus. The buyer's payoﬀ increases
up until this point and is zero once the fundamental value is larger than piS . The seller's and buyer's
payoﬀs from trading are depicted in Figure 5.3. The seller's decision can be summarized as follows
vTS

≤ piS seller executes,
> piS seller does not execute.
(5.16)
Taking the seller's decision into consideration, the following lemma states the reservation value of the
buyer.
Lemma 5.4.1. Buyer's reservation value. Given the seller's arrival rate λS and private valuation
piS, the buyer's risk-aversion coeﬃcient α and private valuation piB, the fundamental value's volatility
σ and λS >
α2σ2
2 , the buyer's reservation value, VB,LO, is the following:
VB,LO = 1− λSe
−αpiB
λS − α2σ22
(
1 + e−αpiSe−
√
2λSpiS
σ2
[
ασ
2
√
pi
λS
−
√
pi
2
√
piS
])
. (5.17)
Proof. The proof is given in appendix A.
In case the seller's private valuation piS is much larger than the variance σ2TS , the above expression is
approximately equal to
VB,LO ≈ 1− λSe
−αpiB
λS − α2σ22
. (5.18)
In the following, the buyer's reservation utility is transformed to the maximum ask price a′ at which
he is willing to buy the asset from the market maker.
The Buyer's Reservation Ask Price
17vt serves here as a reference point, the analysis and conclusions do not change due to this choice. It is equivalent
to setting the bid, b, in Equation (5.5) to 0. This paper also does not aim at explicitly modelling the limit order
submission decision of the buyer, who is being considered here as a liquidity trader with a binary choice.
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The buyer will be indiﬀerent between trading at the market maker's ask price and submitting a limit
order if his utility of submitting the market order, VB,MO(a′), equals his utility from submitting a limit
order, VB,LO, which we derived above as the buyer's reservation utility. The reservation ask price a′ is
the ask price that equates these two utilities. Using Equation (5.18) and VB,MO(a′) = 1− e−α(piB−a′)
yields
1− λSe
−αpiB
λS − α2σ22
= 1− e−α(piB−a′). (5.19)
Simplifying yields
e−αpiB
(
eαa
′ − λS
λS − α2σ22
)
= 0. (5.20)
Solving this equation for a′ results in the following lemma:
Lemma 5.4.2. Reservation ask price. Given the seller's arrival rate λS, the buyer's risk-aversion
coeﬃcient α and the fundamental value's volatility σ, the highest price at which the buyer is willing to
buy the asset, a′, is:
a′ =
1
α
log
(
λS
λS − α2σ22
)
(5.21)
Proof. The proof follows from the steps above.18
The Market Maker's Ask Price
The last step to compute the market maker's ask price is to insert the expression for the reservation
ask price from lemma 5.4.2 into the general solution for the ask price given in proposition 1. This
yields
Proposition 2. Market maker's ask price with reservation ask. Let there be N high-frequency
traders in the market. Given the latency ∆, the buyer's arrival rate λ, the seller's arrival rate λS and
assuming v∆ − v0 ∼ U(−
√
3
√
∆σ,
√
3
√
∆σ) and that 1λS >> ∆, the equilibrium ask price is
a∗ =
√
3
√
∆σ +
√
λ∆
1
α
log
(
λS
λS − α2σ22
)
. (5.22)
Proof. Follows from the steps above.
In the following section we use this result to investigate the relationship market maker latency and
price impact.
18The log(·) represents the natural logarithm function.
110
5.5. Comparative Statics
This paper's main result is stated in proposition 3. It provides the comparative statics analysis of the
ask price with respect to the model primitives.
Proposition 3. Price impact and latency. Given the market maker's ask price a∗ as stated in
Equation (5.22), the ask price
1. increases in the market maker's latency ∆,
2. decreases in the seller's arrival rate λS,
3. increases in the trade size Q,
4. increases in the asset's volatility σ.
Proof. The proof is outlined below.
Let us ﬁrst analyze the impact of latency ∆, starting from Equation (5.22) by taking derivatives with
respect to ∆:
∂a∗
∂∆
=
∂
∂∆
(√
3
√
∆σ +
√
λ∆
1
α
log
(
λS
λS − α2σ22
))
(5.23)
=
σ
2
√
3
∆
+
1
2
√
λ
∆
1
α
log
(
λS
λS − α2σ22
)
> 0. (5.24)
The ﬁrst term comes from the increased adverse selection the market maker is facing and is positive.
Thus, larger latency leads to higher adverse selection costs, which are compensated by a higher spread.
The second term represents the mark up the market maker is able to charge the buyer on average
due to the buyer's preference for immediacy. That term is also positive as the reservation ask price is
positive.
The impact of the intensity of seller arrivals is determined in a similar fashion:
∂a∗
∂λS
=
∂
∂λS
(√
3
√
∆σ +
√
λ∆
1
α
log
(
λS
λS − α2σ22
))
(5.25)
=
√
λ∆
1
α
λS − α2σ22
λS
λS − α2σ22 − λS
(λS − α2σ22 )2
(5.26)
= −
√
λ∆
1
α
α2σ2
2
λS(λS − α2σ22 )
< 0. (5.27)
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The negative sign conﬁrms the intuition that if the buyer's outside option is more valuable, because
his chance of meeting a seller sooner is higher, he will be less willing to pay a high ask price.
The impact of trade size on the ask price can be obtained by recalling that λS(Q) = ΛSQ and applying
the chain rule,
∂a∗(λS(Q))
∂Q
=
∂a∗
∂λS
∂λS
∂Q
(5.28)
= −
√
λ∆
1
α
α2σ2
2
λS(λS − α2σ22 )
(
−ΛS
Q2
)
(5.29)
=
√
λ∆
1
α
α2σ2
2
λS(λS − α2σ22 )
(
ΛS
Q2
)
> 0. (5.30)
The larger the quantity the buyer wants to trade, the longer he would need to wait for a potential
seller, the lower is the value of his outside option and thus the higher is the price the market maker is
able to charge.
The cross-derivative of the ask price with respect to latency ∆ and the order size Q is given by
∂a∗
∂Q∂∆
=
1
2
√
λ
∆
1
α
α2σ2
2
λS(λS − α2σ22 )
(
ΛS
Q2
)
> 0. (5.31)
The higher is the probability that a buyer with a lower valued outside option will come, the higher
the ask price that the market maker can charge.
The eﬀect of an increase in the volatility of the fundamental value on the ask price is:
∂a∗
∂σ
=
∂
∂σ
(√
3
√
∆σ +
√
λ∆
1
α
log
(
λS
λS − α2σ22
))
(5.32)
=
√
3
√
∆ +
√
λ∆
1
α
λS − α2σ22
λS
λSα
2σ
(λS − α2σ22 )2
(5.33)
=
√
3
√
∆ +
√
λ∆
ασ
λS − α2σ22
> 0. (5.34)
Volatility increases the ask price through two channels. First, a higher volatility leads to higher
adverse selection costs for the market maker. Second, it reduces the value of the risk-averse buyer's
outside option, allowing the market maker to charge a higher ask price.
Illustrative examples are provided in Figure 5.4. This ﬁgure represents the sensitivity of the ask price
a∗ to the latency ∆, order size Q, and volatility σ. The base parameters chosen are σ = 0.2, λ = 1,
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ΛS = 10, and Q = 1. The left panel shows the impact of latency and order size. The middle panel
shows the impact of latency and volatility and the right panel the impact of order size and volatility.
The ask price is increasing in latency and this increase is more prominent, the larger the order size.
The ask price also increases in the volatility of the fundamental value.
5.6. Welfare Analysis
This section analyzes comparative statics of slow traders' and high-frequency traders' expected proﬁts
as well as the probability of trading.
High-frequency Traders' Proﬁt
The proﬁt of the HFM has to be equal in expectation to the proﬁt of the HFBs. HFTs' proﬁt is obtained
by plugging the solution for the ask price from Equation (5.22) into the HFBs' proﬁt Equation (5.10).
The sensitivity of HFBs' proﬁt to the model parameters is given in the following lemma.
Lemma 5.6.1. Equilibrium HFT proﬁts. Let there be N HFTs in the market. Given the seller's
arrival rate λS, the buyer's risk-aversion coeﬃcient α, the market maket's latency ∆ and the funda-
mental value's volatility σ, the HFT's expected proﬁt is
E[SP (a∗)] =
1
N
(√
∆λa′2
4
√
3σ
)
(5.35)
=
1
N

√
∆λ
[
log
(
λS
λS−α2σ22
)]2
4
√
3σα2
 . (5.36)
HFTs' proﬁt
1. decreases in the number of HFTs N ,
2. increases in the buyer's arrival rate λ,
3. decreases in latency ∆,
4. decreases in the seller's arrival rate λS,
5. increases in the asset's volatility σ.
Proof. The proof is outlined below.
The eﬀect of an increase in latency can be directly observed in Equation (5.35), where the increase
in latency leads to an increase in HFT proﬁts in proportion to
√
∆. This is due to the increased
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probability of the arrival of the slow buyer by time ∆; thus, it is more natural to normalize the proﬁt
by time. Doing so yields 1N
(
λa′2
4
√
∆
√
3σ
)
, which is decreasing in ∆. This is because as ∆ rises, the
dispersion of the fundamental value increases, lowering the chance that the fundamental value will lie
in the execution interval [a∗ − a′, a∗].
HFTs' proﬁt increases in the arrival rate of the slow buyer by increasing the chance of a trade in the
next ∆ time interval. Proﬁts decrease in the number of HFTs N , as they are divided by a larger
number of possible liquidity providers. HFTs' proﬁt also decreases in the seller's arrival rate. The
reason is that a higher λS increases the buyer's reservation value:
∂E[SP (a∗)]
∂λS
= − 1
N

√
∆λσ log
(
λS
λS−α2σ22
)
√
3λS(λS − α2σ22 )
 < 0. (5.37)
The impact of volatility on HFTs' proﬁt is positive. The proﬁt increases if
∂E[SP (a∗)]
∂σ
=
1
N

√
∆λ log
(
λS
λS−α2σ2
2
)
2
√
3(λS − α2σ22 )
−
√
∆λ
[
log
(
λS
λS−α2σ2
2
)]2
4
√
3α2σ2
 , (5.38)
which is positive provided that
λS
λS − α2σ22
− 1 > 1
4
log
(
λS
λS − α2σ22
)
. (5.39)
Remembering that λS > α
2σ2
2 and setting y =
λS
λS−α2σ22
> 1, the last inequality is always true, because
the function y − 1− 14 log y is always positive for y > 1.
The eﬀects of latency, order size, and volatility on HFTs' proﬁt are illustrated in Figure 5.5. The left
panel shows that HFTs' proﬁt decreases in latency. The middle panel shows the positive eﬀect of the
volatility and the right panel the positive impact of the order size on proﬁts.
Slow Buyer's Utility and the Probability of Trading
In the following, I compute the expected utility of the slow buyer, VB. This is in general given by the
buyer's utility from submitting a market order in case he executes on the market maker's ask quote
114
and by the utility he derives from submitting a limit order in case (i) the ask price was higher than
his reservation ask, or (ii) the high fundamental value created an arbitrage opportunity for the HFBs
from which the slow buyer cannot proﬁt:
VB = E
[(
1− e−α(piB+v∆−a∗)
)
1a∗−a′≤v∆≤a∗
]
+ VB,LOP[a∗ − a′ > v∆ ∨ v∆ > a∗]. (5.40)
Before computing the buyer's expected utility, it is useful to investigate the drivers of the probability
that the trade will happen, P[a∗ − a′ ≤ v∆ ≤ a∗].
Lemma 5.6.2. Equilibrium Probability of Trading. Given the seller's arrival rate λS, the buyer's
risk-aversion coeﬃcient α and arrival rate λ, latency ∆ and the fundamental value's volatility σ, the
probability that a trade between the buyer and the market maker will happen is
P[a∗ − a′ ≤ v∆ ≤ a∗] = λ∆
∫ a∗
a∗−a′
1
2
√
3
√
∆σ
dx (5.41)
= λ
√
∆
a′
2
√
3σ
(5.42)
=
λ
√
∆ log
(
λS
λS−α2σ22
)
2
√
3σα
. (5.43)
The probability of trading
1. decreases in the seller's arrival rate λS,
2. decreases in latency ∆,
3. increases in the buyer's arrival rate λ,
4. increases in the asset's volatility σ.
Proof. The remainder of the proof is outlined below.
From the calculation above it can be seen that the probability of trading between the market maker
and the buyer does not directly depend on the market maker's ask price a∗. However, it depends on
the reservation ask a′. The higher the seller's arrival rate, the lower the reservation ask price and the
lower therefore the probability of trading with the market maker:
∂P[·]
∂λS
= − ασλ
√
∆
4
√
3λS(λS − α2σ22 )
< 0. (5.44)
Increasing the latency or the buyer's arrival rate increases the chance that the buyer will arrive by
time ∆. On the other hand, increasing latency leads to a higher dispersion of the fundamental value,
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reducing the chance that it will fall in the acceptable trading range [a∗ − a′, a∗], lowering the trading
probability. We are interested in the eﬀect per unit of time. Overall, this will be negative. Indeed,
∂(P[·]/∆)
∂∆
= − a
′
4
√
3∆
3
2σ
< 0. (5.45)
The impact of asset price volatility on the probability of trading is given by
∂P[·]
∂σ
= λ
√
∆
α2σ2
2
λS−α2σ22
− 12 log
(
λS
λS−α2σ22
)
√
3α
. (5.46)
This expression is positive provided that
λS
λS − α2σ22
− 1 > 1
2
log
(
λS
λS − α2σ22
)
(5.47)
Setting y = λS
λS−α2σ22
> 1, this condition is always met, because the function y − 1 − 12 log y is always
positive for y > 1.
The eﬀects of latency, order size, and volatility on the probability of trading are illustrated in Fig-
ure 5.6. The left panel shows that higher latency reduces the probability of trading per unit of time.
The middle panel shows the positive impact of the volatility of the fundamental value and the right
the positive impact of the order size.
We are now in a position to compute the expected utility of the slow buyer. The expected utility
can be divided into two components. The ﬁrst is the payoﬀ obtained from executing on the market
maker's ask price. The second arises from submitting a limit order in case trading with the market
maker is no longer the best option for the buyer.
Proposition 4. Equilibrium Slow Trader's Utility. Given the seller's arrival rate λS, the buyer's
arrival rate λ, his risk-aversion coeﬃcient α and private valuation piB, latency ∆ and the fundamental
value's volatility σ, the slow buyer's expected utility derived from a limit order is
VB,LOP[a∗ − a′ > v∆ ∨ v∆ > a∗] =
(
1− λSe
−αpiB
λS − α2σ22
)
λ∆
1− log
(
λS
λS−α2σ22
)
2
√
3
√
∆σα
 . (5.48)
The limit order payoﬀ
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1. increases in the seller's arrival rate λS if VB,LO is suﬃciently large,
2. increases in the latency ∆,
3. increases in the buyer's arrival rate λ.
The slow buyer's expected utility derived from submitting a market order VB,MO is
E
[(
1− e−α(piB+v∆−a∗)
)
1a∗−a′≤v∆≤a∗
]
= λ
√
∆
log
(
λS
λS−α2σ22
)
+ e−αpiB
(
1− λS
λS−α2σ22
)
2
√
3ασ
. (5.49)
The market order payoﬀ
1. increases in the buyer's arrival rate λ,
2. decreases in the seller's arrival rate λS if VB,LO > 0,
3. decreases in the latency ∆ if eαpiB >
∂a′
∂σ2
a′
σ2
.
The slow buyer's overall payoﬀ VB,LOP[a∗ − a′ > v∆ ∨ v∆ > a∗] + VB,MO
1. increases in the seller's arrival rate λS if 2
√
3σ
√
∆ > a′,
2. increases in the buyer's arrival rate λ,
3. decreases in latency ∆.
Proof. The proof of Equation (5.48) and Equation (5.49) is given in appendix B and the comparative
statics are derived below.
The expected limit order surplus of the slow buyer increases in the arrival rate of the seller as it
increases the value of the limit order and decreases the probability of trading with the market maker
at the same time, provided that the value of the limit order is suﬃciently high. Indeed, one has
∂
∂λS
(
VB,LOP[a∗ − a′ > v∆ ∨ v∆ > a∗]
)
=
∂VB,LO
∂λS︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
P[·]︸︷︷︸
>0
+
∂P[·]
∂λS︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
VB,LO. (5.50)
∂VB,LO
∂λS
equals e−αpiB λS
λS−α2σ22
(
λS
λS−α2σ22
− 1
)
, which is positive since λS − α2σ22 > 0. The trade prob-
ability is decreasing in λS by Equation (5.44), so the no-trade probability P[a∗ − a′ > v∆ ∨ v∆ > a∗]
increases in λS . The term VB,LO may in general take negative values. It will remain positive if
eαpiB > λS
λS−α2σ22
, which holds for a broad range of parameters. Thus the buyer's expected limit order
surplus is typically increasing in λS .
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The expected limit order surplus of the slow buyer, VB,LOP[a∗−a′ > v∆∨v∆ > a∗], increases in latency
∆ as a whole, because the probability of slow buyer's arrival increases. As in the case of the probability
of trading, we are interested in the eﬀects per unit of time. As shown above, because the dispersion
of the fundamental value rises with ∆, the probability per unit of time ∆ that the fundamental value
will fall within the execution range, falls. Thus, the time-normalized eﬀect of an increase in ∆ on
the expected limit order proﬁt of the slow buyer is positive if the outside utility of the slow buyer is
positive, VB,LO > 0. Formally,
∂
∂∆
(
VB,LO
P[a∗ − a′ > v∆ ∨ v∆ > a∗]
∆
)
= log
(
λS
λS − α2σ22
)(
1− λSe
−αpiB
λS − α2σ22
)
λ
4
√
3∆
3
2σα
> 0.
(5.51)
Furthermore, the slow buyer's expected proﬁt increases in λ as trading between the buyer and the
market maker becomes more likely. Formally,
∂
∂λ
(
VB,LO
P[a∗ − a′ > v∆ ∨ v∆ > a∗]
∆
)
=
(
1− λSe
−αpiB
λS − α2σ22
)1− log
(
λS
λS−α2σ22
)
2
√
3
√
∆σα
 > 0. (5.52)
Let us now consider the sensitivity of the market order surplus before analyzing the overall welfare of
the slow buyer. The expected market order surplus of the slow buyer is decreasing in λS if the outside
utility of the slow buyer is positive, VB,LO > 0.
∂
∂λS
E
[(
1− e−α(piB+v∆−a∗)
)
1a∗−a′≤v∆≤a∗
]
=
ασ
√
∆e−αpiB
(
α2σ2eαpiB − 2λS (eαpiB − 1)
)
2
√
3λS (α2σ2 − 2λS)2
(5.53)
This expression is negative provided that
1− e
−αpiBλS
λS − α2σ22
> 0 (5.54)
i.e. if
VB,LO > 0. (5.55)
To analyze the sensitivity of the market order surplus with respect to ∆, we use again the proﬁt per
unit of time by dividing the expression by ∆. One has
∂
∂∆
(
E
[(
1− e−α(piB+v∆−a∗))1a∗−a′≤v∆≤a∗]
∆
)
= −e
−αpiB
(
eαpiB log
(
λS
λS−α
2σ2
2
)
− λS
λS−α
2σ2
2
+1
)
4
√
3α
√
∆3σ
. (5.56)
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This expression is negative provided that
eαpiB >
λS
λS−α2σ22
− 1
log
(
λS
λS−α2σ22
) = ∂a′∂σ2
a′
σ2
. (5.57)
The expected market order surplus of the slow buyer is decreasing in ∆ if eαpiB >
λS
λS−α
2σ2
2
−1
log
(
λS
λS−α
2σ2
2
) . In
words, the expected payoﬀ to a market order will decrease in latency if the private valuation is high
enough compared to the elasticity of the reservation ask price with respect to the variance of the
fundamental value σ2.
Turning now to the impact of the model parameters on the slow buyer's overall welfare VB,LOP[a∗−a′ >
v∆ ∨ v∆ > a∗] + VB,MO, the eﬀect of the seller's arrival rate can be computed as
∂
∂λS
(
VB,LOP[a∗ − a′ > v∆ ∨ v∆ > a∗] + VB,MO
)
=
ασ
√
∆λe−αpiB
(
2
√
3α
√
∆σ − log
(
λS
λS−α2σ22
))
√
3
(
λS − α2σ22
)2 .
(5.58)
This expression is positive if
2
√
3σ
√
∆ > a′. (5.59)
Thus, the buyer's overall utility increases in λS if the reservation ask price is lower than the dispersion
of the fundamental value 2
√
3σ
√
∆ > a′, which can be interpreted as a feasibility condition.
The overall expected payoﬀ of the slow buyer also increases in his arrival rate λ as both his expected
payoﬀ due to market and limit order increase in λ.
Turning now to the eﬀect of latency ∆, we are again interested in welfare per unit of time. One has:
∂
∂∆
(
VB,LOP[a∗ − a′ > v∆ ∨ v∆ > a∗] + VB,MO
∆
)
=
λe−αpiB
(
α2σ2
2 − λS log
(
λS
λS−α2σ22
))
2
√
3
√
∆3ασ
(
λS − α2σ22
) . (5.60)
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This expression is negative if
α2σ2
2
< λSαa
′. (5.61)
The overall expected payoﬀ of the slow buyer decreases in latency if the risk-aversion adjustment is
lower than a term proportional to his reservation ask price α
2σ2
2 < λSαa
′. Inserting the value of a′
yields the condition
λS
λS−α2σ22
− 1
log
(
λS
λS−α2σ22
) < λS
λS − α2σ22
. (5.62)
Setting y = λS
λS−α2σ22
, Condition (5.62) can be written as y − 1− y log y < 0. Because λS − α2σ22 > 0,
y varies between 1 and ∞. At y = 1, the above expression equals zero. Futhermore, the derivative of
the expression is equal to − log y, which is negative for y > 1. Taken together this means that the slow
buyer's overall welfare is decreasing in latency.
The eﬀects of latency, order size, and volatility are illustrated in Figure 5.7. The left panel shows the
negative impact of latency on welfare for diﬀerent order sizes Q. The middle panel shows the impact
of latency and volatility, and the right panel the impact of order size and volatility, where we illustrate
the eﬀect of Equation (5.59) by choosing ΛS = 10 for the top panels and ΛS = 100 for the bottom
panels.
5.7. Conclusion
Are faster markets better for institutional investors? The current paper presents a model considering
the impact of both order size and latency on the price impact of trades. A model is proposed, which
is solved analytically and is novel in the theoretical microstructure literature. Larger latency increases
adverse selection costs to the market maker and reduces his probability of trading with a slow investor.
A larger order size decreases the slow trader's outside option, making him susceptible to accept a worse
price for his trade. It is shown that the ﬁrst order eﬀect of increased latency and increased order size is
to increase price impact. Their joint impact is also positive. When the probability of trading is taken
into consideration, the utility of the slow institutional investor decreases with latency. Furthermore,
this model is surmisable to possible extensions. Natural extensions of this work include taking the
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order size as an endogenous variable in a dynamic model, creating scope for trading inﬂuencing prices
every round and the market maker learning from such price changes. It would also be interesting to
observe how such a model could be extended to include the market maker's inventory management or
competition among diﬀerent high-frequency traders that are possibly subject to diﬀerent latencies.
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Market maker submits
ask a∗ valid for the next
interval of length ∆.
Fundamental value
vt+∆ is realized.
vt+∆ > a
∗
Buyer arrives with
probability λ∆
and computes
reservation ask a′.
Market
maker
cancels?
1
N chance.
vt+∆ >
a∗ − a′
Buyer submits
a limit order
with expected
payoﬀ VB,LO.
Market maker's
payoﬀ is zero.
Buyer submits
a market order
and his payoﬀ is
vt+∆ + piB − a∗.
Market maker's
payoﬀ is a∗ − vt+∆.
Market maker's
payoﬀ is zero.
Market maker's
payoﬀ is a∗ − vt+∆.
no
yes
no
yes
yesno
Figure 5.1: Flow of events.
This ﬁgure shows the ﬂow of events. For simplicity, the time t fundamental value is normalized to zero,
vt = 0.
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Payoﬀ
vt+∆
(a− a′)
Market Maker's Limit Order Payoﬀ
Slope is -N−1N
a′
Slope is -1
a
Buyer's Market Order Payoﬀ
vt+∆
Figure 5.2: Market maker's and buyer's payoﬀ structure as a function of the fundamental value vt+∆.
This ﬁgure shows market maker's and buyer's payoﬀ structure as a function of the fundamental value
vt+∆. There are N high-frequency traders in the market. Market maker submits ask at price a and the
maximum price at which the buyer is willing to buy is the reservation ask, a′.
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Payoﬀ
(0, 0)
vTS − vt
piB
piS
piS
Seller's Market Order Payoﬀ
Buyer's Limit Order Payoﬀ
vTS − vt
Figure 5.3: Buyer's and seller's payoﬀ structure as a function of the change in the fundamental value vTS − vt.
This ﬁgure shows buyer's and seller's payoﬀ structure as a function of the change in the fundamental
value vTS − vt. The buyer submits a bid at price vt and the minimum price at which the seller is willing
to sell is his private valuation piS .
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Figure 5.4: Market maker's ask price as a function of latency ∆ and order size Q.
This ﬁgure illustrates the sensitivity of the ask price a∗ to the latency ∆, order size Q, and volatility σ.
The base parameters chosen are σ = 0.2, λ = 1, ΛS = 10, and Q = 1. The left panel shows the impact of
latency and order size. The middle panel shows the impact of latency and volatility, and the right panel
the impact of order size and volatility.
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Figure 5.5: Expected proﬁt of the market maker as a function of latency ∆ and order size Q.
This ﬁgure illustrates the sensitivity of the market maker's proﬁt to the latency ∆, order size Q, and
volatility σ. The base parameters chosen are σ = 0.2, ΛS = 10, and Q = 1. The left panel shows the
impact of latency and order size. The middle panel shows the impact of latency and volatility, and the
right panel the impact of order size and volatility.
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Figure 5.6: Probability of trade between market maker and buyer as a function of latency ∆ and order size Q.
This ﬁgure illustrates the sensitivity of the probability of trading to the latency ∆, order size Q, and
volatility σ. The base parameters chosen are σ = 0.2, ΛS = 10, Q = 1, and λ = 1. The left panel shows
the impact of latency and order size. The middle panel shows the impact of latency and volatility, and
the right panel the impact of order size and volatility.
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Figure 5.7: Expected proﬁt of the slow buyer as a function of latency ∆ and order size Q.
This ﬁgure illustrates the sensitivity of the slow buyer's proﬁt to latency ∆, order size Q, and volatility
σ. The base parameters chosen are σ = 0.2, ΛS = 10, and Q = 1. The left panel shows the impact of
latency and order size. The middle panel shows the impact of latency and volatility, and the right panel
the impact of order size and volatility. The top three panels are computed with ΛS = 10, and the bottom
three panels with ΛS = 100.
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Part III
Appendices
Chapter 6
Formal Description of the Model in Chap-
ter 3
This Appendix provides a detailed formal description of the model. Our description follows that
provided in Goettler et al. (2009).
Structure of the Trading Game
We deﬁne an action a trader takes as a = (p, q, x), where p is the price at which she submits an order,
q ≥ 0 the priority of her order and x is +1 or −1 when the order is buy or sell and 0 if there is no order.
The priority of an order is determined by p, x and the current book L. q decreases with increasing
priority in the queue. If the order is a market order, the priority is 0. The priority of a limit order is
the new order's position in the queue. Formally:
q(p, x) =

0 if x = 0 or
x = 1, p ≥ A(L) or
x = −1, p ≤ B(L),
|lp + x| otherwise.
A trader reentering the market at time t who does not have a pending order in the book faces the same
problem as a new trader. A trader having an order in the book additionally has the option of leaving
the order unchanged, potentially taking advantage of an improvement in the priority of the order. The
optimal action the trader chooses depends on the state in which the trader enters the market.
Let s(θ) be the state observed on a particular entry to the market by a trader of type θ. The state
s(·) includes:
1. the history of the game and its elements as described above, the changes of the fundamental
value until time t −∆ if h = 0 or until time t if h = 1, where ∆ is the lag (if any) with which
slow traders observe the fundamental value. The state further contains the limit order book and
the status of the previous action a = (p, q, x) if the trader previously submitted a limit order,
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where p is the price at which the order was submitted, q the current priority at price p and x an
indicator of a buy (+1) or sell (−1) order or no order (0). If the trader is entering for the ﬁrst
time, x is set to zero;
2. a variable z ∈ {0, 1} used in the Bellman equation to set the agent's future payoﬀ to zero once
she trades. The variable z can also be viewed as the trader's budget or the number of shares she
has available to trade. In our model, traders enter the market with z = 1.
For our numerical implementation, we have to limit the possibly inﬁnite state space. First, because
the fundamental value follows a random walk, it can take unbounded values. For this reason, we only
track all prices and quotes relative to the fundamental value. We further collapse the characterization
of market conditions into (i) the fundamental value vt for h = 1 and vt−∆ if h = 0; (ii) the price of the
last transaction pt and whether the transaction was buyer- or seller-initiated bt = −1 or bt = 1; and
(iii) the limit order book, which is represented by bid and ask prices Bt, At, bid and ask sizes lBt , l
A
t ,
cumulative depths at buy and sell Dbt =
∑N
i=0 (l
i
t > 0), D
s
t =
∑N
i=0 (l
i
t < 0). We investigated models
with broader market characteristics and found that while convergence occurs more slowly, the results
remain practically unchanged.
Traders can choose an action from a feasible action set. In order not to hamper computational tractabil-
ity, we restrict the number of ticks where traders can place limit orders to k. We choose k such that it
does not inﬂuence equilibrium strategies. Denote the expectation of the fundamental value given the
state s as vˆ(s) = E(v|s). The feasible action set is then formally deﬁned as
A(s) = {(p, q, x) | (i)x ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, (ii) q = qˆ(p, x), (iii) if q 6= 0⇒ p ∈ [vˆ(s)− k, vˆ(s) + k] ∩ P}.
A mixed strategy for a trader of type θ is σθ : Sθ −→
∏
s∈Sθ ∆(A(s)), where Sθ is the set of feasible
states that a trader of type θ may encounter and ∆(A(s)) represents possible probability distributions
over A(s).
Every action leads to an expected payoﬀ which is composed of two parts. The ﬁrst is the payoﬀ from
execution prior to reentry and the second the continuation value if the trader reenters prior to the
execution of her order. We consider symmetric equilibria and denote by σ = {σθ}θ∈Θ the strategies
adopted by every other player. Let φ(τ, v; s, a˜, σ) be the probability that an action a˜ = (p˜, q˜, x˜) taken at
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time s leads to an execution at time τ when the fundamental value is v and all other players' strategies
are σ. We further let f(v|s, t) denote the density function of the fundamental value at time t given
state s. Suppose the trader reenters the market at time w > 0. Her expected payoﬀ due to execution
prior to reentry is
pi(s, a˜, w, σ) =
∫ w
0
∫ ∞
−∞
e−ρtx˜(α+ vt − p˜)φ(·)f(v|s, t)dvdt,
where the inner integral is over the possible values of the fundamental value and the outer integral is
over the possible times at which execution can occur. Inside the integral is the instantaneous payoﬀ
discounted back to the time at which the order was submitted.
The agent chooses her action such that it maximizes her expected payoﬀ (the sum of the payoﬀ due to
execution prior to reentry and the continuation value). The reentry time is distributed randomly and
exogenously according to G(·). The state s′ in which the trader reenters has probability of occurring
v(s′|s, a˜, w, σ). We denote the trader's value function in state s by J(s). The trader's optimization
problem can be written as a dynamic programming problem, where the Bellman equation is
J(s, σ) = max
a˜∈A(s)
∫ ∞
0
(
pi(s, a˜, w, σ) + e−ρt
∫
s′∈Sθ
J(s′, σ)v(s′|s, a˜, w, σ)ds′
)
dG(w).
Since the trader always faces a maximization problem over a well-deﬁned and ﬁnite action set, the
maximum over all feasible actions exists.
Fixing the strategies of all other traders, a pure strategy y∗θ for a trader of type θ is a best response if
and only if for every s ∈ Sθ
y∗θ(s) = arg max
a˜∈A(s)
∫ ∞
0
(
pi(s, a˜, w, σ) + e−ρt
∫
s′∈Sθ
J(s′, σ)v(s′|s, a˜, w, σ)ds′
)
dG(w).
A collection of strategies y∗ = {y∗θ}θ∈Θ is a Markov perfect equilibrium if and only if for each pair
θ ∈ Θ, y∗θ is a best response in every feasible state s ∈ Sθ.
Beliefs and Q-Learning
Equilibrium is obtained by ﬁnding common beliefs Q(a|s), where s is the current state and a = a(s)
an attainable action at this state. This is done by simulating the market and updating beliefs until
they converge. In ﬁnding the ﬁxed-point of this game, since an analytic solution is not tractable, we
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turn to the stochastic algorithm of Pakes and McGuire (2001) implemented for a similar kind of games
in Goettler et al. (2005, 2009).
One way to obtain beliefs would be to update them by integrating over all possible sequences of future
outcomes that lead to a transaction being executed. By contrast, the algorithm of Pakes and McGuire
(2001) tracks each share in the book until it executes in the market simulation. Upon execution, we
update the belief Q(a|s) at the state from which the order was submitted by averaging this outcome
with the previous outcomes for shares submitted at this state discounted back by the time it took the
share to execute. We use an online implementation of this reinforcement or Q-learning algorithm and
update the Q(a|s) with the new Q(a′|s′) from the new state s′ where the trader's action was a′, not
just relying on the ﬁnal executions, but incorporating the new belief as soon as a trader reenters and
chooses a new action. Figure 3.8 provides a diagrammatic representation of this procedure.
Not every possible state is visited during the simulation, thus it focuses only on the recurrent subset
of the state space.1 The advantage of this approach is that updates are computed only for the states
actually visited, thus lowering the memory and computation time requirements. The disadvantage is
that not all relevant states might have been visited during the simulation. To prevent the algorithm
from falling into local equilibria which do not satisfy the perfection condition, a couple of state space
exploration techniques are implemented, namely: (i) optimistic initial beliefs  when beliefs of the ﬁrst
explored state-action get corrected, the other un-explored state still possesses higher optimistic initial
beliefs and is thus likely to be explored, (ii) trembles  in the learning phase, traders choose suboptimal
actions with a small probability, and (iii) resetting the learning speed from time to time in order to
speed up learning in diﬀerent phases of the simulation.
The simulation has two main phases: (i) the learning phase, where the beliefs are updating and the
exploration of the state space is promoted, and (ii) the simulation of the equilibrium, during which the
beliefs are ﬁxed and the exploration is not artiﬁcially promoted. The algorithm switches between phase
(i) and phase (ii) depending on the convergence of the beliefs. The convergence during the ﬁrst phase
is called convergence of the ﬁrst type or learning convergence and if beliefs are found to have converged
in the ﬁrst phase, the second phase with ﬁxed beliefs starts. Convergence of the beliefs in the second
phase is called second type convergence or equilibrium convergence. If second type convergence is not
1A recurrent subset of states has the following properties: (i) regardless of the initial state, the system eventually enters
the recurrent class, (ii) once entered, the probability of each state outside the recurrent class is zero, and (iii) each state
in the recurrent class is visited inﬁnitely often as t approaches inﬁnity.
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satisﬁed, the algorithm returns to the learning phase. When second type convergence is satisﬁed, we
claim that the ﬁxed point was obtained and the data collected during the simulation phase represent
equilibrium values.
Formally, at each time t in each state s encountered in the simulation, each action a˜ has an associated
payoﬀ Qt(a˜|s). This real number represents the current belief of an agent about the payoﬀ from this
action at this state.2 The beliefs at each time t imply an optimal strategy yt, which assigns the
payoﬀ maximizing action at each state, a∗(s) ∈ arg maxa˜∈A(s)Qt(a˜|s). The value of state s then is
J(s, yt) = Qt(a
∗(s)|s).
The value for a newly encountered state is called an initial belief Q0(a˜|s) and is determined in the
following way. Consider a buy limit order. The initial belief is determined by the payoﬀ α + vˆ − p
discounted by the expected time until the arrival of a new trader for whom being a counterparty
yields a non-negative payoﬀ. Here, vˆ(s) = E(v|s) is the expectation of the current fundamental value
given the trader's type. If the trader is a HFT, she knows the current fundamental value vt. For
the uninformed slow trader, we have to compute the initial expectation of the fundamental value. Let
δ(s(θ)) = E(v|s)−vt−∆. We update this expected diﬀerence between the expected current fundamental
value and the lagged fundamental value using the following updating rule:
δr+1(s(θ)) =
r
r + 1
δr(s(θ)) +
1
r + 1
(vt − vt−∆).
Thus, for an uninformed trader, the estimate of the current fundamental value is given by vˆ(s(θ)) =
vt−∆ + δr(s(θ)). The initial belief for market orders is straightforward. The initial belief of not
submitting any order is determined as the average of all non-negative beliefs the trader has available
at the current state discounted by the expected return time of the particular trader.
If the previous state was s and the state s′ is hit, the continuation value J(s′|yt′) is deﬁned as in
Figure 3.8 based on the action a′ taken in the new state s′:
1. Market order : payoﬀ from the market order.
2. Limit order : expected value of the limit order represented by the action a′, Q(a′|s′).
3. No order : expected value of taking no action a′, Q(a′|s′).
2Q-learning was ﬁrst described as a model for animals' learning in Watkins (1989) and more details and the underlying
theory can be found in Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis (1996).
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Put together, the Q-factors are updated in the following fashion, where J(s′|yt′) represents the payoﬀ
to the action taken at state s′ and time t′.
Qt′(a
∗|s) = n
n+ 1
Qt(a
∗|s) + 1
n+ 1
e−ρ(t
′−t)J(s′|yt′)
Here, n(a˜∗, s) is a positive integer that is incremented each time a˜∗ is chosen in state s. Periodically
during the simulation, we restart n to some small initial value of n0 for some action and state pairs to
obtain quicker convergence.
Similarly, if the previously submitted limit order is executed, the expected payoﬀ at the previous state
is updated by x˜(α+ vt′ − a˜∗), where t′ is the current time.
A formal proof of convergence to the optimal Q-factors with probability 1 is provided in Section 5.6
of Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis (1996).
Convergence Criteria
We simulate a couple of billion events during which we continuously decrease the artiﬁcial exploration
of the state space by decreasing the trembling probability in order to achieve a soft landing to the
equilibrium values of the Q-factors.3 We use the same convergence criteria as Goettler et al. (2009).
After an initial exploration of the state space, we perform the following computations every 300 million
events:
1. If
|Qk2t2 (a˜|s)−Q
k1
t1
(a˜|s)|
k2−k1 is small (less than 0.01), then
2. ﬁx beliefs Q(·) and simulate 300 million events,
3. compare ﬁxed beliefs to (a) one step ahead J˜1 and (b) realized J˜ empirical payoﬀs. If
 the correlation between J∗ and both J˜1 and J˜ exceeds 0.99, and
 the mean absolute error in beliefs over n is less than 0.01,
convergence is achieved.
3Increasing the trembling probability involves a tradeoﬀ. The beneﬁt is that it allows a faster exploration of the state
space. The cost is that it also impacts the strategies of traders that do not tremble by making them consider a certain
fraction of erroneous orders to be part of general market conditions.
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Step (1) corresponds to the learning convergence criterion described above and step (3) corresponds
to the equilibrium convergence criteria. If (1) is not satisﬁed, learning continues, and if (3) is not
satisﬁed, the algorithm returns to the learning phase. Here, k1 is the number of times that action a˜
has been chosen in state s at the start of the current 300 million events, and k2 the number of times
it has been chosen at the end of the current 300 million new events. Further, t1 and t2 represent the
corresponding times.
The one step ahead and realized empirical payoﬀs required for these convergence computations are
determined as follows. Note that eventually every trader in this model executes and leaves the market.
At the time she executes, she obtains a realized payoﬀ, computed as follows. Suppose the trader enters
at t and executes at t′ . If a˜ was her most recent action before execution, her realized payoﬀ is then
J˜(s, y∗) = e−ρ(t′−t)x˜(α+vt′−p˜). The one step ahead payoﬀ is based on the trader's next entry time or
execution time, whichever is sooner. Suppose a trader takes an action a˜ at time t, and reenters at t′ > t
with a new state s′. Her one-step ahead empirical payoﬀ is J˜1(s, y∗) = e−ρ(t
′−t)J∗(s′, y∗). If the trader's
order executes prior to reentry, her one-step ahead empirical payoﬀ is J˜1(s, y∗) = e−ρ(t
′−t)x˜(α+vt′− p˜).
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Chapter 7
Proofs of Statements in Chapter 5
Appendix A. Price Impact as a Function of Latency
The following proves lemma 5.4.1 by computing the buyer's reservation utility.
Proof. The buyer's payoﬀ is depicted in Figure 5.3. The fundamental value, vTS , is normally distributed
with mean zero and variance σ2TS . The seller, who comes at time TS will only execute if vTS ≤
piS . Put altogether, the buyer's utility from submitting a limit order is given by the expectation of
the exponential of a truncated normal variable weighted by the random arrival time TS , which is
exponentially distributed with intensity λS per unit of time. Formally, it is given by the following
double integral
VB,LO = 1−
∫ ∞
0
λSe
−λSy
∫ piS
−∞
e−α(piB+x)√
2piσ2y
e
− 1
2
x2
σ2y dxdy (7.1)
= 1− λSe−αpiB
∫ ∞
0
e−λSy+
α2σ2
2
y
∫ piS
−∞
1√
2piσ2y
e
− 1
2
(x+ασ2y)2
σ2y dxdy (7.2)
= 1− λSe−αpiB
∫ ∞
0
e−λSy+
α2σ2
2
yΦ(
piS + ασ
2y
σ
√
y
)dy, (7.3)
where Φ(·) represents the normal CDF. The second equation was obtained by expanding the x2 by
ασ2y. The third equality was obtained by the change of variables z = x + ασ2y. Let's focus on the
integral term, which we denote I and solve by parts.
I :=
∫ ∞
0
e−λSy+
α2σ2
2
yΦ(
piS + ασ
2y
σ
√
y
)dy (7.4)
= − 1
λS − α2σ22
[
e−y(λS−
α2σ2
2
)Φ(
piS + ασ
2y
σ
√
y
)
]∞
0
− (−1)1
λS − α2σ22
∫ ∞
0
e−λSy+
α2σ2
2
y ∂
∂y
Φ(
piS + ασ
2y
σ
√
y
)dy
(7.5)
=
1
λS − α2σ22
+
1
λS − α2σ22
∫ ∞
0
e
−y(λS−α
2σ2
2
)− 1
2
(
piS+ασ
2y
σ
√
y
)2
(
ασ
2
√
y
− piS
2
√
y3σ
)
dy (7.6)
=
1
λS − α2σ22
(
1 + e−αpiS
∫ ∞
0
e
−yλS− piS2σ2y
(
ασ
2
√
y
− piS
2
√
y3σ
)
dy
)
. (7.7)
Here, the second equality comes from solving the I integral by parts. Computing the limits of the left
term and the partial derivative for the right term yields the third equality. The fourth results from
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collecting terms. Let us again compute the integral part separately.
J :=
∫ ∞
0
e
−yλS− piS2σ2y
(
ασ
2
√
y
− piS
2
√
y3σ
)
dy (7.8)
=
∫ ∞
0
e
−yλS− piS2σ2y
(
ασ
2
√
y
)
dy −
∫ ∞
0
e
−yλS− piS2σ2y
(
piS
2
√
y3σ
)
dy (7.9)
=
(ασ
2
)∫ ∞
0
1√
y
e
− 1
2
(2λSy+
piS
σ2y
)dy −
(piS
2σ
)∫ ∞
0
1√
y3
e
− 1
2
(λSy+
piS
σ2y
)dy (7.10)
= J1 − J2. (7.11)
The above separation is useful, because the two integrals are special Bessel functions found in Lebedev
(1972) Sects. 8.432 6 p. 959, and 8.469 3 p. 967:∫ ∞
0
1√
t
e−
δ
2
(t+ 1
t
)dt = 2
√
pi
2δ
e−δ, (7.12)∫ ∞
0
1√
t3
e−
1
2
(βt+ γ
t
)dt =
√
2pi
γ
e−
√
βγ , (7.13)
(7.14)
where β = 2λS , γ = piSσ2 and δ =
√
βγ. Hence,
J1 =
ασ
2
√
pi
λS
e
√
−2λS piSσ2 , (7.15)
J2 =
√
pi
2
√
piSe
−
√
2λS
piS
σ2 . (7.16)
Inserting J = J1 − J2 back into the integral I := 1
λS−α2σ22
(1 + e−αpiSJ) and I back into the utility of
submitting a limit order, VB,LO = 1− λSe−αpiBI yields the following
VB,LO = 1− λSe
−αpiB
λS − α2σ22
(
1 + e−αpiSe−
√
2λSpiS
σ2
[
ασ
2
√
pi
λS
−
√
pi
2
√
piS
])
, (7.17)
which concludes the proof of the buyer's reservation utility from submitting a limit order and waiting
for a seller.
Appendix B. Welfare Analysis of Market Maker's Latency
Proof. The following proves the expected utility of the slow buyer from a market order, Equation (5.49):
E
[
1− e−α(piB+v∆−a∗)|a∗ − a′ ≤ v∆ ≤ a∗
]
= λ∆
∫ a∗
a∗−a′
1− e−α(−a∗+piB+x)
2
√
3∆σ
dx (7.18)
= λ∆
e
−αpiB
(
αa′eαpiB−eαa′+1
)
2
√
3α
√
∆σ
(7.19)
= λ
√
∆
log
(
λS
λS−α2σ22
)
+ e−αpiB
(
1− λS
λS−α2σ22
)
2
√
3ασ
. (7.20)
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The ﬁrst and second equalities follow directly from computing the expectation. The third equality is
obtained by plugging in the value for the reservation ask price a′ from lemma 5.4.2.
Proof. The following proves the expected utility of the slow buyer from a limit order, Equation (5.48).
Let us ﬁrst compute the probability of not executing upon slow buyer's arrival:
P[a∗ − a′ > v∆ ∨ v∆ > a∗] = λ∆
(∫ a∗−a′
−√3∆σ
1
2
√
3∆σ
dx+
∫ √3∆σ
a
1
2
√
3∆σ
dx
)
(7.21)
= λ∆
(
1− a
′
2
√
3
√
∆σ
)
(7.22)
= λ∆
1− log
(
λS
λS−α2σ22
)
2
√
3α
√
∆σ
 . (7.23)
The ﬁrst and second equalities follow directly from computing the probability. The third equality is
obtained by plugging in the value for the reservation ask price a′ from lemma 5.4.2.
Multiplying this probability by the expected payoﬀ from a limit order VB,LO given in lemma 5.4.1
yields
VB,LOP[a∗ − a′ > v∆ ∨ v∆ > a∗] = λ∆
1− log
(
λS
λS−α2σ22
)
2
√
3α
√
∆σ

(
1− λSe
−αpiB
λS − α2σ22
)
. (7.24)
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